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Emma Louise Wise 
Metagenomic identification and characterisation of emerging and re-emerging viruses 
causing disease in febrile patients. 
Emerging infectious diseases (EID) significantly impact public health and have the 
potential to cause pandemics. Outbreaks of EID have increased in recent decades, with 
RNA viruses responsible for a substantial proportion of them. Outbreaks are more likely 
to occur in areas with high biodiversity, poor sanitation and public health infrastructure, 
and limited resources for EID control. Furthermore, clinical symptoms of many viral 
infections overlap, making them challenging to diagnose correctly.  
Metagenomic sequencing (metagenomics) negates the need for targeted detection 
assays, generates virus genome information and can detect novel or genetically 
divergent viruses. Through combining targeted PCR-based assays with untargeted 
metagenomics, this project aimed to detect infections in two cohorts of patients with 
fever from low-and-middle income countries (Sierra Leone and Ecuador), characterise 
any viruses identified and pursue further knowledge relevant to EID.  
Plasmodium, Leptospira and Ebola virus (EBOV) infections were detected in Sierra 
Leonean patient samples using PCR-based assays. Human immunodeficiency virus, GB 
virus C (human pegivirus) and hepatitis B virus were identified in 36 PCR-negative Sierra 
Leonean patient samples using metagenomics. The detection of EBOV was surprising 
because the patients tested negative for EBOV RNA using a qRT-PCR assay at the time 




This project detected and isolated Oropouche virus (OROV), an emerging arbovirus, 
from a patient from Ecuador for the first time. Metagenomics revealed that the 
Ecuadorian strain was divergent from other strains at an established diagnostic qRT-PCR 
binding site. This information allowed the optimisation of a qRT-PCR assay, which 
subsequently identified further OROV infections within the patient cohort. Adoption of 
this assay in relevant countries could enhance OROV surveillance and diagnosis. This 
demonstrates the value of using metagenomics alongside PCR-based assays in screening 
studies to ensure diagnostic assays can detect current strains. In addition to OROV, 
Dengue virus, Hepatitis A virus, Zika virus, and Leptospira were identified in Ecuadorian 
patient samples. 
Phylogenetic analyses of OROV sequences suggested that an OROV outbreak occurred 
in Esmeraldas, Ecuador in 2016. OROV vector Culicoides paraensis is not present in this 
area, raising the question of alternative insect vectors. Experiments demonstrated that 
OROV replicates in Aedes spp. cell lines. These species are important mosquito vectors 
of other arboviral diseases and this finding warrants further investigation. Further 
experimental work identified human fibroblasts and hepatocytes as potentially relevant 
to OROV pathogenesis in humans.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
In recent decades, improved living conditions and advances in medicine and technology 
have reduced the burden of infectious disease at a global level (1,2). Despite this, 
morbidity and mortality caused by infectious disease remains a significant problem, 
particularly in low-or-middle-income countries in which resources are limited and 
healthcare systems are often under-funded and overstretched (3). Compounding this is 
the disease burden that occurs during outbreaks of emerging or re-emerging infectious 
disease (EID). The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines EID as “one that either has 
appeared and affected a population for the first time, or has existed previously but is 
rapidly spreading, either in terms of the number of people getting infected, or to new 
geographical areas” (4). Outbreaks of EID have a major immediate impact on public 
health in affected countries, place substantial pressure on healthcare systems during an 
outbreak and have wider implications in the form of pandemic potential.  
An analysis of EID origin events (5) revealed that the number of events increased decade 
on decade from the 1940’s to the 2000’s (corrected for reporting bias), suggesting that 
the threat to global public health from EID is increasing over time (Figure 1.1). A 
systematic review identified nearly 1,400 species of human pathogen in the literature, 
of which 87 were first reported in humans after 1980, of which 58 were viruses. Of these 








Figure 1.1 A map of the geographic origins of EID events (1940 – 2004) caused by all 
pathogen types. Circles represent one-degree grid cells and the area of the circle is 
proportional to the number of events in the cell. This figure is reproduced from Jones et 
al. (2008) (5).  
 
The over-representation of viruses, particularly RNA viruses, in the pool of emerging 
pathogens is often explained in terms of the genetic plasticity afforded to them by their 
genomes. All viruses are obligate intracellular parasites and must create an environment 
in the host cell that enables replication of the viral genome and proteins, effective 
packaging of new virions and virion release from the cell. Viruses with deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) genomes may use a host or viral polymerase for genome replication, RNA 
viruses always encode an RNA-dependant RNA polymerase for this purpose since these 
enzymes do not exist in the host (7). RNA-dependant polymerases have low fidelity, 
resulting in many more mutations per replication cycle compared to DNA-dependant 




average rate of RNA virus genome nucleotide substitution is estimated to be 1.0e-2 to 
1.0e-5 nucleotide substitutions per site/year (9,10). A single infected cell can produce 
thousands of virions from one cycle of replication (11), meaning that the population of 
viruses within a host is genetically diverse. In addition to high mutation rates, RNA virus 
replication cycles occur within a matter of hours, meaning mutations are accumulated 
over short periods of time, making them easy to observe and measure (12). 
Furthermore, in viruses with segmented genomes, genetic diversity is increased by 
reassortment; the process of genome segment exchange that can occur when two 
viruses infect the same cell. This viral population diversity confers the ability to adapt 
when selection pressures are present because of the presence of many genetic variants. 
This means that a minor variant in the population may survive and expand as a result of 
pressures such as immune response, drug treatment, or a change in host species.  
 
1.1.1  ZOONOSES AND PATHOGEN EMERGENCE 
Of all pathogens known to infect humans, only an estimated 50-100 are specific to 
humans (6), the remaining vast majority are zoonotic. The WHO defines a zoonosis as 
“any disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from vertebrate animals to 
humans” (13). A spillover is a transmission event that occurs when a pathogen 
previously restricted to animals infects a human. Zoonotic transmission ranges from 
pathogens that are primarily animal infections but occasionally spill over into humans 
(e.g. rabies virus), to those that are largely human pathogens but are also capable of 
infecting animals (e.g. rubella virus) (6). The latter are sometimes referred to as ‘reverse 




A chain of events must happen for a zoonotic pathogen to emerge and become 
established in the human population. Gardy and Loman (2018) (14) outline three phases 
of disease emergence (Figure 1.2): Pre-emergence, in which the pathogen population 
expands, possibly into a new geographic region and/or a new host, usually as a result of 
changing land use or demographics. Localised emergence may follow, in which spillover 
to humans occurs, resulting from human contact with infected animals or their bodily 
fluids, but this does not result in person-to-person transmission. Finally, in pandemic 
emergence, the pathogen infects multiple humans in sustained chains of transmission, 



















Figure 1.2 Emergence of a zoonotic pathogen from an animal reservoir into the human 





1.1.2  DRIVERS OF EMERGENCE  
EID events tend to occur in hot spots that are defined by environmental, ecological and 
socioeconomic characteristics (5). A landmark report published by the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) in 2003 proposed the ‘convergence model’ that explained the 
interactions of genetic, biological, environmental, ecological, social, political and 
economic factors associated with human infection with a new pathogen (Figure 1.3). 
The 2003 report built on previous work to identify thirteen key drivers of disease 
emergence (16). A common theme was change: change in climate and weather, 
changing ecosystems, economic development and land use, international travel and 
commerce, changing human demographics and behaviour (17). The commonality in 
these factors is an increase in the number of opportunities for humans and pathogens 
to interact, as well as an increased number of interactions between humans. This leads 
to a higher chance of spillover events occurring which are subsequently passed from 
person-to-person. Jones et al. (2008) identified areas at high risk of spillover as those 
with a high diversity of wildlife species in which recent changes in demographic or 
farming have occurred (5). This was corroborated by a biogeographic analysis showing 
that mammalian biodiversity was the strongest predictor of disease co-occurrence (18). 
An additional driver of outbreaks is inadequate sanitation and hygiene in the context of 
the breakdown or absence of public health systems, which was the largest contributor 
in nearly 40% of 400 public health events of international concern (19). Overall, these 
observations suggest that surveillance for EID is best targeted to areas with high 
biodiversity, poor sanitation and public health infrastructure, and limited resources for 







Figure 1.3 The convergence model of disease emergence proposed by the Institute of 
Medicine. Reproduced from Kimball (2004) (20), adapted from (17). 
 
Seasonality is a phenomenon observed for numerous infectious diseases including those 
that cause food-borne illnesses, respiratory infections and vector-borne diseases (21). 
Knowledge of the seasonal trends of infectious disease within endemic countries is 
important to be able to effectively target surveillance, plan vector control strategies and 
guide laboratory testing and diagnosis of patients. The factors leading to seasonality can 
be complex and commonly include human behaviours, climate, environment, and vector 




been studied for mosquito-borne viruses including dengue virus (DENV) (1,21–23), 
chikungunya virus (CHIKV) (24,25) and Zika virus (ZIKV) (26), midge-borne viruses 
including Bluetongue virus and Akabane virus in Australia (27), and Oropouche virus 
(OROV) in Brazil, outbreaks of which tend to occur during the rainy season between 
January and June due to an increased number of vector breeding sites (28). In West 
Africa, Lassa fever incidence is seasonal, with outbreaks occurring yearly in Nigeria and 
cases peaking around March, during the transition from the dry season to the wet 
season (29,30). Malaria incidence has seasonal patterns similar to some arboviruses and 
higher mosquito abundance correlates with more malaria transmission (31). EBOV 
seasonality has recently been investigated using a statistical modelling approach to look 
at previous outbreaks and spillover events (32). The authors found that EBOV spillover 
intensity is highest during transitions between wet and dry seasons, adding weight to 
the theory that there may be seasonality in EBOV spillover events (32–34). 
Understanding seasonal patterns of disease in endemic areas is important to be able to 
plan effective surveillance programmes.  
A valid question regarding EID is why focus on pathogens that cause relatively low 
mortality and morbidity compared to huge global health burdens such as malaria, 
tuberculosis, and hepatitis B infection? Most emerging pathogens do not result in global 
pandemics, but those that do can have devastating and long-term consequences on the 
human population. For example the emergence of human immunodeficiency virus-1 
(HIV-1) last century, which since its discovery has resulted in 32 million deaths and as of 
2018, 37.9 million people living with the infection (35). In 2016, HIV was the 4th most 
common cause of death in low-income countries (36). Furthermore, significant 




reaction to them (6). The economic cost of the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) coronavirus outbreak, which caused fewer than 1000 deaths, was estimated at 
billions of dollars (37), and the outbreak of variant CJD resulting from prion infection in 
the United Kingdom (UK), causing approximately 100 deaths, had a similar economic 
cost (6). Although EID events are more likely to occur in certain geographical areas (18), 
globalisation and the increasingly interconnected nature of the modern world means 
that the spread of a newly emerged pathogen to geographically distant parts of the 
globe can happen extremely quickly. This has been demonstrated many times in recent 
years, notably the global spread of SARS coronavirus in 2003 (38), the emergence and 
subsequent pandemic of influenza A (H1N1) virus in 2009 (39), the export of EBOV to 
multiple countries from West Africa during the outbreak of 2014-2016 (40,41), and 
imported Zika virus cases with subsequent autochthonous transmission in the United 
States of America (USA) and Europe (42,43). Control of EID is a complex, global issue 
that requires collaborative working across borders. To combat EID effectively, 
surveillance on a local level must be combined with rapid, globally co-ordinated 
interventions to detect and control outbreaks at an early stage. 
 
1.1.3  ACUTE UNDIFFERENTIATED FEBRILE ILLNESS  
Acute undifferentiated febrile illness (AUFI) is a widely-used term used to describe an 
undiagnosed, non-specific clinical presentation. Despite there being no widely-
accepted, universal definition, AUFI is typically defined as an illness that includes fever, 
has an abrupt-onset and lasts less than two weeks (44). Illness of this kind can be caused 
by a wide range of infectious agents that have an overlapping clinical spectrum, making 




attributed to diseases that present as AUFI, including malaria, vector-borne viral 
diseases, diarrhoeal diseases and respiratory tract infections (1,45); demonstrating the 
need for improved diagnosis and treatment for AUFI patients.  
Diagnosis of AUFI patients is commonly performed using a combination of clinical 
observations, history, and laboratory tests. Suspected pathogens are identified based 
on clinical factors, from which appropriate laboratory tests are identified. The tests that 
are used depend on the resources and capabilities of the laboratory, the sample type 
available, and the time between the onset of symptoms and sampling. The kinetics of a 
viral infection varies between virus species, but the majority show a similar pattern, 
involving a phase of viraemia that peaks days-to-weeks following exposure (Figure 1.4). 
At this time virus is present in the blood and nucleic acid-based tests that detect viral 
RNA/DNA are useful, and virus isolation in cell culture is possible (Figure 1.4). As 
viraemia declines approximately a week after the onset of symptoms, IgM antibody 
titres rise and become measurable, followed by a longer-lived IgG antibody response 
(Figure 1.4). Following the decline of viraemia, serological tests that detect IgM and IgG 
are much more reliable than nucleic acid-based tests, however they are often not as 
specific because of antibody cross-reactivity to antigenically similar viruses (46). Plasma 
or serum are common sample types used for the detection of viruses using molecular 
methods, although urine, saliva or cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) may be used depending on 
the suspected virus and clinical picture. Assay validation must be performed on any non-






Figure 1.4 Suitable laboratory diagnostic techniques at each stage of a viral infection, 
in this instance CHIKV. Reproduced from Tanabe et al. (2018) (47). 
 
Diagnosing the causative agent of AUFI can be challenging. The majority of current 
diagnostic methods rely on prior knowledge of the causative agent (e.g. genome 
sequence information, known epitopes), and many cases remain undiagnosed, 
potentially leading to inaccurate reporting of disease incidence and in particular the 
underreporting of infectious diseases (48). Misdiagnosis may lead to inappropriate 









1.2  VIRAL CAUSES OF AUFI  
This section provides an overview of a select group of viruses that cause an AUFI-like 
clinical picture in humans, focussing on emerging viruses of current global clinical 
importance. 
1.2.1  ALPHAVIRUSES 
CHIKUNGUNYA VIRUS (CHIKV) is an enveloped, single stranded, positive-sense RNA virus 
that belongs to the genus Alphavirus, family Togaviridae (49). It is a member of the 
Semliki Forest virus complex which includes the closely related Ross River 
virus, O'nyong'nyong virus and Semliki Forest virus. CHIKV was first isolated in 1952 from 
a febrile patient in Tanzania (50) shortly followed by detection in Aedes aegypti 
mosquitoes (51), and has since been detected in more than 100 countries across all 
continents (Figure 1.5) (52). Transmission is via a mosquito-vector, principally Ae. 
aegypti and Ae. albopictus. Both sylvatic (in which wildlife act as the major host) and 
urban (in which humans are the host) cycles exist (Figure 1.6) (53). The sylvatic cycle 
exists mainly in Africa and involves transmission between vertebrate hosts, principally 
non-human primates (54) but also rodents and possibly bats (52). Aedes species 
mosquitoes (Ae. albopictus, Ae. furcifer, Ae africanus, Ae. taylori) are the vector (55). 
Transmission in rural environments is between humans as the host and infected 
mosquito vectors, often Ae. albopictus (55). Larger outbreaks in urban areas are often 
the result of the movement of infected humans into high density urban areas where Ae. 
aegypti and Ae. albopictus are present (52). Since 2005, the role of Ae. albopictus in 
CHIKV transmission has substantially increased, because of the spread of this species 





Figure 1.5 The global distribution of CHIKV, shown as countries and territories reporting CHIKV. Reproduced from Vairo et al. (2019) (52), data from 





Figure 1.6 CHIKV transmission cycles. The sylvatic cycle (green) is present in Africa only. 
The endemic/epidemic urban cycle (red) is widespread throughout the world. Figure 
reproduced from Weaver et al. (2012) (54), adapted from the version originally 
published (60). 
 
Separate lineages of CHIKV exist in Africa, which are restricted to West and 
East/Central/South Africa (ECSA) (52). The latter clade was responsible for an epidemic 
spreading into Asia in the 1950s (52). More recently, numerous large CHIKV epidemics 
have occurred. Transport of CHIKV from Kenya to Lamu island in 2004, then Réunion 
island and others in the Indian ocean caused a series of explosive epidemics (52). In a 
separate introduction from Kenya to India in 2005, millions of people were infected as a 




of independent introductions occurred in the years following, resulting from infected 
travellers returning to Europe, Southeast Asia and the Americas from India, with onward 
local transmission occurring in Southeast Asia, Italy and France (61–63). In 2013, the 
ECSA lineage was detected in the Americas, preceding widespread transmission across 
the continent with 2.9 million cases and 296 deaths as of July 2016 (64), however, the 
number of deaths is thought to have been largely underestimated (65). 
The clinical picture of CHIKV infection in humans is like that of several other arboviruses 
but with some distinctions. The classic symptoms associated with acute infection are 
fever, severe arthralgia and a rash (66). This phase typically lasts 7-10 days, followed by 
a chronic stage lasting months to years, characterised by joint pain and fatigue (67). 
Atypical presentations have been reported including cardiac, neurological and 
haemorrhagic manifestations (66), however these are not common. The case fatality 
rate (CFR) calculated from the Réunion Island outbreak was 1 in 1000 (68), but this figure 
can be higher in vulnerable populations including elderly people and neonates (67). It is 
estimated that 50-97% of infections are symptomatic (69). Treatment of CHIKV infection 
is symptomatic and no specific antiviral treatments exist (70). The field of CHIKV vaccine 
development has produced a number of promising candidate vaccines, however the 
completion of phase III trials is challenging because of the low number of cases observed 
between epidemics (70).  
Because clinical symptoms of CHIKV and other pathogens that circulate in similar 
geographic areas are shared, laboratory confirmation is important. The most commonly 
used laboratory methods for diagnosis of CHIKV are molecular tests (detection of viral 
RNA, typically from serum and plasma samples) and serological assays that detect IgM 




are less common (70). Detection of CHIKV using metagenomic sequencing has recently 
been reported (71). 
CHIKV replicates in a number of human cell types including epithelial and endothelial 
cells and monocyte-derived macrophages, but not lymphoid or monocytoid cells (68). 
However, replication in human monocytes is debated; one study demonstrated that 
CHIKV infects and replicates in human monocytes in vitro, albeit at a low level (72). 
Following initial infection, the virus travels to the lymph nodes then disseminates to 
other tissues via the blood, where it replicates in organs and causes viraemia (67). The 
inflammation observed during CHIKV infection is thought to contribute to the joint pain 
experienced by chronic CHIKV patients. Cytokines tumour necrosis-factor-alpha (TNF-α), 
interleukin (IL) -6, and IL-1, released during infection, promote osteoclast activity and 
are associated with the development of joint pain (73).  
 
MAYARO VIRUS (MAYV) is an alphavirus that was first isolated from forest workers in 
Mayaro, Trinidad, in 1954 (74). Since then sporadic outbreaks of Mayaro fever have 
been reported from Brazil, and one small outbreak occurred in Bolivia (75–80). 
Phylogenetic analyses based on partial envelope (E1-E2) sequences demonstrated the 
existence of three genotypes; D, L and N (Figure 1.7). Virus or antibodies have been 
detected from Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, 
Surinam, Trinidad and Venezuela (Figure 1.7) (81–91). The enzootic transmission cycle 
of MAYV is not well characterised, however, transmission is thought to occur between 
infected mosquitoes (primarily Haemagogus genus) and non-human primates (76,92). 




concerns exist over the potential of the virus to cause outbreaks in new areas, 
particularly as previous outbreaks have involved high numbers of cases (79,93) and Ae. 
aegypti have been demonstrated to be moderately competent vectors in the laboratory 
(94). This raises concerns that an urban transmission cycle could emerge between 
humans and Ae. aegypti in the future (95).  
Mayaro fever typically manifests as fever, headache, rash and arthralgia, the latter of 
which can continue for months or years (96). The overlap in clinical picture between 
MAYV and other arboviruses means infection can easily be mis-diagnosed, particularly 
as a lesser-known cause of disease. Furthermore, cross-reactivity between antibodies 
against MAYV and other alphaviruses such as CHIKV make serological testing challenging 
(97,98). Molecular testing can overcome this problem but currently reverse 
transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays are not widely available in the 
relevant areas (96). Long-term arthralgia is noted in over half of MAYV infected patients 
(93) and in a study evaluating patient immune response to MAYV, infection was 
associated with the release of inflammatory cytokines including IL-13, IL-7, and vascular 
endothelial growth factor (VEGF) (99). MAYV is poorly represented in the literature, 
however the molecular mechanisms of pathogenesis are assumed to be similar to that 

















1.2.2  ARENAVIRUSES 
LASSA MAMMARENAVIRUS (LASV) belongs to the Mammarenavirus genus, family 
Arenaviridae. Mammarenaviruses are enveloped, single stranded, negative-sense RNA 
viruses with a bi-segmented genome (large and small segments), that infect mammalian 
hosts (101). LASV was first discovered in Nigeria in 1969 following cases of febrile illness 
in missionary nurses, subsequently named Lassa fever (102). LASV is endemic in West 
Africa, cases have been reported from Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, 
Senegal, and Sierra Leone (103–105). Insufficient surveillance, civil unrest, lack of point-
of-care diagnostic tests and a wide spectrum of clinical presentations (including 
asymptomatic infections) makes it very difficult to understand the true distribution of 
LASV (106). Similarly, estimates of annual Lassa fever incidence are crude because 
surveillance in endemic areas is not standardised, however, the Center for Disease 
Control (CDC) estimates that each year the virus infects between 100,000 and 300,000 
people, 5,000 of whom die as a result (103). A small number of travel-associated cases 
have been documented from countries in the Americas and Europe (107,108).  
The primary reservoir species for LASV is Mastomys natalensis, the multimammate rat 
(Figure 1.8), in which infection is asymptomatic but virus is shed in urine and faeces, 
which is usually the source of human infection (109). Interactions with Mastomys 
rodents frequently occur in rural areas with poor sanitation or crowded conditions. 
Rodents invade human homes in search of food and exposure to contaminated rodent 
bodily fluids occurs, resulting in infection (106). Following a zoonotic transmission, 
human-to-human transmission is possible via infected bodily fluids, though less 
common (101). Nosocomial outbreaks have occurred, facilitated by poor infection 





Figure 1.8 The LASV reservoir species multimammate rat Mastomys natalensis. B: 
Ventral surface of M. natalensis showing two rows of mammary glands. Reproduced 
from Asogun et al. (2019) (106). 
 
The onset of Lassa fever typically occurs 2-21 days following exposure (103,104). The 
disease has a wide clinical spectrum, ranging from asymptomatic infection to severe 
haemorrhagic disease (110). Common symptoms include fever, headache, myalgia, sore 
throat and gastrointestinal symptoms (111–113). More specific symptoms, associated 
with severe disease, are present in less than a third of Lassa fever patients and can 
include conjunctival infection, facial swelling and haemorrhagic manifestations such as 
mucosal or gastrointestinal bleeding (114). CFRs in hospitalised patients range from 10 
– 20%, if death occurs it results from shock and multi-organ system failure (114,115). 
Ribavirin is used to treat LASV infection and is most effective in the 6 days following 
onset of symptoms (116). No vaccine is currently available although some monoclonal 
antibody therapies have shown promise (117,118). Many survivors of Lassa fever 
experience neurological sequelae, with 25% experiencing deafness as a result of 




Mammarenaviruses are separated into ‘Old World’ and ‘New World’ groups based on 
genetic and geographic factors (121). LASV belongs to the Old World group, alongside 
Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus and Lujo virus. Within the LASV species itself, a high 
degree of genetic diversity is observed with multiple lineages circulating in West Africa 
(122), which presents substantial challenges to developing diagnostic tests capable of 
detecting all known lineages. This is important because Lassa fever is very difficult to 
diagnose based on clinical symptoms alone, due to the wide spectrum of disease and 
symptoms, therefore laboratory diagnosis is required to confirm an infection. The gold 
standard test is RT-PCR for detection of LASV RNA (123). Complementary testing 
includes serological tests, antigen detection, or immunohistochemistry on post-mortem 
samples (106). Virus isolation can only take place in biosafety level 4 containment 
laboratories (106). 
The mammarenavirus life cycle is relatively well understood (Figure 1.9). Virus enters 
the host via inhalation, where it is infects alveolar macrophages which move to the 
draining lymph node, disseminating virus to various tissues throughout the body (101). 
The major cellular receptor for LASV is α-dystroglycan (124) and virus enters the cell via 
a clatherin-independent pathway (125). Viral genome replication takes place in the 
cytoplasm and is initiated by the nucleoprotein (NP) and the large RNA-dependent RNA 
polymerase complex, acquiring 5’ caps from host messenger RNA (mRNA) (101). During 
replication, arenaviruses evade the mammalian immune system in several ways. The NP 
limits the type I interferon (IFN) response by inhibiting activation of downstream genes 
(101). The New World mammarenavirus Z protein inhibits the IFN response by binding 




antiviral signalling protein (MAVS) and halting the signalling cascade that usually results 









JUNIN VIRUS (JUNV) is a New World mammarenavirus capable of causing haemorrhagic 
disease in humans. The other New World viruses in the Mammarenavirus genus are 
Machupo virus (MACV), Guanarito virus (GTOV), Sabia virus (SABV), and Chapare virus 
(CHHF), all of which are capable of causing similar disease. This viruses are the causative 
agents of Argentine Haemorrhagic Fever (JUNV), Bolivian Haemorrhagic Fever (MACV), 
Venezuelan Haemorrhagic Fever (GTOH) and Brazilian Haemorrhagic Fever (SABV) (101). 
They are found in the Americas and have higher CFRs (15-33%) than those seen from 
Old World viruses, however, they cause fewer infections annually (101,126,127). The 
primary animal reservoirs are mice species belonging to sub-family Sigmodontinae, 
family Muridae; JUNV infection is associated with agricultural activities that result in 
exposure to infected mouse urine and/or faeces (101).  
 
1.2.3  BUNYAVIRUSES 
CRIMEAN-CONGO HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER ORTHONAIROVIRUS (CCHFV) is an enveloped, single 
stranded, negative-sense RNA virus with three genomic segments, belonging to the 
genus Orthonairovirus, family Nairoviridae, order Bunyavirales. A febrile illness of 
unknown aetiology occurred in soviet troops re-occupying the Crimean peninsula in 
1944, resulting in approximately 200 hospitalisations with a 10% CFR (128). The disease 
was linked to tick bites however CCHFV itself was not identified until 1967 when it was 
isolated from a patient in Uzbekistan (129). CCHFV has been found over a wide 
geographical area including many regions of Africa, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and 




CCHFV is spread via the bite of an infected Hyalomma species tick and is maintained in 
a sylvatic cycle with domestic livestock (131). It is thought that many human infections 
are subclinical; one study investigating seroprevalence in Turkey during 2009 estimated 
that 88% of infections were asymptomatic (132). Disease in symptomatic patients 
ranges from mild to severe. Symptoms observed in severe disease include bleeding and 
typically develop 3-6 days following the onset of symptoms (Figure 1.10) (130). Reported 
CFRs range from 4%-20% (133). Treatment is frequently with ribavirin, however it is not 
clear whether this is effective (134). A CCHFV vaccine was developed and approved in 
the Soviet Union in 1970 and a similar vaccine has been in use in Bulgaria, however the 
efficacy of these have not been fully evaluated (135,136). Modern attempts to develop 

















Figure 1.10 Clinical presentation of Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever in a severely 
ill patient.  Patient shows ecchymosis (discolouration of the skin resulting from bleeding 
underneath) not seen in other types of viral haemorrhagic fever. Reproduced from 




CCHFV has the highest degree of sequence diversity seen in any arbovirus, up to 31% in 
the M-segment (135). Six viral lineages exist based on the complete sequences of each 
genome segment. Generally (but not always), viruses from similar locations cluster in 
the same lineage (135). This genetic diversity presents challenges for diagnostic tests 
based on RNA detection but despite this, RT-PCR using a serum sample is considered the 
gold standard test. Previously the gold standard was virus isolation, however this is 
constrained by the requirement for a biosafety level 4 containment laboratory (135). 
Serological detection of virus-specific IgM and/or IgG is a useful complementary test 
(135). 
CCHFV targets Kupffer cells, hepatic endothelial cells and hepatocytes (131). An increase 
in liver enzymes is detected during infection, which is related to necrosis of hepatocytes 
(131). Vascular leakage during infection is caused by both the virus itself and the 
immune response; in particular high levels of cytokines IL-1, IL-6, and TNF-α are 
observed. Levels of IL-6 and TNF-α are higher in fatal cases (137,138). 
 
HANTAVIRUSES are a group of 36 virus species within the genus Orthohantavirus, family 
Hantaviridae, order Bunyavirales (49). The geographical distribution of the hantaviruses 
is related to the distribution of their animal reservoir and they are widely distributed 
across parts of Asia, Europe, Africa and the Americas (139,140). Hantaviruses are usually 
closely associated with a specific rodent species, resulting from co-evolution between 
virus and host (141). Known reservoir species include the bank vole Myodes glareolus 
(Puumala virus) (142), Apodemus flavicollis (Dobrava virus) (143), Rattus norvegicus 




(145). Hantaviruses infect approximately 200,000 people each year (146), with Sin 
Nombre virus and Andes virus responsible for hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) in 
the Americas, Hantaan virus causing haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome (HFRS) in 
Asia, Puumala virus and Dobrava virus causing HFRS in Europe, and Seoul virus causing 
HFRS globally (147). Hantavirus infections are thought to be highly underreported due 
to the lack of comprehensive epidemiological data from many countries, particularly in 
Europe where it is estimated that only 20% of all Puumala virus  infections are diagnosed 
(148). 
In recent years Seoul virus was identified in the UK, first in wild rats (149) and then 
independently in a breeding colony of pet rats (150,151) following three linked cases of 
HFRS. These cases demonstrate the continued emergence of hantaviruses and the 
potential for interaction between humans and reservoir species. 
Human hantavirus infection usually results from exposure to infected animals, their 
urine, faeces or virus-contaminated aerosols (Figure 1.11) (147). Human-to-human 
transmission has only been recorded for Andes virus (152). Depending on hantavirus 
species, human infection can result in serious disease, manifesting as HPS, or HFRS (147), 
with CRFs of up to 40% and 12%, respectively (147). Diagnosis of hantavirus infection is 
based on clinical and epidemiological information combined with laboratory tests; 
commonly detection of IgM and IgG antibodies in patient serum (153). Commercially 
available rapid tests exist which detect IgM antibodies at point-of-care (154,155). 
Molecular detection using RT-PCR is common and can detect infection before the 
presence of specific antibodies (156,157). There is no specific therapy for hantavirus 
infection and only one vaccine (Hantavax) which is licensed for human use in the 








Figure 1.11 Hantavirus life cycle and spillover infection to humans.  Reproduced from 





Pathogenic hantaviruses suppress the innate immune response. The early IFN response 
is abrogated by viral interference with interferon regulatory factor (IRF)-3 and NF-кB 
(Nuclear factor kappa-light-chain-enhancer of activated B cells) signalling pathways 
(158). The cytoplasmic tail of the Gn glycoprotein has been implicated in this inhibition 
of IFN response and this is thought to be necessary for hantavirus replication in 
endothelial cells, the primary site of infection (158). Additionally, some hantaviruses are 
known to infect dendritic cells (DCs); Hantaan virus induces maturation in infected DCs 
which may lead to dissemination of the virus following DC migration to lymph nodes 
(159,160). 
 
RIFT VALLEY FEVER PHLEBOVIRUS (RVFV) belongs to the genus Phlebovirus, family 
Phenuiviridae, order Bunyavirales. RVFV was first described in 1930 following disease 
and abortions in sheep in Kenya (161), but was not isolated until 1967 from a case in 
Nigeria (162). Outbreaks have since been reported from West Africa, South Africa, 
Madagascar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen (163,164). Rift Valley fever is primarily a 
disease of livestock, however, it be transmitted to humans through direct contact with 
infected animal blood or carcasses, or a bite from an infected mosquito. Vertebrates act 
as hosts, in which infection is asymptomatic or causes mild disease, and the virus has 
been detected in a wide range of species including camels, lions, elephants and bats 
(165–167). Aedes species mosquitoes are the primary enzootic reservoir and vector for 
RVFV, with Culex, Anopheles and Mansonia mosquitoes acting as secondary vectors, 
playing a role in the amplification of epidemics (164). Aside from mosquitoes, virus has 





Disease in humans is usually mild with non-specific ‘flu-like’ symptoms, although in rare 
cases severe disease develops, manifesting as one or more of three clinical syndromes; 
ocular disease, meningoencephalitis, or haemorrhagic fever (162). Fatalities are rare 
(<1%) but occur most commonly in patients with haemorrhagic fever (163). Treatment 
for severe disease is supportive; the administration of ribavirin has been shown to 
increase the chance of neurological disease developing (168).  A formalin-inactivated 
vaccine is used to protect lab workers and those at high risk of exposure, however it is 
not suitable for animal use due to the requirement for three inoculations to establish 
effective immunity (169,170). A number of modern vaccine candidates have been 
developed that show promise and some have undergone field testing, however financial 
investment is required to get these to a point where they could be applied effectively in 
endemic countries (171–173). Diagnosis in humans is performed on blood samples using 
RT-PCR, ELISA to detect viral antigen, or serology to detect IgM or IgG antibodies (162). 
As with other bunyaviruses, the non-structural NSs protein is the major virulence factor 
for RVFV and plays a role in innate immune evasion (174). Animal studies have 
demonstrated a protective role for type I IFNs in phlebovirus infection, which is typically 
induced by detection of viral RNA by RIG-I, as well as the cytoplasmic RNA 
helicase/MAVS axis (175). 
 
OROPOUCHE ORTHOBUNYAVIRUS (OROV) belongs to the genus Orthobunyavirus, family 
Peribunyaviridae, order Bunyavirales. At least 30 viruses within this genus can cause 
human disease (176), many of these are within the Simbu serogroup including Simbu 




(IQTV, Figure 1.12). OROV infection in humans causes an acute febrile illness, Oropouche 
fever, which has infected more than 500,000 people since its discovery in Trinidad and 
Tobago in 1955, where it was isolated from a febrile patient (28,177). OROV has caused 
multiple epidemics in Brazil and Peru, as well as a single epidemic in Panama (28). In 
2016 the WHO announced that the emergence of OROV in new areas was a significant 
risk, in large part due to the wide geographical spread of the biting midge vector 
Culicoides paraensis (178). OROV is of particular interest in the context of EID because 
the clinical picture is similar to that of other arboviral diseases circulating in the same 
geographical locations, meaning OROV may not be considered as a cause of infection in 
febrile patients because of the higher prevalence and awareness of other infections such 









Figure 1.12 Phylogenetic tree of members of the Simbu serogroup, genus 
Orthobunyavirus, based on the protein-coding portion of the genomic L segment.  
Modified from Ladner et al. 2014 (179). 
 
In the urban transmission cycle, humans act as hosts and C. paraensis is the vector, 
although there is some debate as to the existence of other vector species, particularly 
the mosquito Culex quinquefasciatus (28,180). OROV is maintained in a sylvatic cycle 
that is not well understood, but thought to involve numerous vertebrate host species 
and insect vectors (181). Urban outbreaks occur when a person becomes infected from 
an insect bite in a forested or rural area then moves into an urban area where the vector 




Oropouche fever is typically self-limiting and relatively mild in nature. An incubation 
period of four to eight days after exposure precedes non-specific systemic symptoms 
which can include fever, headache, myalgia, arthralgia, anorexia, dizziness, chills, and 
photophobia. Viraemia is typically seen 2-4 days following the onset of symptoms (28). 
There are no reports of death from OROV infection; however infections of the central 
nervous system (CNS) and meningitis have been reported in rare cases (183,184). No 
treatments or vaccines are available for OROV infection, although a virus particle 
production assay and an OROV rescue system have been developed in recent years 
(185,186), which may be useful for developing a recombinant vaccine as well as 
improving knowledge of OROV pathogenesis. 
Studies have identified several factors involved in OROV pathogenesis and immune 
response. In vitro studies in HeLa cells demonstrated that OROV induces apoptosis by 
triggering an intracellular pathway involving mitochondria (187), while a mouse study 
showed that OROV infection advances from the posterior to the anterior of the brain, 
crossing the blood-brain-barrier and spreading into the brain parenchyma, which is 
associated with more severe clinical signs (188). Activation of MAVS, IRF-3 and IRF-7, 
and production of type I IFNs are implicated in controlling infection (189).  
 
1.2.4  FILOVIRUSES 
EBOLAVIRUS (EBOV) is a genus of enveloped, single stranded negative-sense RNA viruses 
with non-segmented genomes and a characteristic filament shape. The genus belongs 
to the family Filoviridae and contains five viral species; Zaire ebolavirus, Sudan 




Since the first detection of EBOV in 1976, ebolaviruses Zaire, Sudan and Bundibugyo 
have been responsible for sporadic, relatively small outbreaks of haemorrhagic fever in 
humans. These outbreaks have typically been limited to rural areas in Sudan, Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Gabon and Uganda (Table 1.1) (41,191). An 
exception to the typical small, contained outbreaks was the West African Ebola virus 
outbreak, the largest outbreak to date, that occurred between 2014-2016. This affected 
urban as well as rural areas and resulted in 28,646 cases and 11,323 deaths (Table 1.1) 
(192). Blood samples from EBOV-negative patients are used in this project and the 
outbreak is introduced in more detail in Chapter 3. At the time of writing, the second 
largest EBOV outbreak on record is ongoing in the DRC and as of 26th December 2019, 

















Case fatality rate 
(%) 
2019 Uganda Zaire 4 3 75 
2018 DRC Zaire 3,366† 2,227† 66† 
2017 DRC Zaire 8 4 50 
2015 Italy Zaire 1 0 0 
2014 DRC Zaire 66 49 74 
2014 Spain Zaire 1 0 0 
2014 UK Zaire 1 0 0 
2014 USA Zaire 4 1 25 
2014 Senegal Zaire 1 0 0 
2014 Mali Zaire 8 6 75 
2014 Nigeria Zaire 20 8 40 
2014 Sierra Leone Zaire 14,124* 3,956* 28 
2014 Liberia Zaire 10,675* 4,809* 45 
2014 Guinea Zaire 3,811* 2,543* 67 
2012 DRC Bundibugyo 57 29 51 
2012 Uganda Sudan 7 4 57 
2012 Uganda Sudan 24 17 71 
2011 Uganda Sudan 1 1 100 
2008 DRC Zaire 32 14 44 
2007 Uganda Bundibugyo 149 37 25 
2007 DRC Zaire 264 187 71 
2005 Congo Zaire 12 10 83 




2003 Congo Zaire 35 29 83 
2003 Congo Zaire 143 128 90 
2001 Congo Zaire 59 44 75 
2001 Gabon Zaire 65 53 82 




Zaire 1 1 100 
1996 Gabon Zaire 60 45 75 
1996 Gabon Zaire 31 21 68 
1995 DRC Zaire 315 254 81 
1994 Côte d'Ivoire Taï Forest 1 0 0 
1994 Gabon Zaire 52 31 60 
1979 Sudan Sudan 34 22 65 
1977 DRC Zaire 1 1 100 
1976 Sudan Sudan 284 151 53 
1976 DRC Zaire 318 280 88 
Table 1.1 Recorded Ebola virus disease outbreaks. Table adapted from WHO (194). 
†Outbreak ongoing, figures correct as of 26th December 2019. *Includes suspect, 
probable and confirmed Ebolavirus disease (EVD) cases. 2018 and 2017 DRC outbreak 
data from (193) and (195), respectively. 
 
Bats are strongly indicated to be reservoirs for EBOV; numerous studies have shown 
evidence of EBOV-antibodies in bats (196–200), viral RNA has been detected from bat 
samples (201) and experimental studies have shown that EBOV can infect bats without 




(203). Outbreaks of Ebolavirus disease (EVD) in humans begins with a spillover event 
where a person is infected through contact with an infected animal, or contaminated 
faeces, urine or blood. Following this, human-to-human transmission may occur via 
contaminated bodily fluids (204). 
EVD in humans begins with symptoms including fever, chills, myalgia and malaise (205). 
Progression of disease leads to multi-system involvement including respiratory, 
gastrointestinal, vascular, postural, and neurological symptoms. Haemorrhagic 
manifestations may be observed from the peak of disease onwards (205). Previous 
outbreaks have recorded CFRs of 25-90% (204) with an average of 65% (206).  
There are no approved therapies for the treatment of EVD, which is currently largely 
supportive (41). However, the West African EBOV outbreak highlighted the need for 
effective EBOV vaccines and therapeutic agents. During the outbreak, collaborative 
working led to rapid progress in clinical trials, including phase II vaccine trials in West 
Africa and a ring vaccination phase III trial in Guinea (207). Despite best efforts, the 
majority of trials took place towards the end of the outbreak, when it was difficult to 
recruit sufficient numbers to demonstrate statistically significant results, as was the case 
for the ZMapp monoclonal antibody trial (207). Most recently, the recombinant 
vesicular stomatitis virus - Zaire ebolavirus vaccine developed by Merck has been used 
on a large scale for the first time during the ongoing EBOV outbreak in DRC, where more 
than quarter of a million people were vaccinated between August-December 2019 
(193,208). Full analyses will be published in time, but an initial report shows that the 
vaccine is well-tolerated and accepted by the community (209). Despite these advances, 
no vaccines or therapeutics have been licensed as of the time of writing (210), although 




for the Merck vaccine (211) and the WHO has given it prequalification status, 
recognising that it meets standards for quality, safety and efficacy (212).  
Filoviruses infect cells of myeloid lineage including DCs, monocytes and macrophages 
early in the course of infection. In the later stages, cell tropism becomes more broad 
and non-lymphocytic cell types are susceptible to infection (213). Filoviruses can 
abrogate the innate immune response by preventing the production of type I IFNs and 
blocking the induction of an anti-viral state (214), allowing the virus to replicate rapidly 
and to a high titre. Furthermore, the filovirus glycoprotein (GP) is able to evade the 
immune response in a number of ways, perhaps most notably by the production of a 
soluble form of GP which competes for antibodies that would otherwise bind to and 
possibly neutralise whole virions (213). 
 
MARBURG MARBURGVIRUS (MARV) forms a distinct genus (Marburgvirus) within the 
Filoviridae family and causes a similar disease in humans to that caused by EBOV, 
however, the average CFR is slightly lower at 54% (206). The virus was discovered 
following simultaneous outbreaks in Germany and Serbia in 1967 as a result of 
transmission from monkeys imported from Uganda (215). Outbreaks and sporadic cases 
of MARV have since been reported from Angola, DRC, Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa 
(in one person with recent travel to Zimbabwe) (215). Bats of the genus Rousettus are 







1.2.5  FLAVIVIRUSES 
DENGUE VIRUS (DENV) is an enveloped, single stranded, positive-sense RNA virus with a 
non-segmented genome, within the Flavivirus genus, family Flaviviridae (49). DENV has 
five known antigenically distinct serotypes (DENV1-5), the most recently discovered of 
which, DENV-5, was identified in 2013 (216). DENV serotypes 1-4 circulate in urban and 
peri-urban environments around the world (217), whereas DENV-5 has only been 
detected in rural parts of Sarawak state, Malaysia (216). DENV is responsible for a huge 
burden of disease and is widespread throughout tropical and sub-tropical regions, 
currently endemic in more than 100 countries and showing increased incidence in recent 
decades (218). 70% of the burden of disease is in Asia, although the Americas and 
Western Pacific regions are also seriously affected (Figure 1.13) (218). The epidemiology 
of DENV in Africa is poorly characterised, reflected by the lack of distribution data for 
this continent (Figure 1.13), however, 32 countries have reported cases of DENV since 
1960 (219). All four serotypes have been detected in Africa, although DENV-2 is most 
common (219). Accurate DENV case estimation is difficult, however, the WHO estimates 
that 390 million infections occur annually across the world, with 3.9 billion people at risk 





Figure 1.13 Distribution of dengue fever in 2016. Colour shows the average number of 
suspected or confirmed dengue cases, reported to WHO 2010-2016. Available at 
https://www.who.int/denguecontrol/epidemiology/en/. 
 
DENV is frequently transmitted to humans from a bite by an infected Ae. aegypti 
mosquito, which acts as the primary vector (217).  Ae. albopictus is also a vector but to 
a lesser extent than Ae. aegypti (218), and sexual transmission has been reported (220). 
Transmission occurs in cycles between wild vertebrates and mosquito vectors (wild 
cycle) and humans and mosquito vectors (epizootic cycle) (217). 
DENV infection in humans causes dengue fever which has a broad clinical spectrum, 
ranging from a non-serious ‘flu-like’ illness to severe forms which can be fatal. Typically, 
non-serious symptoms last for 2-7 days and include fever, headache, muscle and joint 
pain, nausea and rash. Severe dengue involves complications resulting from fluid 




estimates that half a million people are hospitalised with severe dengue each year, of 
which 2.5% die as a result (218). Between 2010 and 2016, a decline in the CFR was 
recorded, believed to result from improved case management in dengue endemic 
countries (218). There is no specific treatment for dengue fever, however in 2015 the 
first DENV vaccine (Dengvaxia CYD-TDV) was registered for use in endemic areas of some 
countries (218). In line with WHO recommendations, laboratory diagnosis of DENV is 
carried out through a combination of serological testing to detect anti-DENV IgM and/or 
IgG antibodies, and RT-PCR to detect viral RNA (221). Virus isolation is also often carried 
out (221). 
Immunopathogenesis plays a role in severe dengue, which occurs more frequently in 
patients that have had a previous DENV infection. The mechanism of antibody-
dependant enhancement (ADE) is well understood (222).  Antibodies against viral 
precursor membrane and envelope proteins, made during the immune response to a 
primary infection, are likely to poorly neutralise a subsequent DENV infection due to 
high viral genetic and antigenic variation and low antibody titres (222). During a 
subsequent infection, opsonisation of virions into cells in which they can replicate, such 
as macrophages, increases viral entry and replication (223–225). In addition, the 
resulting induction of inflammatory cytokines contributes to the ‘cytokine storm’ often 
seen accompanying the onset of severe symptoms in patients with severe dengue 
(222,226). Evidence suggests DENV-specific antibodies also enhance ZIKV infection 
(227,228), a related flavivirus that co-circulates with DENV in several countries, however 





JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS (JEV) is a member of the Flavivirus genus (Figure 1.14) that 
can infect the human CNS and is a major cause of viral encephalitis in Asia, with an 
estimated 68,000 cases occurring annually (229). Four genotypes exist, named I-IV, of 
which genotype III historically caused the large majority of cases, however genotype I 
has become more prevalent in recent decades (230,231). JEV is endemic in 25 countries 
in South Asia, South-East Asia and Western Pacific regions and may be seasonal or year-
round depending on the climate, which influences vector populations (229,232). 
Transmission to humans occurs via the bite of an infected Culex species mosquito. 
Humans do not develop viraemia of sufficient titre to infect biting mosquitoes, which 







Figure 1.14 Phylogenetic relationships within the Flaviviridae.  Reproduced from 
Kleinert et al. (2019) (233). 
 
Most infections are asymptomatic or mild but in rare cases severe disease develops, the 
most common form of which is acute encephalitis syndrome, characterised by severe 
headache, malaise and the inability to think clearly, which may progress to flaccid 
paralysis (231). The CFR is up to 30% in severe disease and permanent sequelae including 
paralysis and recurrent seizures are seen in 20-30% of survivors (229). Several safe and 




14-2 vaccine (231). No effective anti-viral treatment exists (229). Laboratory diagnosis is 
usually by detection of IgM antibodies, however because of antibody cross-reactivity 
with other flaviviruses, a plaque reduction neutralisation test (PRNT) should also be 
performed to confirm the presence of JEV (231). RT-PCR is often not appropriate 
because viraemia subsides by the time sever disease manifests, however it shows better 
utility with CSF samples than blood (231).  
The dermis is the primary site of infection for JEV, in which the virus replicates in 
currently undefined cell types before being transported to lymphoid organs via infected 
immune cells (234). Low-level viraemia occurs and the virus may replicate in 
lymphocytes, although this is not thought to be a major site of replication (235,236). JEV 
enters the brain through a poorly-understood mechanism, where it can be detected 
primarily in the nuclear grey matter (237). CNS inflammation is a hallmark of JEV 
infection, in which brain-infiltrating monocytes, macrophages and microglia play a major 
role (237).  
 
TICK-BORNE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS (TBEV) is a flavivirus found in central, eastern and northern 
Europe and Asia. There are three genetic subtypes; European (mainly transmitted by 
Ixodes ricinus ticks), Siberian and Far Eastern (mainly transmitted by Ixodes 
persulcatus) (238). TBEV belongs to the TBEV serocomplex; a group of closely related 
tick-borne flaviviruses including: Powassan/deer tick virus, Omsk haemorrhagic fever 
virus, Kyasanur Forest disease virus, louping ill virus, and Langat virus (239). In 2019, 
Public Health England (PHE) announced that cases of TBEV had been detected in the UK 




the disease into new regions in Europe is thought to be a result of the spread of tick 
populations, likely caused by climate change and change in land use (238). 
Disease in humans results from a bite from an infected tick. Cases of TBEV have 
increased in recent years, the WHO estimates that 10,000-12,000 clinical cases occur 
annually, although this is believed to be an underestimate (242). The initial disease is a 
typical ‘flu-like’ illness, which may be followed by infection of the CNS resulting in 
meningitis, encephalitis or meningoencephalitis, with CFR estimates of 1-20% 
depending on the virus (238,243). Survivors of neuro-invasive TBEV infection experience 
long-term sequelae in 25-40% of cases (243). Currently there are no effective antiviral 
treatments for TBEV, but there is an effective vaccine (238). Diagnosis of TBEV is 
performed through a combination of clinical and laboratory findings. IgM and IgG 
antibody detection in patient CSF is considered a reliable method (244). Similar to JEV, 
neuronal damage and immunopathology is thought to be responsible for the clinical 
symptoms and disease progression in TBEV infection (239).  
 
WEST NILE VIRUS (WNV) is a flavivirus that was discovered in Uganda in 1937, causing 
epidemics in Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Asia in the following decades (245). In 
1999 WNV was introduced to the United States, possibly from the Middle East, where it 
caused a large outbreak, subsequently becoming endemic and spreading through North, 
Central and South America (246). Infection is maintained in a complex sylvatic cycle 
involving multiple species of mosquitoes and birds and as such, outbreak localities are 




WNV transmission to non-reservoir host species has resulted in significant morbidity and 
mortality in equine and bird species; large declines in numbers have been reported in 
23 bird species (248,249). WNV is transmitted to humans through the bite of infected 
Culex species mosquitoes (250,251). Humans are not reservoir hosts and most infections 
are asymptomatic, however, 20% of individuals experience symptoms including rash, 
headache and fever (246). Severe neurological disease is rare but can be fatal and is seen 
in <1% of cases. Symptoms may include encephalitis, meningitis and acute flaccid 
paralysis. There are currently no effective treatments or vaccines available (246) and 
sequelae are seen in approximately 50% of survivors (245).  Laboratory diagnosis is 
performed using ELISA to detect IgM or IgG antibodies in serum or CSF, PRNT, virus 
isolation in cell culture or RT-PCR to detect viral RNA (246). 
WNV replicates in keratinocytes and DCs at the site of infection, then migrates to lymph 
nodes in activated Langerhans cells (234). Viraemia and virus dissemination to organs, 
including the kidneys and spleen, follows (234). WNV can cross the blood-brain-barrier 
but the mechanism is not well understood. The neuropathology seen during infection is 
thought to be at least partly caused by the immune response, either from CNS-resident 
cells or from infiltrating leukocytes (245). Some recovering patients develop chronic 
kidney disease or long-term neurological sequelae; the mechanisms are not well 
understood but it is suggested that generation of IL-1 by astrocytes negatively impacts 






YELLOW FEVER VIRUS (YFV) is a flavivirus found in tropical regions of Africa, and Central and 
South America (Figure 1.15) (253). YFV was once considered a forgotten disease but has 
re-emerged in recent years, likely due to a decrease in vaccination coverage in endemic 
areas. This can occur, for example as seen in Southern Sudan, because of political unrest 
and population movement of unvaccinated people (254). Very recently, in 2016-2018, 
re-emergence in non-endemic areas and endemic areas with low levels of vaccination 
coverage has highlighted the need for better understanding and surveillance of YFV 
infection (255).  
 
 
Figure 1.15 Countries with areas of endemic YFV and countries with requirements for 
proof of vaccination from incoming travellers (as of July 2018).  Reproduced from 




YFV is transmitted by mosquitoes in the Haemogogus, Sabethes and Aedes genera (255). 
The virus is maintained in a sylvatic cycle between mosquitoes and non-human 
primates, and in an urban cycle between mosquitoes and humans (255). The annual 
number of YFV cases globally is estimated at 80,000-200,000 (257). Yellow fever disease 
presents as a ‘flu-like’ illness commonly observed in flavivirus infection and usually 
improves within five days. In approximately 15% of patients, symptoms quickly recur 
and may become more severe, including jaundice, bleeding, liver and kidney damage. In 
patients who develop severe disease the CFR is approximately 50% (253). A live-
attenuated YFV vaccine (YFV-17D) is widely available and was used successfully in mass 
vaccination campaigns during the 1940-1950s and 2000s (258,259). YFV diagnosis is 
performed through a combination of clinical observations and laboratory tests, including 
virus culture, serology, molecular testing, and antigen detection (256). 
In humans YFV replicates primarily in the liver (260). To reach this organ, the virus infects 
DCs in dermal tissue at the site of infection which migrate to lymph nodes, priming an 
adaptive immune response prior to spreading virus through the bloodstream to the liver 
(255). Studies in human cells and humanised mice show that YFV has a broad tropism 
and can replicate in hepatocytes, haemopoietically-derived cells including DCs, 
monocyte-derived macrophages, T-cells, Kupffer cells and endothelial cells (261–266). 
Studies of tissue biopsies from YFV fatalities, in addition to evidence from animal 
models, suggest that hepatocyte apoptosis is important in YFV pathogenesis and that 






ZIKA VIRUS (ZIKV) is an emerging flavivirus that was first detected in Uganda in 1947 in a 
sentinel rhesus macaque, followed shortly after by detection in humans in Nigeria in 
1953 (269). In the following decades, sporadic cases were reported from Africa and 
South-east Asia, then in 2007 a major outbreak occurred in Yap Island, Micronesia (270), 
followed by an outbreak in French Polynesia in 2013-2014, during which two thirds of 
the population were infected (271). In 2015 the first cases of ZIKV were reported from 
Brazil; following this the virus spread rapidly through the Americas (269). Since 2015, 55 
countries reported autochthonous, vector-borne transmission of ZIKV, of which 48 are 
in the Americas or the Caribbean (272). Additionally, 5 countries reported sexual ZIKV 
transmission (272). This outbreak is introduced in more detail in Chapter 4. 
ZIKV transmission cycles are not fully understood, however sylvatic and urban cycles are 
known to exist, in which ZIKV transmission is maintained between vertebrate hosts and 
mosquito vectors. Vertical and venereal ZIKV transmission occurs within vector 
populations (Figure 1.16) (269). In urban cycles, the primary method of transmission is 
a bite from an infected female mosquito (typically the anthropophilic species Ae. 







Figure 1.16 ZIKV transmission cycles. A) Horizontal transmission occurs in sylvatic and 
urban cycles B) Vector-borne transmission occurs via horizontal transmission between 
vertebrates and vectors, and via vertical and venereal transmission between 




ZIKV in humans is asymptomatic in 80% of infections, while the remaining 20% 
experience a mild disease lasting between two and seven days, characterised by rash, 
fever, arthralgia, conjunctivitis and other minor symptoms (274). During the French 
Polynesian outbreak, an increase in patients presenting with severe neurological 
conditions including Guillain-Barré syndrome, encephalitis, meningoencephalitis, and 
myelitis was reported. An association between ZIKV infection and microcephaly was 
made in 2016, when a 20-fold increase in congenital defects in the USA was recorded by 
the CDC (275). A link between ZIKV infection, Guillain-Barré syndrome and microcephaly 
was reported in a number of studies (276–278). ZIKV is closely related to DENV, and 
questions exist over whether cross-reactive antibodies could have a protective effect, 
or whether ADE and resulting pathology occur, as seen in sequential infection with 
different DENV serotypes (222). A recent review of the evidence surmised that current 
knowledge is inadequate to draw a clear conclusion on this (279). Currently, there are 
no licensed treatments or vaccines for ZIKV infection (280). The laboratory testing 
protocols recommended by the WHO are nucleic-acid tests for patients <7 days from 
the onset of symptoms, and serological and/or nucleic-acid tests in patients ≥7 days 
from onset of symptoms (281). 
The pathogenesis of ZIKV is the subject of much research, though not yet fully 
understood. Axl (a phosphatidylserine receptor) enables viral entry in permissive cells 
including dermal fibroblasts and a number of cell types in the CNS (282). ZIKV activates 
toll-like receptor 3 and indirectly causes apoptosis (273). An increase of cytokines 
including IL-1β, IL-2, IL-4, IL-6, IL-9, IL-10, IL13, IL-17, IFN-γ-induced protein 10, 
chemokine (C-C motif) ligand 5 (CCL5), macrophage inflammatory protein 1 alpha, and 




returned to baseline levels during recovery (283). ZIKV antagonises type I IFN signalling 
in human cells by the viral NS5 protein binding to signal transducer and activator of 
transcription 2 (STAT2), leading to its degradation. In this way the upregulation of IFN-
stimulated genes is attenuated (273). 
 
1.2.6  NON-VIRAL INFECTIOUS CAUSES OF AUFI  
Although viruses are responsible for a substantial burden of AUFI-like disease (284,285), 
non-viral agents play a large part. Malaria has historically been a huge problem in 
tropical regions, however, global efforts to control transmission have resulted in a 
significant decline in cases in recent years (286). Despite this, malaria is still a serious 
issue, causing 219 million infections and 435,000 deaths in 2017 (287). Plasmodium 
falciparum is responsible for the vast majority of malaria burden, transmitted by 
Anopheles spp. mosquitoes (288). A plateau in the rate of case decline was observed 
between 2015-2017 (286), highlighting the need to continue investing in malaria 
surveillance, vector control, treatment and eradication efforts. 
A review of studies looking at the aetiology of >80,000 AUFI patients in Asia identified 
dengue fever as the most common aetiology (12%), with leptospirosis, typhoid and 
scrub typhus following, all of which are bacterial infections (284). Leptospirosis is a 
zoonosis resulting from infection with Leptospira spp., which are distributed worldwide 
although incidence is poorly understood in affected regions (289). Transmission occurs 
when humans are exposed to urine from infected rodents, often via contaminated 
water, but does not occur from person-to-person (290). Typhoid is caused by Salmonella 




Annually it is responsible for 11-20 million cases and 128,000 – 161,000 deaths, primarily 
in developing areas of Africa, the Americas, South-East Asia and Western Pacific regions 
(291). Antibiotic treatment is usually effective and two licensed vaccines exist (291). 
Scrub typhus, caused by Orientia tsutsugamushi infection, is transmitted to humans via 
larval mites and infections are most commonly seen in rural areas of Southeast Asia, 
Indonesia, China, Japan, India, and northern Australia (292).  
O. tsutsugamushi belongs to the Rickettsiaceae family of Gram-negative bacilli, which 
includes the genus Rickettsia. Bacteria responsible for several different diseases belong 
to the Rickettsia genus, including epidemic typhus or louse-borne typhus fever (R. 
prowazekii), murine typhus fever (R. typhii), rickettsialpox (R. akari) and Rocky Mountain 
spotted fever (R. rickettsia). The geographic distribution of rickettsial disease is 
determined by the range of the vector, which are ectoparasites or arthropods (hard or 




1.3  METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING AND VIRUS DETECTION 
1.3.1  CURRENT NEXT GENERATION SEQUENCING TECHNOLOGIES 
Sanger’s dideoxy chain termination method of DNA sequencing (1st generation 
sequencing) was developed the 1970s and widely used in the following decades, making 
the sequencing of bacterial and eukaryotic genomes possible and enabling the 
completion of the first human genome sequence in 2001 (294). The development of 
next-generation sequencing (NGS) began in 2005 with second-generation sequencing 
technologies such as the Roche 454 sequencing system, which utilised a pyrosequencing 
approach, and the Illumina sequencing-by-synthesis chemistry, now widely used in 
molecular biology laboratories (Table 1.2) (295). Third generation sequencing 
technologies were developed shortly afterwards from 2009, encompassing novel 
approaches that remove the amplification step used in second generation approaches. 
Although the costs associated with NGS are high, the development of this technology 
has resulted in a dramatic decrease in the cost of DNA sequencing per megabase. 
‘Moore’s law’, coined to describe the long-term trend in computer power doubling every 
two years, is commonly used to observe and project technology improvements. Those 
that follow Moore’s law are considered to be doing extremely well in terms of speed of 
development. The cost per megabase of DNA fitted well with Moore’s law between 2001 
and 2008, following which a dramatic drop in cost occurred, far outpacing Moore’s law 

















Number of reads 
per run 
Time per run 
(hours) 







454 Roche GS FLX + 2nd PCR Pyrosequencing 700 1 Indel 1.00E+06 23 
Illumina MiSeq 2nd PCR Synthesis 2 × 300 0.1 Substitution 4.4-5.0E+07 56 
Oxford Nanopore 
MinION 








Table 1.2 Comparison of widely used 1st, 2nd and 3rd generation sequencing technologies. Adapted from Derocles et al. 2018 (297). PCR = polymerase 
chain reaction. Updates to the table were made from the following sources: read length – MinION (298), error rate – MinION (299), number of reads 






Figure 1.17 Sequencing costs per megabase of DNA, 2001 - August 2019.  The dramatic 
decrease in cost seen from 2008 coincides with the transition from Sanger to NGS. Data 
from the National Human Genome Research Institute, figure reproduced from 
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Costs-Data 
 
Illumina and Nanopore are probably the most widely used sequencing technologies in 
the field of virus genome sequencing at present. In Illumina’s sequencing-by-synthesis 
chemistry, DNA is prepared by generating sequencing libraries, where DNA is 
fragmented into 200-300 bp and adapters are ligated to the ends of the fragments 
(Figure 1.18). The library is applied to a solid surface (the flow cell) where adapters 
enable the DNA bind to the surface of the flow cell. DNA is amplified in a polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR) known as ‘cluster generation’, where approximately one million 




sequencing reaction works in a similar way to the Sanger method; it uses 
deoxyribonucleotide triphosphates (dNTPs) that contain a fluorescently labelled 
terminator, which prevents further DNA polymerisation after a single base has been 
incorporated (Figure 1.18). Unlike Sanger sequencing, the termination is reversible, and 
fluorescence is detected optically following the addition of dNTPS, after which the 
terminator is removed before another cycle of dNTP addition begins. Millions of 
sequencing reactions occur simultaneously on the flowcell and the resulting reads are 
























Nanopore sequencing is a third-generation sequencing technology that has been 
commercialised by UK-based company Oxford Nanopore Technologies (ONT). It utilises 
a novel chemistry based on the use of protein pores (nanopores) embedded in a lipid 
bilayer, situated within a flow cell (Figure 1.19). DNA libraries are prepared by adding an 
adaptor molecule to the end of each DNA fragment. DNA libraries are applied to the 
flowcell where they are driven through a nanopore by means of an enzyme motor, which 
is part of the adapter (Figure 1.19). Electrical current passes through the nanopore and 
changes in conductivity occur as DNA is translocated, with each base producing a 
characteristic change. This is detected and converted to a trace that can be read and 







Figure 1.19 Nanopore sequencing chemistry. Reproduced from (303). 
 
The most well-known ONT product is the MinION, a palm-sized DNA sequencer that is 
used in conjunction with a laptop computer, making it highly portable and therefore well 
suited to field-work. It has the capability to generate extremely long reads and produces 
data in real-time as the run progresses. The initial set-up costs are low, whilst reagents 
and flowcells come at a premium price. Compared with an Illumina benchtop sequencer, 
costs are much lower, especially as there is no service or maintenance contract costs. 
This makes nanopore sequencing a more realistic option for genome sequencing in low- 
and middle-income countries, or during EID outbreaks. The challenges of nanopore 




technology itself does not require a PCR amplification step, this is often practically 
necessary to get sufficient data), high error rates requiring high depth of coverage to 
compensate, and high cost consumables (Table 1.2) (14). However, whilst error rates are 
higher than that of Illumina, the errors generated tend to be random (resulting from a 
low signal-to-noise ratio) as opposed to the systematic biases observed in Illumina 
processes (304). Therefore, at high depth of coverage nanopore sequencing overcomes 
the high error rate, and the reduced systematic bias may even be preferable over 
Illumina sequencing for some applications. 
Illumina error rates are the lowest of any current NGS technology, making it reliable and 
accurate for variant analysis (Table 1.2). Both Illumina and nanopore sequencing have 
the capability to multiplex samples using a barcoding system, meaning multiple samples 
can be sequenced in one run, the number of which is usually determined by the depth 
of coverage required for each sample. The initial set up costs of an Illumina sequencer 
are high compared to nanopore sequencing, with an instrument costing significantly 
more and the nature of the instrument meaning a molecular biology laboratory is 
required.  
 
1.3.2  NGS OF PATHOGEN GENOMES 
Prior to the advent of NGS technologies, virus genome sequencing was accomplished by 
generating multiple overlapping PCR amplicons followed by Sanger sequencing to obtain 
the complete genome sequence. This approach is costly in terms of time and effort, as 
primer pairs must be designed for each target, PCR reactions frequently require re-




metagenomic NGS, defined below) overcomes many of these drawbacks, and the 
increased depth of sequence data produced (hundreds or even thousands of reads at 
each nucleotide position) allows the heterogeneity of viral populations to be studied, 
providing important insights into viral evolution (40). 
Sequencing requires DNA (although recent developments in nanopore technology have 
made possible direct sequencing of viral RNA (306,307)), however sequencing from RNA 
is easily achieved through the means of reverse transcription. Additional considerations 
are needed when performing metagenomic sequencing from RNA. RNA virus genomes 
are usually kilobases long, whereas host DNA genomes are often orders of magnitude 
larger. This means that a single contaminating host cell can form the equivalent of half 
a million virions in sequencing reads (308). To reduce this ‘background’, it is essential 
that DNA is removed from the sample prior to sequencing. Despite this, it is still possible 
(though not optimal) to detect the presence of DNA viruses, bacteria, fungi, and 
parasites, because ribosomal RNA and mRNAs produced by actively replicating DNA will 
be sequenced, allowing a broader range of pathogen detection (308).  
 
1.3.3  TARGETED VERSUS METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
Targeted NGS (Figure 1.20) uses target sequence capture/hybridisation techniques to 
enrich for target sequences, which is useful for viral genomes which usually make up a 
tiny proportion of the DNA or RNA present in a sample (305,309). These techniques 
allow more efficient viral genome sequencing and identification using NGS, which is 
useful when looking for several targets, when using poor quality samples, and when high 




with NGS, which utilises millions of pathogen-specific probes that can enrich for highly 
diverse sequences, is promising because of the high sensitivity and specificity of this 
method (311). However, targeted approaches require prior knowledge of the pathogen, 
meaning novel or genetically divergent pathogens are likely to be missed. In contrast, 
metagenomic sequencing (metagenomics) is the direct sequencing and characterisation 
of all genetic material present in a sample (312). This approach is an attractive 
alternative to conventional molecular diagnostic methods such as RT-PCR, or targeted 
NGS sequencing approaches, because novel or genetically divergent pathogens can be 
detected from clinical samples with no specific amplification and there is no 





Figure 1.20 Workflows for targeted and non-targeted NGS approaches.  Adapted from 




1.3.4  METAGENOMICS WORKFLOW 
A typical metagenomics workflow for identifying viral genomes begins with (if 
sequencing RNA) a DNAse treatment to remove contaminating DNA, followed by reverse 
transcription to generate complementary DNA (cDNA, Figure 1.20). These two initial 
steps are not required if sequencing is from DNA, and the former would be omitted if 
sequencing both RNA and DNA. Next, a random amplification may be performed 
(though not always) to increase the quantity of cDNA/DNA in the sample (Figure 1.20). 
Numerous methods have been described to achieve this, each of which carry their own 
potential source of bias (314). The SISPA (Sequence-Independent, Single-Primer 
Amplification) approach uses a primer with a defined sequence at the 5’ end and a 
stretch of random nucleotides at the 3’ end, to randomly amplify cDNA/DNA. Reported 
biases associated with the SISPA method are uneven distribution of sequencing reads 
across genomes, and poor representation of low abundance genomes (315). However, 
the method has been tested extensively on clinical samples and is well documented in 
recovering multiple pathogens: DNA and RNA viruses, bacteria, fungi, and parasites 
(316–323). Sequencing libraries, prepared from the randomly amplified cDNA/DNA, are 
then sequenced on the platform of choice (Figure 1.20).  
A typical bioinformatics pipeline for analysing metagenomic data for the purpose of 
identifying microbial genomes uses the raw sequencing reads in a series of analysis steps 
(Figure 1.21). To start, data is optimised by filtering out poor-quality reads, trimming 
adaptor sequences, and removing host reads. Then identification of microbial genomes 
is achieved through a combination of taxonomic classification of individual reads, de 




The metagenomic sequencing method chosen for this project focusses on identifying 
RNA viruses, which as previously explained, have a prominent role in EID. The method 
has previously been shown to be effective in identifying RNA viruses directly from clinical 
material (321,322,324,325), however as explained the detection of replicating DNA 
viruses and bacterial is still possible (though not optimal) because viral RNA 
intermediates and bacterial ribosomal RNA will be sequenced. An Illumina Miseq was 
chosen as the primary method of sequencing over the ONT MinION, because the lower 
error rate of the Illumina method is more desirable in the context of this project, and 
portability is not required.   
The bioinformatics pipeline chosen starts with taxonomical classification of filtered and 
trimmed sequencing reads using Centrifuge (326). Virus classifications at species level 
exceeding 0.01% total reads were investigated further using mapping techniques. De 
novo assembly, an unbiased non-targeted analysis method, was performed using 
SPAdes (327). This generated contigs from which scaffolds were constructed. Scaffolds 
were analysed using Kaiju, which translates nucleotide sequence into amino acid 
sequence then compares this to a database of viral sequences using the Burrows-
Wheeler transform, to assign a taxon to the query sequence (328). This assesses protein, 
not nucleotide homology, which is more sensitive for sequences that are divergent from 
the current known breadth of viral sequences. Mapping to relevant virus reference 
genomes was performed using BWA-MEM (329) to identify the number of reads 
mapping to a particular pathogen and determine genome coverage. Virus reference 
genomes were chosen to include: viruses previously tested for using RT-PCR assays (to 




viruses identified during taxonomic classification, de novo assembly and subsequent 












1.3.5  APPLICATIONS OF METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
1.3.5.1 CLINICAL DIAGNOSTICS 
The application of metagenomic sequencing to the clinical diagnosis of infectious 
disease is an exciting prospect with many challenges. The first published clinical use of 
metagenomics was the detection of Leptospira in the CSF of a teenage boy with 
neurological symptoms, reported in 2014 (316). Leptospirosis was clinically suspected 
however PCR and culture tests were negative. The diagnostic PCR primers were found 
to poorly match the Leptospira genome (316). Since then, reports of using 
metagenomics to identify causative pathogens from patients with common 
presentations (330–332), as well as emerging viral infections (322), have demonstrated 
the potential of the approach. A recent study found that the majority of CHIKV and 
DENV-positive plasma samples contained quantities of viral RNA sufficient to generate 
significant portions of viral genomes using a metagenomic approach (321). 
Metagenomic pipelines for virus identification in AUFI patients have undergone 
development in recent years and show promise (322,333,334). Initial results from a 
study comparing conventional and metagenomic approaches to influenza virus 
detection in respiratory samples reported comparable specificity, but reduced 
sensitivity (335). This approach identified other viruses, demonstrating the potential of 
metagenomics for identifying co-infections, which could be missed using conventional 
approaches. Metagenomics has the added benefit of providing sequence information 
which can be used in epidemiology, transmission studies, vaccine efficacy studies and 




pathogen detection from clinical CSF samples was the first to successfully demonstrate 
proof-of-concept for diagnosis of infectious causes of meningitis and encephalitis (334). 
Though results are promising, many challenges remain, including lower sensitivity than 
conventional tests and higher costs (14), which can make it less practical to use for large 
numbers of samples or in resource-limited settings. Although NGS is much more 
expensive than Sanger per sample, the potential for cost saving by using a single 
(metagenomic) test rather than multiple targeted diagnostic assays requiring separate 
reagents and instruments, coupled with decreasing sequencing costs, may make 
metagenomic sequencing attractive from a cost-perspective under the right 
circumstances. 
The wide array of bioinformatics tools available means that reproducibility and 
standardisation can be difficult to achieve. Studies have demonstrated that the choice 
of bioinformatic algorithms can affect results when identifying the make-up of 
microbiota samples (336,337). The development of automatic ‘user-friendly’ 
bioinformatics pipelines are a step towards improving reproducibility and increasing 
suitability for clinical use (338). Metagenomic sequencing has traditionally taken more 
time than conventional molecular detection methods, however developments have led 
to sequencing library preparation and amplification methods which are easily completed 
in a matter of days or even hours (308). 
 
1.3.5.2 VIRUS DISCOVERY 
The pace at which novel viruses have been discovered has accelerated in recent years 




targeted PCR methods, de novo assembly of sequencing data enables identification of 
viruses that are novel or highly genetically divergent. This, in addition to the ability to 
sequence directly from a wide variety of clinical samples without requiring specific 
amplification, has proven to be invaluable in identifying causative agents in clinical 
cases. Furthermore, it has made large-scale studies of virus diversity within clinical, 
animal and environmental samples possible. Recent studies identified a staggering 184 
novel vertebrate viruses (the majority of which belonged to the Picobirnaviridae family) 
from macaque faeces (339), and 1,445 from invertebrates (340). A novel bornavirus, 
originating from a squirrel, was identified as the cause of fatal encephalitis in three 
squirrel breeders (341), whilst a novel phlebovirus was identified in two men suffering 
from severe febrile illness after receiving tick bites in the state of Missouri, USA (342).  
Whilst the discovery of such a large number of new viruses is exciting, further studies 
are required to understand the ecology of a novel virus, including its ability to cause 
disease in humans and to cross species barriers (14). In clinical cases, it is essential that 
findings are interpreted in a clinical context and confirmatory testing should be 












Figure 1.22 Publications by year for A) “RNA virus metagenomics” and B) “virome”, 
from 2006-2016 using the “Results by Year” graph from Pubmed. C) number of viral 
species, D: genera, and E: families, assigned by the ICTV from 1970-2016.  Reproduced 
from Greninger (2018) (308). 
 
1.3.5.3 EID SURVEILLANCE AND OUTBREAK RESPONSE 
NGS technology has recently reached a point at which rapid genomic surveillance can 
become part of the response to an outbreak of infectious disease. Conventionally, this 
response involves using epidemiological data gathered by interview-based contact 
tracing to understand transmission chains within an outbreak (311). Using pathogen 




incomplete case reporting, and provides data that can not only be used for 
epidemiological analyses and tracking the geographic and temporal spread of an 
outbreak, but also for monitoring virus evolution, identifying co-infections, and 
monitoring responses to vaccination or treatments (Figure 1.23) (311,343).  
 
 
Figure 1.23 The application of pathogen genome sequencing for response to outbreaks 
of infectious disease. Reproduced from Ladner et al. 2019 (311). 
 
The utility of this technology was exemplified during the West African EBOV outbreak, 
during which EBOV genome sequencing from Guinean patient samples, using an 
amplicon-based approach in conjunction with a MinION sequencer, mapped the genetic 
evolution of the virus from March 2014 to January 2015 and identified multiple virus 




approach using samples from Sierra Leonean EBOV patients further demonstrated that 
real-time genome sequencing is possible during outbreaks in a resource-limited setting 
(343). Virus genome sequencing during the ZIKV outbreak in the Americas provided 
important data for epidemiological analyses. Two main ZIKV lineages exist, named 
‘African’ and ‘Asian’; the strain responsible for the outbreak in the Americas belonged 
to the Asian lineage, as did strains responsible for previous major ZIKV outbreaks in 
humans (344). Genome sequence analyses showed that during the Americas outbreak, 
the virus became more genetically diverse over time, due to the introduction into an 
immunologically naïve population (273). The implementation of cutting edge 
epidemiological and genomic surveillance during recent yellow fever outbreaks, 
including those in Angola and the DRC in 2015 and the largest Brazilian YFV outbreak for 
decades, detected late in 2016, has helped elucidate the demographic and ecological 
factors that contributed to the ongoing transmission of YFV (345,346). This real-time 
approach provides essential and timely information on virus transmission that can help 
public health authorities prioritise vaccination in relevant areas and demographics. 
The unbiased nature of metagenomics is useful for monitoring viruses with high genetic 
diversity, such as LASV, which has previously proven difficult to detect using 
conventional targeted methods (347). Metagenomic sequencing of LASV genomes 
directly from clinical samples in Nigeria in 2018, during an unusually severe Lassa fever 
season with the largest upsurge of cases on record, allowed rapid phylogenetic analyses 
which informed the public health response whilst the outbreak was still ongoing (348). 
Analyses showed that the large number of cases were due to independent introductions 
from the rodent reservoir, rather than the evolution of a more virulent strain or 




Countries most at risk from EID events often have limited capability to respond to such 
events, frequently because of the financial and infrastructure constraints present in low- 
and middle-income countries (3). Laboratory capacity may be insufficient and using 
high-cost bench top sequencers is not an option. In this instance, the portability of the 
ONT MinION nanopore sequencing platform, in addition to the low start-up costs, makes 
it a very attractive option for sequencing under these circumstances. This makes the 
incorporation of metagenomic sequencing into diagnostic and surveillance protocols in 
countries at high risk of EID events much more realistic than it ever has been previously.  
 
1.3.6  LIMITATIONS OF METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
Sensitivity is the main limitation of metagenomics for virus detection. Viruses that 
typically show low viral loads in clinical samples are difficult to detect directly from 
clinical material with a high degree of confidence. These may require culturing prior to 
sequencing, or other confirmatory tests, if the virus is to be ruled out definitively (308). 
For example, genome sequencing was used extensively during the 2015 ZIKV outbreak 
in the Americas to better understand viral genetic diversity and transmission 
(42,349,350). Metagenomic sequencing was undertaken initially (349), however 
targeted approaches proved more useful due to the low amount of viral RNA present in 
clinical samples (42,349–351). For diagnostic purposes, RT-PCR assays frequently have a 
lower limit of detection than metagenomic sequencing, however, detection is reliant on 
the target site being well conserved throughout the viral population. In some cases, an 
effective strategy may be to use metagenomic sequencing to generate complete 
genomic sequence for a limited number of isolates, then design an RT-PCR based on the 




The nature of the metagenomic sequencing method means that all nucleic acids present 
in a sample (RNA or DNA) are sequenced. This includes genetic material not just from 
the sample, but also any introduced during processing methods, for example 
contaminants within the laboratory, reagents, or sequencing instrument. Careful 
adherence to good practice in the molecular laboratory prior to sequencing is essential 
to minimise potential contaminants, and the addition of negative controls can help to 
minimise false-positive results (338). Data analysis and interpretation of results must be 
performed carefully and require a thorough understanding of the methodology and 





1.4  PROJECT AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
1.4.1  RATIONALE AND ANTICIPATED OUTCOMES 
As has been broadly introduced in this chapter, EIDs are an important cause of mortality 
and morbidity and place a large burden on global healthcare, despite medical and 
scientific advances in recent years (3). EIDs are most prevalent in areas that have drivers 
associated with disease emergence such as high biodiversity, and outbreaks are 
exacerbated by limited resources to respond (5,18). Numerous viruses have emerged to 
cause outbreaks in recent decades, including those transmitted by arthropod vectors 
including DENV, CHIKV and ZIKV, and rodent vectors including arenaviruses and 
hantaviruses. Zoonotic spillover events that lead to chains of human-to-human 
transmission, such as EBOV, are increasingly observed (5). Preventing and controlling 
outbreaks of viral disease is a complex and challenging task, requiring reliable 
infrastructure, sufficient and sustained funding, and co-ordination at both a national and 
international level.  
At the time of the ZIKV outbreak in the Americas, the WHO made a number of 
recommendations for action as part of their ‘Zika strategic response plan’, in an effort 
to support national governments in controlling the outbreak (352).  These 
recommendations are not exclusive to ZIKV and are relevant to many viral causes of EID. 
They include: 1) advancing research in prevention, surveillance and control of virus 
infection, 2) developing, strengthening and implementing integrated surveillance 
systems for virus infection, 3) strengthening the capacity of laboratories to test for virus 





This project aims to support these actions by undertaking retrospective testing for 
viruses in two cohorts of patients from low and middle-income countries that have high 
biodiversity; Sierra Leone and Ecuador (353). The inclusion criteria for both cohorts were 
patients that presented voluntarily to a medical centre with fever. For Sierra Leonean 
patients, only those that tested negative for EBOV were included. Patients were sampled 
during the acute phase of their illness, during which many viruses are detectable in the 
blood due to viraemia, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This makes PCR/RT-PCR and 
sequencing appropriate methods to use with these samples, as opposed to serological 
detection of IgM antibodies, which are unlikely to have developed to a detectable level 
so early in the course of disease. Virus detection was carried out by combining a 
screening approach using a panel of PCR/RT-PCR assays for potential causative agents 
informed by geography, followed by metagenomic sequencing of a smaller subset of 
PCR/RT-PCR negative samples in an effort to detect novel, genetically divergent or 
unexpected viruses.  
 
Additional anticipated outcomes from this project are: 
• Support existing in-country laboratories by identifying circulating viruses and 
recommending additional assays to include in surveillance and diagnostic 
testing. 
• Protect UK public health from imported infectious diseases by identifying 




• Enhance future surveillance efforts and collaborative research programmes by 
banking propagated, clinically significant viruses with national curated virus 
collections.  
 
1.4.2  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
The aims of the project are: 
1. To establish if pathogenic viruses are present within the two study groups, 
focussing on RNA viruses. 
2. To characterise viruses identified through whole genome sequencing and virus 
isolation. 
3. To further investigate relevant virus(es) resulting from aims 1 and 2. Objectives 
will be based on the nature of the virus and relevant research questions 
stemming from it but will have a pathogenesis or immunological focus. 
 
1.4.2.1 AIM 1 OBJECTIVES 
• Perform testing for known pathogens on RNA extracted from patient plasma 
samples using a panel of RT-PCR and PCR assays (conventional and real-time). 
• Use the RT-PCR/PCR results and sample metadata to identify a suitable subset of 
pathogen-negative samples for metagenomic sequencing, with the intention of 
detecting novel or unexpected pathogens. 
• Perform unbiased metagenomic sequencing and subsequent data analysis to 




1.4.2.2 AIM 2 OBJECTIVES 
• Isolate virus in vitro and generate stocks of purified, quantified virus. 
• Generate complete, annotated viral genome sequences from cultured isolates 
using NGS, and make these publicly available via the online database GenBank. 
• Compare viral genome sequences with other publicly available strains and 
perform relevant phylogenetic analyses. 
 
1.4.2.3 AIM 3 OBJECTIVES 
This set of objectives naturally evolved during the course of the project, based on the 
results from aims 1 and 2. The final objectives were: 
• The focus of aim 3 became OROV pathogenesis, about which relatively little 
published literature exists and therefore performing fundamental research in 
this area would be valuable. 
• Using cell lines from a range of different insects that may be relevant to OROV 
transmission, determine which insect-derived cell lines OROV replicates in.  
• Identify human cell types that may be biologically relevant in natural infection 
and perform experiments to determine whether OROV is capable of replicating 




CHAPTER 2: MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1  HUMAN PLASMA SAMPLES 
2.1.1  SIERRA LEONEAN FEBRILE PATIENTS 
Residual clinical samples and accompanying data were collected from patients 
following routine diagnostic testing in PHE-led laboratories during the EBOV outbreak 
in 2014-2015 in Sierra Leone. After the outbreak, samples and data were transferred 
to PHE laboratories in the UK for curation by PHE, forming the Sierra Leone Ministry of 
Health and Sanitation – PHE (MoHS-PHE) Ebola biobank (354). The MoHS in Sierra 
Leone retain ownership of the samples and data. The MoHS-PHE Ebola Biobank 
Governance Group is an independent group established to ensure the effective use of 
the biobank and co-ordinate access to samples and data for researchers. 
One hundred and twenty plasma samples from the MoHS-PHE Ebola biobank were 
allocated for use in this project (Table 2.1) following ethical approval from the MoHS-
PHE Ebola Biobank Governance Group, the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review 
Committee and the PHE Research Ethics and Governance Group (ref: R&D 270). Whole 
blood samples were obtained during 2014-2015 from patients presenting at an Ebola 
treatment centre (ETC) with a PHE-run EVD diagnostic laboratory on-site. All patients 
showed symptoms consistent with EVD. At the time of sampling, plasma was removed 
from centrifuged whole blood in ethylene diamine tetraacetic acid (EDTA), RNA was 
extracted and EBOV real-time reverse transcription PCR (qRT-PCR) performed using 
either the RealStar Zaire Ebolavirus qRT-PCR Kit 1.0 (Altona Diagnostics, UK) or a Zaire-
specific qRT-PCR based on that published by Trombley et al. (355). Whole blood was also 
tested for Plasmodium using a rapid device test (RDT, BinaxNOW or SD Bioline Malaria 




EBOV at the time of sampling. Following testing, plasma was frozen and shipped to PHE 
for inclusion in the MoHS-PHE Ebola Biobank. Where available, the following metadata 
was provided with the samples (Appendix 1): Sierra Leone ID number, patient ID number 
(redacted from Appendix 1 to maintain patient confidentiality), laboratory of origin, 
sample type, specimen date, EBOV qRT-PCR result, Plasmodium RDT result, sample 
status (new/repeat/follow-up), patient age, patient district, patient chiefdom. Samples 
were allocated new ID numbers upon receipt (‘PHE ID’, Appendix 1). 
 
Ebola treatment centre 
(ETC) location 
Plasmodium negative Plasmodium positive 
Makeni 36 4 
Port Loko 36 4 
Kerry Town 36 4 
Total: 108 12 
Table 2.1 Laboratory origin and Plasmodium status of febrile patient samples from 
Sierra Leone.  90% of requested samples were Plasmodium negative to optimise the 
sample set for virus discovery, 10% were Plasmodium positive to identify co-infections. 
 
2.1.2  ECUADORIAN FEBRILE PATIENTS 
Plasma were obtained from whole blood samples taken from patients at Delphina Torres 
de Concha Hospital, Esmeraldas province, Ecuador in 2016 (n=196, Appendix 2) and 
2017 (n=62, Appendix 3). These patients attended the hospital voluntarily and 




collected with the samples: patient age, sex, patient location, number of days of fever, 
other clinical signs and symptoms. The use of patient samples in this project was 
approved by the bioethics committee of Universidad San Francisco de Quito (USFQ), 
Ecuador. This work was performed as part of a collaboration between PHE, USFQ and 
Delphina Torres de Concha Hospital. 
 
2.2  CHEMICALS AND REAGENTS 
Unless stated otherwise, all chemical/reagents were purchased from ThermoFisher 
Scientific, UK. Purification of PCR products was undertaken using a 2:1 ratio of Agencourt 
AMPure XP beads (Beckman Coulter, UK). RNA and DNA quantifications were performed 
using the Qubit RNA broad spectrum kit and Qubit dsDNA high sensitivity kit 
(Thermofisher Scientific, UK), respectively. Primers and probes were ordered from 
Integrated DNA Technologies, UK. 
 
2.3  RNA EXTRACTION FROM PATIENT PLASMA SAMPLES 
Plasma samples were inactivated using AVL buffer (Qiagen, UK) and ethanol and RNA 
was extracted using the QIAamp Viral RNA mini kit (Qiagen, UK). 140 μl plasma was 
added to 560 μl AVL buffer containing 5.6 μl linear polyacrylamide (LPA, Sigma-Aldrich, 
UK), and 24 μl MS2 bacteriophage (1.45e+5 plaque forming units) to act as an internal 
control. The mixture was incubated for 10 minutes at room temperature, then 560 µl of 
ethanol was added prior to a second 10-minute incubation at room temperature to 
complete the chemical virus inactivation process. Total sample was transferred to a spin 




RNA was eluted from the spin column membrane in 175 µl nuclease-free water (Life 
Technologies, UK) and stored at -80°C. A negative extract control (nuclease-free water) 
was included in every batch of RNA extractions to act as a quality control for cross-
contamination. 
Plasma samples from Sierra Leone were stored and manipulated under containment 
level (CL) 4 conditions because of the risk of the presence of advisory committee on 
dangerous pathogens (ACDP) hazard group (HG) 4 pathogens. Due to the training and 
safety controls necessary to work in this environment, the initial chemical inactivation 
step was carried out by experienced CL4-trained staff. Once in AVL buffer, the samples 
were handled at CL3 for the subsequent ethanol inactivation step. 
 
2.4  RT-PCR/PCR ASSAYS FOR PATHOGEN DETECTION 
RNA was tested for pathogens known to cause acute fever, using real-time and 
conventional RT-PCR and PCR assays developed or optimised at PHE (Table 2.2). These 
assays form part of the PCR testing protocol used by the Rare and Imported Pathogen 
Laboratories (RIPL) to diagnose infection in returning UK travellers. As such, assay 
conditions and platforms were set to conform with those validated by RIPL. 
RNA from Sierra Leonean patient samples was screened for CHIKV, DENV serotypes 1-4, 
EBOV, RVFV, YFV, ZIKV, Leptospira, Rickettsia and internal control MS2 bacteriophage 
using qRT-PCR assays. LASV and Plasmodium were tested for using conventional RT-PCR 
assays followed by agarose gel electrophoresis. For EBOV detection, two assays were 
used, the Zaire-specific assay adapted from Trombley et al. (2010) (355), used in the 




al. (2007) (356). This was because the Zaire-specific assay has better sensitivity for Zaire 
EBOV (the species responsible for the West Africa EBOV outbreak), and the pan-EBOV 
assay is capable of detecting non-Zaire EBOV species. RNA from Ecuadorian patient 
samples was tested using the same assays as described for Sierra Leone, except for 
EBOV, LASV and RVFV because they are not known to circulate in the Americas. MAYV 
was also tested for because it is known to circulate in South America. Details of each 
assay follow, grouped by the commercial kit used. For all assays, a standardised volume 
















































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2 Pathogen specific RT-PCR/PCR tests used in this study.  SSIII = SuperScript III Platinum One-Step qRT-PCR kit (Invitrogen, UK). 
Takyon = Takyon Low ROX Probe 2X MasterMix dTTP blue (Eurogentec, Belgium), QOS = Qiagen One-Step RT-PCR kit (Qiagen, UK), Fast 
virus = TaqMan Fast virus 1-step master mix. FAM = 6-carboxyfluorescein, BHQ1 = Black Hole Quencher 1, MGB = Minor Groove Binder. 






2.4.1  SUPERSCRIPT I II PLATINUM ONE-STEP QRT-PCR KIT 
2.4.1.1 DROSTEN QRT-PCR ASSAY 
Primer/probe mixes for each target were made in advance and frozen at -20ºC for 
subsequent use. Details of primer/probe mix formulations are provided in Table 2.3.  
Assay 
target 
Component Final concentration 
Volume for 100 
reactions (µL) 
CHIKV 
Water N/A 221.5 
2x reaction mix 1 x 1000 
MgS04 (50mM) 3.75 mM 150 
CHIK_E1 F (100µM) 900 nM 18 
CHIK_E1 R (100µM) 900 nM 18 
CHIK E1 P (100µM) 625 nM 12.5 
DENV1-3 
Water N/A 104 
2x reaction mix 1 x 1000 
MgSO4 (50mM) 6.25 mM 250 
Den Dros F (100µM) 300 nM 6 
Den Dros R1 (100µM) 900 nM 18 
Den Dros P (100µM) 500 nM 10 
MS2 F1 (10µM) 40 nM 8 
MS2 R1 (10µM) 40 nM 8 
MS2 Taq Cy5 (10µM) 80 nM 16 
DENV4 
Water N/A 141 




MgSO4 (50mM) 6.25 mM 250 
Den Dros F (10µM) 50 nM 10 
Den Dros R2 (100µM) 450 nM 9 
Den Dros P (100µM) 500 nM 10 
MAYV 
Water N/A 344 
2x reaction mix 1 x 1000 
MAYARO 9666 (100µM) 900 nM 18 
MAYARO 9797 (100µM) 900 nM 18 
MAYARO 9734 FAM (10µM) 200 nM 40 
Rickettsia 
Water N/A 381 
2x reaction mix 1 x 1000 
CS F (100µM) 900 nM 18 
CS R (100µM) 450 nM 9 
CS P (100µM) 600 nM 12 
RVFV 
Water N/A 221.5 
2x reaction mix 1 x 1000 
MgS04 (50mM) 3.75 mM 150 
RVFNF (100µM) 900 nM 18 
RVFNR (100µM) 900 nM 18 
RVFNP (100µM) 625 nM 12.5 
YFV 
Water N/A 170 
2x reaction mix 1 x 1000 




TM YF FWD (100µM) 250 nM 5 
TM YF REV (100µM) 250 nM 5 
TM YF PRB (10µM) 200 nM 40 
Table 2.3 Primer/probe mix formulations for Drosten qRT-PCR assay targets.  MgS04 = 
magnesium sulphate. 
 
Immediately prior to testing, primer/probe mixes were thawed and combined with 
platinum taq enzyme to make a mastermix for each target (Table 2.4). 
Component Volume for 1 reaction (µL) 
Primer/probe mix 14.2 
Platinum taq 0.8 
Table 2.4 Mastermix formulation for Drosten qRT-PCR assay targets. 
 
15 µl mastermix was aliquoted into each well in a 96-well PCR plate prior to the addition 
of 5 µl sample RNA, or positive/negative control per well. The reactions were performed 
on a LightCycler® 480 instrument (Roche, UK), using the ‘Drosten with MS2’ cycling 





















None 45 10:00 None 1 20 
Denature None 95 05:00 None 1 20 
Amplify Quantification 95 0:05 None 
45 
20 
  57 0:35 Single 20 
Cooling None 40 0:30 None 1 20 
Table 2.5 ‘Drosten with MS2’ qRT-PCR cycling conditions. 
 
2.4.2  TAQMAN FAST VIRUS 1-STEP MASTER MIX 
Primer/probe mixes were made in advance and frozen at -20ºC for subsequent use. 





Volume for 100 
reactions (µL) 
CCHFV 
Water n/a 59 
CCHF S122F 900 18 
CCHF S1R 900 18 
CCHF probe 250 5 
Pan-EBOV 
Water n/a 59 




FiloB_Ebola 900 18 
FAMEBO_DEGEN 250 5 
Zaire EBOV + MS2 
Water n/a 27 
F565 Zaire 900 18 
R6405 Zaire 900 18 
P597S Zaire 250 5 
MS2 F1 40 8 
MS2 Rev 40 8 
MS2 Taq Cy5 80 16 
ZIKV + MS2 
Water n/a 922 
Zika NS1 Fwd 900 18 
Zika NS1 Rev 900 18 
Zika NS1 Probe 1 250 5 
Zika NS1 Probe 2 250 5 
MS2 F1 40 8 
MS2 Rev 40 8 
MS2 TAQ Probe 80 16 
Table 2.6 Primer/probe mix formulations for ABi fast-mix qRT-PCR assay targets. 
 
Immediately prior to testing, primer/probe mixes were thawed and combined with 4x 





Component Volume for 1 reaction (µL) 
Water 9 
4x reaction mix 5 
Primer/probe mix 1 
Table 2.7 Mastermix formulation for CCHFV and EBOV qRT-PCR assay targets. 
 
Component Volume for 1 reaction (µL) 
4x reaction mix 5 
Primer/probe mix 10 
Table 2.8 Mastermix formulation for ZIKV qRT-PCR assay. 
 
15 µl mastermix was aliquoted into each well in a 96-well PCR plate prior to the addition 
of 5 µl sample RNA, or positive/negative control per well. The reactions were performed 
on a 7500 or Viaa7 Real-Time PCR System (both Applied Biosciences, UK), using the ‘Fast 























None 50 05:00 None 1 
Denature None 95 00:20 None 1 
Amplify Quantification 95 0:03 None 
40 
  60 0:30 Single 
Table 2.9 ‘Fast virus’ qRT-PCR cycling conditions. 
 
2.4.3  QIAGEN ONE-STEP RT-PCR KIT 
2.4.3.1 PLASMODIUM RT-PCR 
Plasmodium primer mix was made in advance and frozen at -20ºC for future use (Table 
2.10).  
Component Final concentration 
Volume for 100 
reactions (µL) 
Water N/A 1270 
5x RT-PCR Buffer 1x 500 
dNTPS (10mM) 400 μM 100 
Primer ‘Mal F’ (100 M) 600 nM 15 
Primer ‘Mal R’ (100 M) 600 nM 15 





Immediately prior to testing, primer mix was thawed and combined with the enzyme 
mix to make a mastermix (Table 2.11). 
 
Component Volume for 1 reaction (µL) 
Primer mix 19 
Enzyme mix 1 
Table 2.11 Mastermix formulation for Plasmodium RT-PCR assay. 
 
20 µl mastermix was aliquoted into 0.2 mL PCR tubes prior to the addition of 5 µl sample 
RNA, or positive/negative control per well. The reactions were performed on a 
GeneAmp 9700 thermocycler (Applied Biosystems, UK) using the ‘Plasmodium’ cycling 







Reverse Transcription 50 30:00 1 
Denature 95 15:00 1 







Hold 72 5:00 1 
Holding temp. 4 Indefinitely n/a 




PCR products were visualised using gel electrophoresis (see section 2.5). The presence 
of a 291 bp product indicated a positive result. 
 
2.4.3.2 LASV RT-PCR 
LASV primer mix was made in advance and frozen at -20ºC for subsequent use (Table 
2.13) 
Component Final concentration 
Volume for 100 
reactions (µL) 
Water N/A 770 
5x RT-PCR Buffer 1x 500 
Q solution 1x 500 
dNTPs (10mM) 400 μM 100 
Primer Lassa 1 (36E2) (100 M) 600 nM 15 
Primer LVS-339-rev (100 M) 600 nM 15 
Table 2.13 Primer mix formulation for LASV RT-PCR assay. 
 
Immediately prior to testing, primer mix was thawed and combined with the enzyme 







Component Volume for 1 reaction (µL) 
Primer mix 19 
Enzyme mix 1 
Table 2.14 Mastermix formulation for LASV RT-PCR assay. 
 
20 µl mastermix was aliquoted into 0.2 mL PCR tubes prior to the addition of 5 µl sample 
RNA, or positive/negative control per well. The reactions were performed on a 
GeneAmp 9700 thermocycler (Applied Biosystems, UK) using the ‘Lassa RT-PCR’ cycling 
conditions (Table 2.15). 
Step Temp. (°C) Time (M:S) Cycles 
Reverse 
Transcription 
50 30:00 1 cycle 
Denature 95 15:00 1 cycle 
Amplify 95 00:30 
45 cycles  52 00:30 
 72 00:30 
Hold 4 Hold 1 cycle 
Table 2.15 ‘Lassa RT-PCR’ cycling conditions.  
 
PCR products were visualised using gel electrophoresis (see section 2.5). The presence 





2.4.4  TAKYON LOW ROX PROBE  2X MASTERMIX DTTP BLUE 
Leptospira primer/probe mix was made in advance and frozen at -20ºC for subsequent 
use (Table 2.16).  
Component Volume for 100 reactions (µL) 
LeptoF1 (forward) 100 µM 10 
LeptoF2 (forward) 100 µM 10 
LeptoR (reverse) 100 µM 10 
Pathprobe (probe) 100 µM 2.5 
Interprobe (probe) 100 µM 2.5 
Enviroprobe (probe) 100 µM 2.5 
Water 712.5 
Table 2.16 Primer/probe mix formulation for Leptospira qRT-PCR assay.  
 
Immediately prior to testing, primer/probe mix was thawed and combined with the 
enzyme mix to make a mastermix (Table 2.17). 
 
Component Volume for 1 reaction (µL) 
Primer/probe mix 7.5 
TakyonTM 2x master mix 12.5 





20 µl mastermix was aliquoted into each well in a 96-well PCR plate prior to the addition 
of 5 µl sample RNA, or positive/negative control per well. The reactions were performed 
on a 7500 or Viaa7 Real-Time PCR System (both Applied Biosciences, UK), using the 
‘Leptospira’ cycling conditions (Table 2.18). 
 










Denature None 95 05:00 None 1 20 
Amplify 
Quantification 95 00:03 None 
50 
20 
 60 00:30 Single 20 
 72 00:10  20 
Table 2.18 ‘Leptospira’ qPCR cycling conditions. 
 
2.4.5  INTERPRETATION OF QRT-PCR RESULTS 
The qRT-PCR assays used in this study use a cut-off cycle quantification (Cq) value of 40, 
any value equal to or higher than this represents a negative result. A Cq value of <35 
with an amplification plot showing a sigmoidal shaped amplification curve is considered 
positive. Cq values of 35 – 39.9 indicate a borderline result and are repeated in duplicate. 
The cut-off values were determined prior to this project using standardised validation 
protocols developed by RIPL at PHE Porton Down. 
For samples with an initial borderline result, a repeat Cq of 35 – 39.9 (in duplicate) was 
considered positive, a repeat Cq of >40 was considered negative. The result was called 




<40 for one replicate and no Cq for the other replicate. A sample was considered positive 
by conventional RT-PCR if a visible band of the correct size was present on the gel. 
Positive controls (Table 2.2) and negative controls (nuclease-free water) were included 
in every assay run. Negative extraction controls for each batch of RNA extractions were 
tested using all RT-PCR assays, to control for contamination at the extraction stage. A 
qRT-PCR assay targeting the internal control MS2 was performed to control for 
ineffective RNA extraction. 
 
2.5  GEL ELECTROPHORESIS  
PCR products were visualised on a 2% agarose gel stained with 1 µg/mL ethidium 
bromide (Sigma-Aldrich, UK), a DNA chelating agent that fluoresces under UV light. 
Amplicons were separated using 110 volts for 40 minutes and run alongside a 100 base 
pair (bp) DNA ladder (New England Biolabs, UK), then visualised under UV light using a 
transilluminator and GeneSys software (Syngene, UK). 
 
2.6  ANTI-CHIKV, -DENV AND -ZIKV IGM ELISA 
Plasma samples that had a CHIKV, DENV or ZIKV qRT-PCR Cq value of 35 – 40 were tested 
in triplicate for IgM antibodies against the virus in question, using commercial capture 
ELISAs to detect serological evidence of recent infection.  
DENV IgM antibodies were detected using the dengue IgM capture ELISA (Abbott Rapid 
Diagnostics, UK), CHIKV and ZIKV IgM antibodies were detected using the anti-CHIKV 
and anti-ZIKV IgM ELISA (Euroimmun, UK), respectively. Assays were performed in 




substituted for Super AquaBlue substrate. The kit substrates required an acidic stop 
solution which was incompatible with sodium hypochlorite, the decontamination agent 
used in the containment level 3 laboratory. Absorbance was measured at 405 nm using 
a Multiskan FC microplate photometer and interpretation carried out according to 
manufacturer’s instructions. 
 
2.7  OROV QRT-PCR DEVELOPMENT 
2.7.1  PRIMER ALIGNMENTS 
Primer and probe sequences were aligned with a set of 149 OROV N gene coding 
sequences from the Genbank nucleotide database 
(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/), using the ClustalW algorithm in the MEGA7 
software package. Sequences represented the geographic (Brazil, Panama, Peru and 
Trinidad and Tobago) and temporal diversity of OROV isolates from the 1950s to present 
day (363). 
 
2.7.2  ASSAY OPTIMISATION AND VALIDATION 
Primer concentrations were tested in multiple combinations at 1 µM, 3 µM, 9 µM and 
18 µM. Probe concentrations were tested from 5 µM to 25 µM. Magnesium sulphate 
(MgSO4) concentration was optimised by adding additional MgSO4 to the reaction mix, 
from none added to a maximum concentration of 85 mM. Optimal concentrations were 
considered those that gave the lowest Cq value across the range of values tested, using 




Unless a substantial improvement in sensitivity was demonstrated (>2 Cq values), 
primer/probe/MgSO4 conditions were set to comply with those standardised by RIPL. 
This ensured that the OROV assay could be easily incorporated into the RIPL test 
protocol for returning UK travellers. Cross-reactivity to 23 non-target virus species and 
a panel of negative human sera was also assessed. A cross-reaction was considered 
present if a Cq value of <40 was observed. 
 
2.7.3  QRT-PCR LIMIT OF DETECTION ANALYSIS  
Absolute quantitation of RNA copy number was calculated from a standard curve of 
serially diluted OROV S segment RNA, transcribed using the Megascript kit (Ambion, 
UK). A 711 bp region of the S segment, encompassing the N and Ns open reading frames 
(ORF), was amplified from strain OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 cDNA using primers 
incorporating a T7 promoter sequence (forward primer sequence 5’ GTC AGA GTT CAT 
TTT CAA CGA TGT ACC ACA ACG G 3’, reverse primer sequence 5’ GAA ATT AAT ACG ACT 
CAC TAT AGG G CTC CAC TAT ATG TC 3’). RNA was quantified then purity confirmed using 
the RNA 6000 pico kit on a bioanalyzer (Agilent, UK). RNA copy number was calculated 
by first estimating the formula weight of the RNA standard using the product of the 
strand length (711 bases) and the average formula weight of RNA (assuming the average 
mass of an RNA nucleotide is 340 Daltons). The inverse of the formula weight is the 
number of moles of template present in one gram of material. The number of molecules 
of the RNA standard per gram was calculated using Avogadro's number 







The number of copies of RNA standard in the sample (Table 2.19) was estimated by 
multiplying by 1.0e+9 to convert to ng, then multiplying by the amount of RNA standard 
(in ng). A ten-fold serial dilution of RNA standard representing a range of concentrations 
from 1 copy to 1.0e+8 copies was tested using the optimised, validated qRT-PCR assay. 
Each data point on the standard curve was plotted using the mean Cq value from three 
separate experiments. 
 
 OROV RNA standard 
Strand length 711 
Mr (g/mol) 228034.5 
RNA conc. (ng/ul) 3240 
Number of RNA copies/ul 8.1e+12 
Table 2.19 RNA standard copy number, calculated from strand length, molecular 
weight and RNA concentration. Mr (molecular weight) was calculated using the formula: 
molecular weight of ssRNA = (# nucleotides x 320.5) + 159. 
 
2.7.4  OROV QRT-PCR ASSAY CONDITIONS 
The assay was modified from an assay developed by Weidmann et al. (2003) (361) that 
targets the OROV S segment (Table 2.20). The assay uses the Superscript III Platinum 
One-step quantitative RT-PCR kit (SSIII, Table 2.21) and was run on a 7500 Real-Time PCR 




Primer name Reference Sequence (5’ – 3’) 
ORO F 
Weidmann 
et al. (361) 
CAT TTG AAG CTA GAT ACG GAC AA 
OROV Ec2 R This study CAT CTT TGG CCT TCT TTT RG 
ORO P 
Weidmann 
et al. (361) 
6FAM CAA TGC TGG TGT TGT TAG AGT CTT CTT CCT 
BHQ1 
Table 2.20 Primers and probe used in the optimised OROV qRT-PCR assay (6FAM = 6-
carboxyfluorescein, BHQ1 = black hole quencher 1). 
 
Component Name Stock concentration Volume for 1 reaction (μl) 
Water n/a 1.7 
2X Reaction mix 2x 10.0 
ORO F 18µM 1.0 
OROV EcR2 18µM 1.0 
ORO P 25µM 0.5 
SS III RT/Taq enzyme mix n/a 0.8 
Template n/a 5.0 
Table 2.21 Reaction formulation for the OROV qRT-PCR assay, using the Superscript III 

















RT None 50 10:00 None 1 20 
Denature None 95 02:00 None 1 20 
Amplify Quantification 95 0:10 None 
45 
20 
  60 0:40 Single 20 
Cooling None 40 0:30 None 1 20 
Table 2.22 Cycling conditions used in the OROV qRT-PCR.  
 
2.8  PREPARATION OF CDNA FOR METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
RNA was treated with Turbo DNAse to remove DNA, then purified using the Zymo RNA 
clean & concentrator -5 kit (Cambridge Bioscience, UK). Sequence-independent single-
primer amplification (SISPA) was performed as follows (321): first-strand cDNA was 
synthesised by annealing 1 μl Sol-primer A (40 pmol/μl, 5’ GTT TCC CAC TGG AGG ATA 
NNN NNN NNN 3’) to 4 μl template RNA at 65°C for 5 minutes. This was followed by a 
reverse transcription (RT) reaction using the total volume of the previous reaction plus 
0.5 μl SuperScript™ III reverse transcriptase, 2 μl 5x first strand buffer, 1 μl dNTPs (10 
μM) and 1 μl nuclease-free water at 42oC for 60 minutes. First-strand cDNA was 
converted to double stranded DNA by incubating the total volume of cDNA at 37oC for 
8 minutes in a reaction with 0.15 μl Sequenase Version 2.0 DNA polymerase (Fisher 
Scientific, UK), 1 μl 5x reaction buffer and 3.85 μl nuclease-free water. This was followed 
by a further incubation at 37oC for 8 minutes after the addition of 0.15 μl Sequenase 




5 μl of the cDNA product was used as template in a 50 μl PCR reaction containing 0.5 μl 
AccuTaq LA DNA polymerase (Sigma-Aldrich, UK), 5 μl 10x reaction mix, 1 μl Sol-Primer 
B (100 pmol/μl, 5’ GTT TCC CAC TGG AGG ATA 3’), 1 μl DMSO, 2.5 μl dNTPs (10 μM) and 
35 μl nuclease-free water. The thermal cycling conditions were: 98°C for 30 seconds (s), 
followed by 30 cycles at 94°C for 15 s, 50°C for 20 s, and 68°C for 5 minutes, with a final 
extension step at 68°C for 10 minutes. PCR product was purified and eluted in a final 
volume of 30 μl nuclease-free water, and DNA quantified to determine concentration 
(ng/µl). 
 
2.9  ILLUMINA LIBRARY PRE PARATION 
Sequencing libraries were generated using the Nextera® XT DNA library prep kit 
(Illumina, UK), in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. The Nextera 
transposome was used to fragment 1.5 ng of purified, quantified SISPA PCR product and 
add partial adapters in a process known as ‘tagmentation’ (366). The tagmented DNA 
was amplified using a limited-cycle PCR programme to add sequencing primer 
sequences and indices. Resulting DNA libraries were purified and normalised to ensure 
equal library representation prior to pooling in equal volumes. Sequencing libraries were 
run on an Illumina MiSeq in a 2 x 150 reads run. 
 
2.10  NANOPORE LIBRARY PREPARATION 
Library preparation for Ecuadorian febrile patient samples from 2017 was undertaken 




barcoding genomic DNA protocol (ONT, UK), followed by sequencing on a FLO-MIN106 
MinION flow cell (ONT, UK). 
 
2.11  NGS DATA ANALYSIS  
Reads were trimmed to remove adaptors and low-quality bases using trimmomatic 
v0.3.0 (367) with default parameters, to achieve an average phred score of Q30 across 
the read. Analysis of NGS data was undertaken within a Linux environment and using a 
local instance of Galaxy, an open source web-based platform (368). 
 
2.11.1  TAXONOMIC ANALYSIS USING CENTRIFUGE 
Centrifuge is a classifier for metagenomic sequences that assigns taxonomic labels to 
short DNA sequences by querying a database of pathogen and human sequences for 
each k-mer in a sequence, classifying the query sequence based on the result. The 
system uses a novel indexing scheme based on the Burrows-Wheeler transform and the 
Ferragina-Manzini index (326). The database used was ‘Bacteria, archaea, viruses, 
human’ downloaded from https://ccb.jhu.edu/software/centrifuge/. For identification 
of viral sequences from patient RNA samples that tested RT-PCR-negative for target 
pathogens, Centrifuge was used to classify sequencing reads from fastq files prior to 
human read removal. The output datasets were analysed in Microsoft Excel to identify 
reads assigned as virus at the species level, using a threshold of ≥0.01% of total reads. 





2.11.2  HUMAN READ REMOVAL 
Following taxonomic analysis, human reads were removed from the patient sequencing 
data to both improve the efficiency of data analysis by removing unnecessary reads and 
avoid ethical implications regarding human genome sequences. This was accomplished 
by mapping reads to the human genome (human_g1k_v37[1000 genomes]) using BWA-
MEM v0.7.13 (329). Non-mapped reads were selected using SAMtools (370) fastq, with 
flag -F 2. 
 
2.11.3  MAPPING READS TO VIRUS REFERENCE SEQUENCES 
Reads were mapped to virus reference sequences using BWA-MEM v0.7.13 (329). The 
resulting SAM file was converted to a BAM file, which was sorted and indexed using 
SAMtools. Quasi bam (371), a tool developed in-house at PHE, was used to generate a 
consensus sequence and a heterogeneity report. Bamstat and SAMtools flagstat were 
used to provide general alignment statistics on mapping, including total reads, number 
and percentage of reads mapped. 
 
2.11.4  MAPPING NON-HUMAN READS TO MULTIPLE VIRUS REFERENCE SEQUENCE S 
Non-human reads were mapped using BWA-MEM to a custom multifasta file containing 
genomes of interest, constructed following RT-PCR/PCR testing. Two separate files were 
constructed for analysing the Sierra Leone and Ecuadorian patient sample cohorts, 
comprised of: at least one representative genome from each viral RT-PCR target, any 
virus identified during the taxonomic analysis or BLAST analysis of de novo assembled 




Mapping was performed as described above. Detection of a virus was defined as the 




Virus Accession number Reference(s) Reason(s) for inclusion 
CHIKV HM045817.1 (372) qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (Senegal, 2005). 
DENV-1 MF576311.1 This study Positive control DENV-1 strain from NCPV. qRT-PCR target. 
DENV-1 (partial 
envelope) 
FJ502863.1 n/a qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (Nigeria, 2007). 
DENV-2 LC121816.1 n/a qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (East Africa, 2016). 
DENV-3 (partial 
envelope) 
KT187282.1 n/a qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (Ivory Coast, 2008). 
DENV-4 MF004387.1 n/a qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (Senegal, 1981). 
EBOV MF599508.1 n/a 
Virus identified in patient sample(s) by Centrifuge. Strain is best BLASTn match 




Virus identified in patient sample(s) by Centrifuge. Strain is best BLASTn match 
to patient GBV-C consensus. 
HBV GQ161781.1 (373) 
Virus identified in patient sample(s) by Centrifuge. Strain is best BLASTn match 




HIV AB485634.1 n/a 
Virus identified in patient sample(s) by Centrifuge. Strain is best BLASTn match 
to SL-110 HIV consensus. 
IAV (segment 1) MK898494.1 n/a 
Virus identified in patient sample(s) by Centrifuge. Strain is best BLAST match to 
SL0-63 IAV consensus sequence. 
LASV (L segment) KM821860.1 n/a RT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (Sierra Leone, 2012). 
ONNV KX771232.1 n/a 
Virus identified by Centrifuge. Strain is 100% match to reads in SL-058 and has 




(374) qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (Guinea, 1981). 
YFV JX898868.1 (375) 




MF629798.1 (376) qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (Senegal, 2013). 
MS2 V00642.1 (377) Internal control. 





Virus Accession number Reference(s) Reason(s) for inclusion 






De novo assembled scaffold(s) show homology to MF503628.1 and 
MF499120.1. Colombian strain (LC259090.1) chosen for its proximity to 






De novo assembled scaffold(s) show homology to these accessions; the 
complete genome sequence from the isolated OROV from patient D-087. 
RVFV KY366333.1 n/a De novo assembled scaffold(s) show homology to this accession. 
IAV CY257968.1 n/a 
De novo assembled scaffold(s) show homology to this accession (IAV matrix 
proteins 1 & 2). 
DENV-1 MF797878.1 This study 
qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical and temporal proximity 
(Esmeraldas, Ecuador 2014). 
DENV-2 KY474308.1 (381) qRT-PCR target. 
DENV-3 FJ898457.1 n/a qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its geographical proximity (Ecuador). 








qRT-PCR target. Strains chosen for their geographical proximity (Peru). 
Genotype N (KP842812.1) and genotype D (KP842815.1). 
YFV MF434851.1 (382) qRT-PCR target. Strain chosen for its temporal proximity (Brazil, 2017). 
ZIKV MF794971.1 This study 





Identified using taxonomic analysis of sequencing reads from Ecuadorian 
patient samples from 2017 (MinION). Reference sequence is from the NS5B 
protein gene, partial cds. 
MS2 V00642.1 (377) Internal control. 
 
Table 2.24 Reference sequences used for mapping non-human reads generated from Ecuadorian patient samples using metagenomic sequencing. 




2.11.5  DE NOVO  ASSEMBLY 
De novo assembly of Illumina sequencing reads was performed using SPAdes v3.8.2 
(327), using default options with the --meta flag. Kmers of 21, 33, 55, 77, 99, 127 were 
used. The resulting scaffolds were filtered on average coverage (≥2 reads depth) and 
length (≥300 bp) and analysed for homology to known protein sequences using Kaiju, a 
program for fast taxonomic classification based on sequence comparison to a reference 
database of microbial proteins (328). A viral subset of the nr NCBI RefSeq database 
(‘kaiju_db_viruses.fmi’, available at http://kaiju.binf.ku.dk/server) was used.  Following 
filtering for non-human viruses and viruses shown to be potential contaminants (based 
on the negative control results, as described below), scaffolds with homology to 
pathogenic human viruses were identified. 
De novo assembly of nanopore sequencing reads was performed following removal of 
human reads, assembled using Canu (383) and the resulting contigs were manually 
analysed using BLASTn to identify homology to viral sequences. 
 
2.11.6  IDENTIFICATION AND REMOVAL OF CONTAMINANT SEQUENCES 
Negative extraction controls from each batch of RNA extractions and a negative 
template control (water, included at the metagenomic sequencing RNA preparation 
stage) were sequenced and analysed using the same methods used with the patient 
samples (described above). This controlled for contaminants that may have been 
incorporated during the extraction and sequencing process. Virus-specific reads 
identified in the negative controls were considered potential contaminants if seen in the 




2.12  RANDOM AMPLIFICATION OF CDNA ENDS (RACE)  
Terminal sequences were confirmed by RACE analysis, undertaken using a modified 
version of a previously described protocol (186). DNAse treated RNA was 
polyadenylated using a Poly(A) tailing kit, then used in a RT reaction (ProtoScript II First 
Strand cDNA Synthesis Kit, New England Biolabs, UK) with an oligo-d(T) primer. Resulting 
cDNA was amplified by PCR (Q5 High-Fidelity 2X Master Mix, New England Biolabs, UK) 
using a 3’ PCR anchor primer and a primer specific to each terminal sequence. Amplified 
products were Sanger sequenced and data analysed using the DNASTAR Lasergene 
package to assemble contigs and confirm nucleotide sequences. For OROV, it was 
possible to generate both the 5’ and 3’ terminal sequences using 3’ RACE analysis as viral 
RNA from cell culture contains both genomic and anti-genomic sequences.  
 
2.13  MULTIPLEX TIL ING PCR PRIMER ‘PRIMAL ’  SCHEME 
An amplicon-based approach using the algorithmic design method described by Quick 
et al. (2017) (351) was implemented for OROV. The Ecuadorian strain 
OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 (MF926352.1 - MF926354.1) was used as a reference 
sequence to generate a set of primers using the ‘Primal Scheme’ webtool 
(http://primal.zibraproject.org/). To avoid generating three separate schemes for each 
segment, which may be incompatible, the S, M and L genomic segments were 
concatenated and input to the webtool using the default settings (400 bp amplicons, 50 
bp overlap). The designed primer scheme was subsequently modified manually to 
account for segment ends, incorporating 5’ and 3’ end primers.  
RNA extracted from OROV-positive Ecuadorian patient plasma samples and the cell-




cDNA Synthesis Kit (New England Biolabs, UK) and random hexamers. The resulting 
cDNA was used as a template in two multiplex PCR reactions using the Ecuador OROV 
primers designed as described above with Q5 High-Fidelity 2X Master Mix (New England 
Biolabs, UK), to generate multiple overlapping amplicons that spanned the viral genome. 
PCR products were purified, quantified and visualised on a 1.5% agarose gel stained with 
1:10,000 ethidium bromide, run alongside a 1 kb DNA ladder (New England Biolabs, UK). 
The expected DNA concentration was 5-50 ng/μl DNA, negative control values should 
be ≤1 ng/μl. Purified DNA was prepared for NGS using a modified version of the 1D 
Native barcoding genomic DNA protocol (ONT, UK) developed as part of the Zibra 
project (http://www.zibraproject.org/blog/protocol-low-input-native-barcoding-
protocol/), followed by sequencing using a MinION flowcell (ONT, UK). The resulting 
reads were mapped to the relevant OROV reference sequences using BWA-MEM. 
 
2.14  COMPARATIVE VIRAL GENOME ANALYSES 
2.14.1  OROV 
For analysis of Ecuadorian OROV strains against publicly available OROV sequences, 
OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 was selected as a representative Ecuadorian strain. 
Alignments and maximum-likelihood phylogenetic trees were generated in MEGA7 for 
S, M and L segments, using all complete OROV coding sequences (n=112 S, n=24 M, n=23 
L) in the GenBank nucleotide database, with 100 bootstrap replicates. Alignment and 
analysis of Ecuadorian OROV strains was performed in MegAlign v14 using ClustalW. The 





2.14.2  HEPATITIS B VIRUS (HBV) 
The patient hepatitis B virus (HBV) genome sequence was analysed using BLASTn to 
identify the most closely related sequence from the nucleotide collection (nr/nt) 
database. Representative HBV genomes were aligned with the patient sequence using 
ClustalW in MEGA7. These were full-length genome sequences from alignments made 
publicly available by Bell et al. (384), the number of sequences included from each 
genotype was proportionate to the total number sequences available for that genotype 
(A=25, B=50, C=77, D=36, E=12, F=9, G H and I = 1). A phylogenetic tree was constructed 
from the alignment using the maximum-likelihood method based on the Tamura-Nei 
model in MEGA7. 
 
2.14.3 HIV 
Patient HIV genome sequences were analysed using BLASTn to identify the most closely 
related sequence from the nucleotide collection (nr/nt) database. For patient genomes 
that had complete coverage of the pol gene, the Recombinant Identification Programme 
(RIP) (385) available at https://www.hiv.lanl.gov/content/sequence/RIP/RIP.html) was 
used to identify viral subtypes by comparing sequences with HIV-1 M subtypes 
previously identified in Sierra Leone (A1, A2, A6, B, C, G, CRF02_AG, CRF09_cpx and 




2.15  VIRUS ISOLATION, PROPAGATION AND QUANTIF ICATION 
2.15.1  CELL LINES  
Cell lines were kindly provided free of charge by the European Collection of 
Authenticated Cell Cultures (ECACC, Table 2.25).  
Cell line Species Cell type Source 
C6/36 Aedes albopictus Embryonic ECACC (89051705) 
Vero African green monkey Kidney, epithelial ECACC (84113001) 
Table 2.25 Cell lines used to propagate virus from febrile patient plasma samples.  
 
2.15.2  VIRUS PROPAGATION 
Virus isolation from suspected positive (CHIKV, DENV, OROV, ZIKV) patient plasma 
samples was undertaken by inoculating Vero (70% confluent) and C6/36 (50% confluent) 
cell monolayers in T25 flasks (Nunc, UK) with 250 μl patient plasma diluted 1:10 in the 
relevant cell culture medium. Cultures were incubated at 37°C, 5% (v/v) CO2 (Vero) or 
28°C (C6/36) for 14 days or until signs of cytopathic effect (CPE) were observed. 
Supernatants were sampled at days 5, 7, 11 and 14 post-infection, RNA was extracted 
as described above (see section 2.3), then viral RNA was measured using pathogen-
specific qRT-PCR to determine relative quantity over time. Supernatants from virus 
positive cultures were harvested as described in section 2.15.3. 
Subsequent passaging of viral supernatant was undertaken to increase volume and virus 
titre using the same method described above but using 80-90% confluent Vero cell 
(OROV) or 50% confluent C6/36 cell (ZIKV) monolayers. Cells were inoculated with virus 




Cultures were harvested (see section 2.15.3) 3-4 days (OROV) or 14 days (ZIKV) post-
infection. 
Isolation of OROV from qRT-PCR-positive patient plasma samples was undertaken by 
inoculating 80% confluent Vero cell monolayers with patient plasma diluted 1:10 in 
minimum essential medium (MEM, Life Technologies Ltd., UK) to a volume of 1 mL, then 
incubating at 37°C with 5% (v/v) CO2 for 96 hours. Supernatants were sampled at 24-
hour intervals for 96 hours, replication was determined by measuring OROV RNA using 
qRT-PCR.  
 
2.15.3  VIRUS HARVEST 
Virus cultures were frozen at -80°C for at least 30 minutes to disrupt cellular membranes 
for maximum viral yield. Upon thawing, supernatant and dislodged cells were 
centrifuged at 3000 revolutions per minute (rpm) for 10 minutes to pellet cellular debris. 
Viral supernatants were filtered through a 0.2 μm pore filter (Sartorius, UK) to remove 
cellular debris, then aliquoted and stored at -80°C.  
 
2.15.4  VIRUS QUANTIFICATION BY PLAQUE ASSAY 
Ten-fold serial dilutions of virus supernatant were made in MEM. 80 -90% confluent 
Vero cells in 6- or 24-well plates (Corning, UK) were washed with Dulbecco’s phosphate-
buffered saline (D-PBS, Fisher Scientific, UK), 250 μl (6-well plate) or 100 μl (24-well 
plate) virus dilutions were inoculated in triplicate. Plates were incubated at 37°C, 5% 
(v/v) CO2 for 60 minutes. Inoculum was removed then 3 mL (6-well plate) or 0.5 mL (24-




(FBS, Sigma-Aldrich, UK), 1% non-essential amino acids (NEAA, Invitrogen, UK), 1% 
antibiotic-antimycotic (Invitrogen, UK), 2 mM L-glutamine (Fisher Scientific, UK), 1.5% 
Seaplaque agarose (Scientific Laboratory Supplies, UK)) was added. Plates were 
incubated at 37°C, 5% (v/v) CO2 for 3 days, then fixed with 20% formaldehyde for a 
minimum of 5 hours to inactivate virus and fix cell monolayers. Agarose plugs were 
removed and monolayers stained with 2.3% crystal violet for 60 minutes. Plates were 
rinsed with water before air drying, plaques were counted by eye. Virus titre was 
calculated using the number of visible plaques from the lowest dilution showing >10 
plaques, using the equation: average number of plaques x dilution factor x volume factor 
= plaque forming unit (pfu)/mL. 
 
2.15.5  POSITIVE CONTROL VIRUS STRAINS 
Viruses were kindly provided free of charge by the National Collection of Pathogenic 
Viruses (NCPV) for use as positive control material (Table 2.26). They were propagated 
at the same time as patient plasma samples to ensure that culture conditions were 
suitable for viral growth. To check for cross-contamination, RNA extracted from positive 
control cultures underwent metagenomic sequencing, from which complete genome 








Virus species Strain name NCPV catalogue number 
DENV-1 TC861[HA] 0106037v 
CHIKV S27 Petersfield 0006254v 
ZIKV PRVABC59 1604131v 
OROV NCPV: 1409261v 1409261v 
Table 2.26 Viruses used as positive controls during virus propagation, provided by 
NCPV. 
 
2.16  OROV REPLICATION IN BIOLOGICALLY RELEVANT CELL TYPES 
2.16.1  CELL LINES 
Cell lines and animal models capable of supporting OROV replication (from published 
studies) are summarised in Table 2.27. Cell lines used in OROV replication experiments 
in this study were kindly provided free of charge by the ECACC, Plymouth University, and 




Cell name Cell type Species Study type Study reference(s) 
Vero Kidney cells African green monkey In vitro (185,387–389) 
MDCK Kidney epithelial cells Canine In vitro (185) 
DF-1 Embryonic fibroblasts Chicken In vitro (185) 
MRK101 Kidney cells Gray red-backed vole In vitro (185) 
BHK-21 Kidney fibroblasts Hamster In vitro (185) 
A549 Epithelial alveolar adenocarcinoma cells Human In vitro (185) 
HeLa Epithelial cervical adenocarcinoma cells Human In vitro (185,388) 
2fTGH Epithelial fibrosarcoma cells Human In vitro (185) 
HuH-7 Hepatocarcinoma cells Human In vitro (390) 
THP-1 Monocytes with a macrophage-like phenotype Human In vitro (390) 
Jurkat Transformed T lymphocytes Human In vitro (390) 




QT-35 Fibrosarcoma cells Quail In vitro (185) 
LLC-MK2 Kidney epithelial cells Rhesus macaque In vitro (185) 
CPT-Tert Choroid plexus cells Sheep In vitro (185) 
Hepatocytes Liver cells Hamster In vivo (392,393) 
Kuppfer cells Liver macrophages Hamster In vivo (392) 
Neurons Brain cells Hamster In vivo (393) 
Brain cells Brain cells Neonatal BALB/c mice In vivo (188) 






Species Cell type Source 
1BR3 Human Skin fibroblast ECACC (90011801) 
Aag-2 Aedes aegypti Embryonic Pirbright Institute 
AE Aedes aegypti Unknown Pirbright Institute 
AF319 Aedes aegypti Embryonic Pirbright Institute 
BHK-
21 
Hamster Kidney, fibroblast Pirbright Institute 
C6/36 Aedes albopictus Embryonic 
























Embryonic Pirbright Institute 





Larvae Pirbright Institute 





ECACC (84113001), Pirbright 
Institute 
Table 2.28 Cell lines used in OROV replication experiments. ECACC catalogue numbers 




2.16.1.1 ISOLATION OF PERIPHERAL BLOOD MONONUCLEAR CELLS (PBMCS) 
Twenty healthy volunteers were recruited from PHE Porton Down through a request for 
participants. Volunteers were given information on the study and provided informed 
consent. Ethical approval for taking these samples was given by the PHE Research Ethics 
and Governance Group. 
Forty mL of blood was taken from each volunteer into sodium heparin vacutainers 
(Scientific Laboratory Supplies, UK). Whole blood was processed immediately to isolate 
peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs). Blood was mixed 1:1 with Roswell Park 
Memorial Institute 1640 medium (RPMI, Invitrogen, UK), then transferred to Greiner 50 
mL LeucoSep tubes (Scientific Laboratory Supplies, UK) and centrifuged for 20 minutes 
at 2000 rpm. PBMCs were aspirated into a fresh conical tube filled with RPMI and 
centrifuged for 10 minutes at 1700 rpm. The cell pellet was resuspended in 15 mL RPMI 
and centrifuged for a further 10 minutes at 1700 rpm. The cell pellet was resuspended 
in 5 mL RPMI and cells were stained with 0.5% Trypan Blue (Invitrogen, UK) using a 1:10 
ratio. Live cells were counted using a Neubauer improved haemocytometer (VWR 
International, UK), using the mean of three counts. Following counting, PBMCs were 
centrifuged for 10 minutes at 1700 rpm then resuspended in a volume of freezing 
medium (Dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO):FBS in a ratio of 1:9) that gave 5e+6 cells/mL. 1 mL 
aliquots were transferred to a Mr. Frosty freezing container (Life Technologies, UK) and 







2.16.2  OROV REPLICATION TIMECOURSE EXPERIMENTS  
2.16.2.1 OROV REPLICATION IN HUMAN CELL TYPES 
For adherent cells (HepG2, 1BR3, HEKn and HPEKp), 24-well plates were seeded with the 
appropriate density of cells (Table 2.29) one day prior to infection (day -1). On day 0, 
cells were observed for confluency then washed with D-PBS prior to infection. Virus 
(OROV strain OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 passage (P)2 or P3 Vero, cultured and 
harvested as per sections 2.15.2 and 2.15.3) was diluted in culture medium to obtain 
inoculum of the desired multiplicity of infection (MOI). Cells were inoculated with 200 
µl virus inoculum, or mock-infected with the same volume of uninfected Vero cell 
culture supernatant. Cells were incubated at 37ºC, 5% (v/v) CO2 for 60 minutes, 
inoculum was removed and cells washed with D-PBS prior to the addition of 600 µl 
culture medium (Table 2.29). At designated timepoints, the total volume of supernatant 
was removed from the cell monolayer and frozen at -80ºC. The monolayer was washed 
with D-PBS, then 350 µl of RLT buffer (Qiagen, UK) with 1:100 β-mercaptoethanol (VWR 
International Ltd., UK), 1:100 LPA and 1.45e+5 pfu internal control MS2 bacteriophage 
was added to the monolayer and incubated for 10 minutes at room temperature. Cells 
in RLT buffer were physically removed from the plate and aspirated to a microtube, then 
frozen at -80ºC.  
During the time-course experiments, cell viability was assessed at each timepoint to 
control for lack of virus replication due to suboptimal cell health. This was achieved using 
mock-infected cells (for biosafety reasons it was not possible to assess infected cell 
viability or the presence of CPE at CL3). Cell monolayers were dissociated using 0.25% 
Trypsin-EDTA (hepatocytes and fibroblasts) or TryPLE (keratinocytes), then stained 1:1 




haemocytometer. Percentage viability was determined using the mean of three counts 
in the equation:  
Viability = total viable cells/total cells x 100 
For the PBMC time-course experiment, the following adjustments were made to 
accommodate the non-adherent cell type: cells were plated on the day of infection and 
incubated for at least one hour prior to infection following plating. At each timepoint, 
supernatants and cells were harvested by low speed centrifugation to pellet the cells, 
followed by aspiration of supernatant to a microtube. Each well was rinsed with 350 µl 
buffer RLT (+ LPA + MS2), which was then added to the cell pellet and incubated for 10 
minutes at room temperature. Supernatants and cells in buffer RLT were stored at -80ºC. 
Pilot time-course experiments were performed using single replicates, subsequent time-












Cell line Cell seeding density Culture medium 
HepG2 6.8e+5 
EMEM + 10% FBS + 2mM 
L-glutamine + 1% NEAA + 
1% Pen-Strep. 
1BR3 2.5e+5 
EMEM + 15% FBS + 2 
mM L-glutamine + 1% 
NEAA + 1% Pen-Strep. 
HEKn 2.6e+4 
EpiLife + HKGS + 1% 
Anti/Anti. 
HPEKp 2.6e+4 
EpiLife + HKGS + 1% 
Anti/Anti. 
PBMCs 5.00e+5 
RPMI-1640 + 10% FBS + 2 
mM L-glutamine + 1% 
Pen-Strep. 
Table 2.29 Cell seeding densities and culture medium used in human cell timecourse 
experiments. EMEM = Eagle’s minimum essential medium (Scientific Laboratory 
Supplies Ltd., UK). FBS = Foetal bovine serum. NEAA = Non-essential amino acids. Pen-
strep = penicillin-streptomycin (Sigma-Aldrich, UK). HKGF = Human keratinocyte growth 
supplement. Anti/Anti – antibiotic/antimycotic. 
 
2.16.2.2 OROV REPLICATION IN INSECT AND MAMMALIAN CELL TYPES 
This experiment was performed in collaboration with Dr. Barry Atkinson at the Pirbright 
Institute, Surrey. On day -1, insect and mammalian cell lines were seeded into T25 flasks 
(Nunc, UK) at a density of 1.0e+6 and 5.0+e5 cells/flask, respectively. Cells were 
observed prior to infection on day 0 and all were 40-70% confluent. Two flasks per cell 
line were seeded; one for OROV infection and one for mock-infection using PBS with 1% 




On day 0, all cell lines were infected with OROV strain OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 
(P1 Vero, cultured and harvested as per sections 2.15.2 and 2.15.3), at a MOI of 0.1. 
Virus was diluted in PBS-A to obtain 1 mL inoculum per T25 flask. This was added to the 
cell monolayer following one wash with PBS-A. 1 mL PBS-A was added to all mock-
infected flasks. Following a 60-minute incubation at 33ºC with 5% (v/v) CO2 (mammalian 
cell lines) or 28ºC (insect cell lines), 10 mL of the respective culture medium (Table 2.30) 
was added to each flask. Following the removal of the day 0 timepoint supernatants, 
flasks were returned to the incubators at the aforementioned conditions for 7 days. 
Supernatants were sampled at 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 days post-infection and stored at -
80ºC.  
 
Cell line Culture medium 
Aedes agypti cell lines 
L-15 + 2% FBS + 10% TPB + 1% Pen-
Strep. 
Other insect cell lines 
Schneider’s Drosophila Medium + 2% 
FBS + 10% TPB + 1% Pen-Strep. 
Vero DMEM + 2% FBS. 
BHK-21 
GMEM + 2% NBCS + 10% TPB + 1% Pen-
Strep. 
Table 2.30 Cell culture media used in insect and mammalian cell timecourse 
experiments. TPB = Tryptose phosphate broth (Sigma-Aldrich, UK). FBS = Foetal bovine 
serum. DMEM = Dulbecco’s modified eagle medium. GMEM = Glasgow minimum 





2.16.2.3 RNA EXTRACTION AND OROV QRT-PCR 
RNA was extracted manually from infected cells harvested from human cell time-course 
experiments using the RNeasy mini kit (Qiagen, UK). At CL3, one volume of 70% ethanol 
was added to thawed cells in buffer RLT (with 1:100 β-mercaptoethanol, 1:100 LPA and 
1.45e+5 pfu internal control MS2 bacteriophage) that had previously undergone a 10-
minute incubation in the RLT buffer to inactivate virus. This subsequent 10-minute 
incubation with the ethanol completed the chemical inactivation procedure. At CL2, RNA 
was extracted in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions and eluted in 30 µl of 
nuclease-free water. 
RNA was extracted from infected cells harvested from human cell time-course 
experiments and from supernatants harvested from mammalian and insect cell time-
course experiments using the BioSprint 96 One-For-All Vet Kit (Indical Bioscience, 
Germany) with the automated Kingfisher Flex System. Thawed cells in 350 µl buffer RLT 
(with additions as described above) or 100 µl supernatant in 300 µl buffer RLT (with 
additions as described above), were inactivated at CL3 for 10 minutes at room 
temperature, then one volume of isopropanol was added and incubated for a further 10 
minutes to complete the chemical inactivation procedure. At CL2, 40 µl proteinase K was 
added to samples originating from cellular material to aid the complete lysis of cells. 
RNA extracted was carried out in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions, using the 
‘BS96 Vet 100’ protocol on the Kingfisher Flex System. RNA was eluted in 75 µl AVE 
buffer (Indical Bioscience, Germany). 
OROV and MS2 RNA was measured semi-quantitatively from experimental RNA samples 
using the OROV qRT-PCR previously described in section 2.7.4, with the following 




the assay was multiplexed to detect MS2 (Table 2.31) under standardised RIPL 
conditions (mastermix volumes identical to those given in Table 2.8, cycling conditions 
given in Table 2.9). These changes were made by RIPL prior to incorporating the assay 
into their qRT-PCR portfolio and was used in this instance to save resources via the MS2 
multiplex capability. 
 
Component Final concentration (nM) Volume for 100 reactions 
(µL) 
ORO_F 900 18 
OROV Ec2R 900 18 
ORO_P 250 5 
MS2 F1 40 8 
MS2 Rev 40 8 
MS2 Taq Cy5 80 16 
Water n/a 927 




CHAPTER 3: PATHOGEN DETECTION IN FEBRILE SIERRA LEONEAN PATIENTS  
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1  INFECTIOUS DISEASE IN SIERRA LEONE 
Sierra Leone is situated on the coast of West Africa and shares borders with Liberia and 
Guinea. The population totals just over 7 million people (census 2016) in an area of 
approximately 70,000km2 (394), with clusters of population in the lower elevations of 
the south and west, and the northern third of the country more sparsely populated 
(395). Sierra Leone is classified as a low-income country, as defined by having a gross 
national income per capita of  995 United States Dollars (USD) or less (396). Following 
many decades of colonialism, it became independent from Britain in 1961. Political 
instability resulted in a long-standing civil war  from 1991-2002; consequentially over 2 
million people were displaced and tens of thousands died (395). Since peace was 
achieved in 2002, democracy has slowly been re-established and in the present day, 
Sierra Leone functions as a republic (395). The country is divided into 14 districts that sit 
within four provinces (Eastern, Northern, North Western and Southern) and one area 
(Western) (395). The climate is tropical with a wet season (May to December) and dry 
season (December to April). The terrain is made up of a coastal belt of mangrove 
swamps, wooded hill country, upland plateau and mountains to the east (395).  
Life expectancy in Sierra Leone in 2016 was 52 for men and 54 for women. Childhood 
mortality is high, with 105 deaths per 1000 live births (397). Six of the ten leading causes 
of death in Sierra Leone have infectious causes, with malaria the leading cause, 
estimated to contribute to 20% of all deaths of those under five years old (398,399). 
Malaria is a serious public health problem in Sierra Leone, responsible for 38% of 




(400). Malaria prevalence has decreased in recent decades and the Sierra Leone MoSH 
aim to reduce malaria morbidity and mortality by 40% by 2020 (400).   
HIV infection/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is the 9th leading cause of 
death in Sierra Leone (401). In 2016, 67,000 people were living with HIV infection, 5,300 
new infections were acquired and 2,800 AIDS-related deaths occurred (402). An 
estimated 26% of HIV-positive people accessed antiretroviral therapy (402). HIV 
infections and deaths have increased since 2010 (402) and it is likely that the weakening 
of the public health system following the EBOV outbreak contributed to this. However, 
to combat this the MoHS launched a National HIV Strategic Plan 2016-2020 (400) that 
targets interventions at groups at higher risk of HIV transmission, including female sex 
workers, men who have sex with men, and prisoners (402,403). 
Cholera and tuberculosis (TB) are important bacterial diseases endemic to Sierra Leone. 
Major outbreaks of Cholera (caused by Vibrio cholerae) occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, 
with the most recent in 2012, detected via an increase in diarrhoea and vomiting cases 
reported in weekly surveillance (400). TB (caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis) 
burden is high in Sierra Leone and was detrimentally affected by the West African EBOV 
outbreak due to a reduction in care-seeking and impacts on the health system (400). TB 
is a priority for the MoHS which aims to improve surveillance, community engagement, 
address co-infection with HIV, and combat drug-resistance (400).  
Haemorrhagic fevers caused by LASV and EBOV sporadically cause disease in Sierra 
Leone. LASV is endemic, with the highest proportion of cases recorded from the south-
eastern districts of Kenema, Bo and Kailahun (404). The MoSH have collaborated with 




development of national prevention strategies, enhances laboratory diagnostics and 
provides training in laboratory diagnosis, clinical management and environmental 
control (400). The emergence of EBOV in West Africa resulted in the worst outbreak on 
record, affecting mainly Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia. This outbreak is outlined later 
in this thesis. EBOV transmission from virus persisting in the bodily fluids of EVD 
survivors, as well as zoonotic introductions, remains a risk. A study investigating the 
cause of illness in febrile LASV negative patients in Sierra Leone identified antibodies 
against EBOV, DENV, CHIKV, WNV, Leptospira, and typhus, as well as widespread 
infection with Plasmodium falciparum (405). Other viral diseases of public health 
importance in Sierra Leone include viral hepatitis, measles, polio, rabies and yellow fever 
(400). 
 
3.1.2  PUBLIC HEALTH IN SIE RRA LEONE 
Sierra Leone’s healthcare system functions within three tiers of service delivery: 
peripheral health units, district hospitals, and referral hospitals. There are 
approximately 19,000 healthcare workers (Figure 3.1) and almost 1,300 healthcare 
facilities in total, including 40 hospitals, around half of which are government owned 
and the other half privately-owned (400). The impact of the West African EBOV outbreak 
(2014-2016) on the Sierra Leonean public health system was significant, both directly in 
terms of the death of hundreds of healthcare workers following nosocomial 
transmission, and indirectly by paralysing the healthcare system so that it could not 
effectively respond to other, non-EVD related public health issues. Since the end of the 




service via health workforce planning and management, health information systems, 
policy and planning, district and hospital management and health financing (400). 
 





3.1.3  EBOLA VIRUS OUTBREAK IN WEST AFRICA, 2014-2016 
The EBOV outbreak that occurred in West Africa from 2014-2016 was the worst on 
record in terms of the number of recorded cases and deaths (194). The index case was 
retrospectively identified as a two-year-old child who became ill in the village of 
Meliandou in December 2013 and subsequently died in the forested district of 
Guéckédou in south-eastern Guinea (Figure 3.2), bordering Liberia and Sierra Leone (41). 
Members of the child’s family became infected, resulting in nosocomial transmission 
within a healthcare centre which is thought to have enabled the spread of the virus into 
a town setting (41). In March 2014, cases of EBOV were reported from two other rural 
locations in Guinea (Macenta and Kissidougou, Figure 3.2) by the WHO African regional 
office (406).  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Map of Guinea showing the initial locations of the EBOV outbreak. 




By the end of March and May 2014, cases had been confirmed in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, respectively. The WHO provided support to national healthcare services during 
the early phase of the outbreak in an attempt to control the spread of the virus, 
however, in August 2014 rapidly increasing case numbers led the WHO to issue a 
statement declaring the EBOV outbreak a public health emergency of international 
concern. The international community responded by providing support in all three 
countries, working with national healthcare workers to run ETCs and provide EBOV 
diagnostic capability. Despite best intentions, much of this was done following the peaks 
of the outbreak that occurred in September 2014 in Liberia and November 2014 in Sierra 
Leone (cases numbers in Guinea remained relatively stable throughout the duration of 
the outbreak), leading to criticism that the WHO moved too slowly (41). By the end of 
the outbreak, 24/34 districts in Guinea and every district in Liberia and Sierra Leone had 
reported EBOV transmission. In addition, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, the USA, the UK, Spain 
and Italy reported imported cases during the outbreak, with Spain experiencing the first 
case of autochthonous EBOV transmission outside of Africa (194).  
Towards the end of the outbreak, the major challenge was identifying and isolating the 
few remaining cases. EBOV-free status was defined as a 42-day period with no new 
cases. Guinea was initially declared EBOV-free in December 2015, however additional 
cases were identified in March 2016 and final EBOV-free status was granted in June that 
year (41). Similar situations occurred in Liberia and Sierra Leone, with Liberia initially 
declared EBOV-free in May 2015, then for the final time in June 2016 following a small 
number of cases identified in the intervening period (41). Sierra Leone was declared 
EBOV-free in November 2015, but another case was identified in January 2016. Final 




In response to the call from WHO, the UK government pledged £427 million to help 
control the outbreak (408). This included building ETCs in Sierra Leone and deploying 
medical and scientific experts to staff them alongside national healthcare workers. 
Three ETCs had a PHE-run diagnostic laboratory integrated on-site, voluntarily staffed 
by scientists from PHE, other government bodies and academic institutions.  These ETCs 
were located in: Kerry Town, 19 miles from the capital Freetown and run by non-
governmental organisation (NGO) Save the Children; Port Loko district, run by NGO 
GOAL; and Makeni, Bombali district, run by NGO International Medical Corps (Figure 3.3) 
(408). Together, these laboratories were the largest provider of field pathology services 








Figure 3.3 Locations of PHE-run EBOV diagnostic laboratories in districts within Sierra 
Leone, indicated by stars. Blue = Kerry Town ETC, green = Port Loko ETC, yellow = 






The EBOV positivity rate from samples tested has been published from a number of 
laboratories that functioned during the outbreak (409,410), including the European 
Mobile Laboratory in Guéckédou, Guinea, which was operational from 2014-2015 and 
tested 2,178 samples from hospitalised patients. Of these, 43% were negative for EBOV, 
despite showing clinical signs consistent with the local case definition (409). Due to 
resource limitations during the outbreak, it was not possible to test EBOV-negative 
patients for differential diagnoses, except for Plasmodium in some laboratories 
(including the three PHE-run laboratories). O’Shea et al. (2015) investigated the cause 
of illness in 51 EBOV-negative patients that presented at a British-run ETC in Kerry Town, 
located in the Western Area, between November 2014 and February 2015. Whilst a 
substantial proportion of patients were infected with Plasmodium (25.5%); influenza A 
virus, coronavirus and astrovirus infections were also identified in addition to bacterial 
infections including E.coli, Shigella and Vibrio spp. (411). This project attempts to 
address the alternative causes of illness experienced by EBOV-negative patients by 
investigating the presence of other viral agents in the blood of patients from the Kerry 
Town, Port Loko and Makeni ETCs.  
 
3.1.4  PHE-RUN DIAGNOSTIC FIELD-LABORATORIES 
The three PHE-run EBOV diagnostic field laboratories opened in October (Kerry Town) 
and December (Port Loko and Makeni) 2014, for the purpose of providing molecular 
testing for EBOV and rapid device testing (RDT) for Plasmodium (410). The laboratories 




and buccal swab samples from the wider community (410). The EBOV molecular assay 
was a qRT-PCR in which the Cq value for a given sample indicated the relative quantity 
of EBOV RNA present. In the field laboratories, patient sample Cq values were 
interpreted as positive (<40) or negative (≥40) and reported to the medical team to 
inform patient management and to the Sierra Leone MoHS for surveillance and 
epidemiological purposes. 
Following sample inactivation using AVL buffer and ethanol, RNA extraction was carried 
out in the field laboratories either using an automated EZ1 nucleic acid extraction 
machine (Qiagen, UK), or manually, using the same column-based kit used in this 
project; the QIAamp viral RNA mini kit (Qiagen, UK). Purified RNA (including internal 
control MS2 bacteriophage) was eluted in 60 µl of AVE elution buffer (410). Initially, the 
RealStar Filovirus Screen qRT-PCR Kit 1,0 (Altona Diagnostics, UK), targeting the EBOV L 
gene, was used for laboratory confirmation of EBOV infection. Due to operational 
requirements and some performance issues, all three laboratories transitioned from this 
assay to a modified version of the EBOV Zaire-specific ‘Trombley’ qRT-PCR assay (355), 
targeting the NP gene, around the time of January 2015 (410). The Trombley assay is 
used in this project alongside a pan-EBOV assay, for molecular detection of EBOV RNA 
in patient samples. The BinaxNOW RDT (Abbott, UK) was initially used for Plasmodium 
diagnosis in the field due to its successful use in a previous field-based setting and its 
broad detection of Plasmodium species, however, in line with efforts to standardise 
testing across diagnostic laboratories in Sierra Leone, it was replaced with the SD Bioline 
Malaria Ag P.f. RDT (Abbott, UK), which showed improved specificity for the major 




Whilst the field laboratories were operational, the Kerry Town laboratory tested 6,148 
samples, of which 19.7% (n=1,209) were EBOV-positive, 77% (n=4,738) EBOV-negative 
and 3.3% (n=201) were indeterminate or needed a repeat test (due to poor sample 
condition) (410). The Port Loko laboratory tested 18,458 samples of which 5.1% (n=936) 
were EBOV-positive, 90.1% (n=16,626) EBOV-negative and 4.8% (n=896) indeterminate 
or needed a repeat test (410). The Makeni laboratory tested 26,117 samples (including 
the samples it tested in its subsequent role as a ‘legacy laboratory’, following 
decommissioning of the ETC), of which 1.2% (n=325) were EBOV-positive, 95.9% 
(n=25,045) EBOV-negative and 2.9% (n=747) indeterminate or requiring a repeat test 
(410). The laboratories ceased testing when the ETCs they were embedded in were 
decommissioned in November (Kerry Town) and December 2015 (Port Loko and Makeni) 
(410). The large proportion of samples that tested negative for EBOV begs the question 
of what caused the symptoms these patients experienced. This formed a major aim of 
this project; to identify viral causes of disease in this group of patients in order to better 
understand the causes of febrile illness in Sierra Leone, and subsequently provide 




3.2  METHODOLOGY: SAMPLE SELECTION FOR METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
From the samples that had no positive RT-PCR/PCR result for any pathogen, 33 were 
selected for metagenomic sequencing based on the following criteria: 
Samples excluded: 
• Samples with an EBOV-positive or inconclusive qRT-PCR result 
• Samples with a Plasmodium positive PCR result 
• Samples designated ‘follow-up’ in the associated metadata 
• Samples from patients aged ≤13 years old (in accordance with a request from 
the PHE-MOHS biobank committee) 




• Samples initially qRT-PCR inconclusive for CCHFV (n=2) 
• Samples initially RT-PCR inconclusive for LASV (n=1) 
 
A subset of samples that met the above criteria were chosen to include a similar number 
of samples per ETC, over the complete breadth of dates, with as much metadata as 
possible. In addition, three samples that were EBOV-positive by qRT-PCR were 




3.3  RESULTS  
3.3.1  RT-PCR/PCR TESTING OF FEBRILE PATIENT PLASMA 
RT-PCR/PCR results for CCHFV, CHIKV, DENV, LASV, RVFV, YFV, ZIKV and Rickettsia were 
negative for all of the 120 patient samples tested (Table 3.1). One patient was positive 
for Leptospira. 22 patients were positive for Plasmodium and two were inconclusive 
(Table 3.1). A comparison of Plasmodium RDT results from the field with RT-PCR results 
obtained in the laboratory during this project shows that there is a disparity in 10.9% of 
the samples tested (Table 3.2). Of this, 6.7% are samples that tested positive by RT-PCR 
but negative by RDT and 4.2% are samples that tested negative by RT-PCR but positive 
by RDT. Unexpectedly, eight patients tested positive for EBOV by qRT-PCR, with a further 
ten samples yielding an inconclusive result (Table 3.1). EBOV and Plasmodium results, 
with associated metadata, are summarised for EBOV-positive/inconclusive samples in 
Table 3.3. All patient samples were positive for internal control MS2. A complete list of 











 Positive Negative Inconclusive 
EBOV 8 102 10 
Plasmodium 22 98 2 
Leptospira 1 119 0 
LASV 0 120 0 
CCHFV 0 120 0 
CHIKV 0 120 0 
DENV 0 120 0 
RVFV 0 120 0 
YFV 0 120 0 
ZIKV 0 120 0 
Rickettsia 0 120 0 
Table 3.1 Pathogen detection results from qRT-PCR, RT-PCR and PCR assays. 
 
 
 PCR positive PCR negative PCR inconc. Total 
RDT positive 7.5 4.2 1.7 13.3 
RDT negative 6.7 63.3 0.0 70.0 
RDT n/t 4.2 12.5 0.0 16.7 
Total 18.3 80.0 1.7  
Table 3.2 A comparison of test results for Plasmodium performed in the field (RDT) or 
retrospectively during this project (RT-PCR). Values given are percentages of the total 













































Maforki Negative n/a 35 
Follow-
up 
SL-043 Positive 33.16 32.64 26/11/2014 Blood 
Kerry 
Town 
WA nd Negative n/a 56 Original 






nd Negative Negative 36 Original 
SL-055 Positive No Cq 35.93 20/02/2015 Blood 
Kerry 
Town 
nd nd Negative Negative 23 Original 





Koya Negative Negative 30 Original 






Negative Negative 9 Original 










SL-111 Positive No Cq 34.42 14/01/2015 Blood 
Maken
i 
nd nd Negative n/a 43 
Follow-
up 






Negative Positive 20 Original 





Maforki Negative Negative 35 
Follow-
up 







Negative Negative 16 Original 






nd Negative Negative 18 Original 
SL-051 Inconc. No Cq 35.96* 03/01/2015 Blood 
Kerry 
Town 
nd 369 Negative n/a 25 Original 






nd Negative Negative 38 Original 






nd Negative Positive 16 Original 


















nd Negative n/a 15 
Follow-
up 
SL-112 Inconc. No Cq 35.38* 14/01/2015 Blood 
Maken
i 
nd nd Negative n/a 15 
Follow-
up 
Table 3.3 Details of the samples with a qRT-PCR EBOV-positive or inconclusive result. Inconc. = inconclusive. nd = no data. n/a = not 
applicable because a malaria test was not performed on this sample. †Note that the MS2 Cq value for this sample was abnormally high, 
progressing to negative in subsequent tests. *Denotes that the sample was repeated in duplicate. The Cq value shown is from one replicate 




3.3.2  VIRUS DETECTION BY METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
The total number of reads generated per patient sample ranged from 598,037 to 
3,047,881 (mean = 1,139,132, Table 3.4). On average, 59% of reads were of human origin 
(minimum 11.1%, maximum 92.0%), and 6% were of microbial origin (minimum 0.01%, 
maximum 75.6%). The mean number of viral reads per sample was 0.55% (minimum 
0.0002%, maximum 4.96%). The number of reads specific to internal control 























SL-007 Port Loko 878,690 54.2 0.3 0.3 0.005 7 
SL-009 Port Loko 888,242 51.9 0.8 0.8 0.025 3 
SL-013 Port Loko 1,050,824 69.0 1.8 1.7 0.041 159 
SL-014 Port Loko 907,837 49.8 10.3 5.3 4.960 8 
SL-017 Port Loko 742,779 67.4 2.8 0.9 1.860 3 
SL-018 Port Loko 624,260 92.0 0.9 0.9 0.068 2 
SL-023 Port Loko 872,056 57.6 0.7 0.6 0.090 4 
SL-024 Port Loko 822,202 61.0 3.3 0.4 2.920 24 
SL-029 Port Loko 903,912 53.5 3.2 3.1 0.011 1 
SL-041 Kerry Town 829,718 57.5 0.3 0.3 0.010 1 
SL-043 Kerry Town 1,222,021 52.4 0.2 0.2 0.002 2 
SL-044 Kerry Town 1,119,205 51.9 0.1 0.1 0.011 1 
SL-046 Kerry Town 638,196 73.2 0.4 0.3 0.059 0 
SL-058 Kerry Town 906,338 91.3 2.9 2.8 0.107 0 
SL-063 Kerry Town 695,572 86.0 2.1 1.9 0.142 63 
SL-065 Kerry Town 1,244,050 54.8 1.2 1.2 0.006 1 
SL-071 Kerry Town 934,890 91.2 1.1 1.1 0.025 0 
SL-073 Kerry Town 1,329,914 11.1 75.6 75.6 0.002 1 
SL-074 Kerry Town 1,762,774 59.3 0.0 0.0 0.000 1 
SL-078 Kerry Town 3,047,881 57.3 0.8 0.8 0.011 17 




SL-082 Makeni 832,223 58.6 2.4 2.3 0.060 31 
SL-086 Makeni 1,402,458 54.0 0.0 0.0 0.001 0 
SL-090 Makeni 1,754,839 61.2 0.4 0.4 0.009 61 
SL-091 Makeni 1,095,595 51.2 0.1 0.1 0.000 0 
SL-093 Makeni 1,337,792 57.9 6.0 2.1 3.880 84 
SL-095 Makeni 1,380,305 48.8 0.3 0.3 0.006 14 
SL-096 Makeni 2,062,315 36.0 42.2 42.0 0.110 13 
SL-097 Makeni 767,545 48.5 3.1 2.4 0.710 7 
SL-098 Makeni 1,138,384 43.1 14.4 14.4 0.028 8 
SL-104 Makeni 1,307,147 73.3 1.4 1.4 0.010 0 
SL-108 Makeni 1,017,142 46.1 18.8 18.5 0.229 74 
SL-110 Makeni 887,413 47.1 4.7 0.8 3.910 4 
SL-113 Makeni 1,475,595 48.9 13.6 13.5 0.014 1 
SL-116 Makeni 1,332,504 77.9 0.9 0.9 0.015 4 
SL-117 Makeni 1,198,098 62.3 0.5 0.5 0.008 2 
Mean n/a 1,139,132 58.79 6.06 5.50 0.546 17 
 
Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics for Sierra Leone patient sample sequencing data, 
classified using Centrifuge. Read classification statistics were generated using the 




3.3.2.1 IDENTIFICATION AND REMOVAL OF CONTAMINANT SEQUENCES 
Reads matching pathogen sequences present in the negative extraction controls (NXC) 
and no template control (NTC) were identified as potential contaminants and removed 
from further analyses. These were O’nyong-nyong virus (ONNV), influenza A virus (IAV) 
and CHIKV (Table 3.5). Reads from patient samples that mapped to known strains 
handled in the laboratory were also removed from further analyses (DENV-1 strain 
TC861HA). 
 












Present in NTC. Frequently handled 
in the laboratory. 




Control strain handled in the 
laboratory. 
3 2 - 410 
ONNV 
Present in NTC. Sequence matches 
known lab strain. 
12 2 - 176 
IAV 
Reads map to only one of 8 viral 
genome segments. Frequently 
handled in the laboratory. 
3 2 - 272 




3.3.2.2 TAXONOMIC IDENTIFICATION USING CENTRIFUGE 
Taxonomic assingment of reads was performed using Centrifuge (326) with the 
‘Bacteria, archaea, viruses, human’ database, detailed in section 2.11.1. Centrifuge 
outputs were filtered using a threshold of ≥0.01% of total reads. Viruses exceeding this 
were investigated further using mapping and assembly methods (detailed in section 
2.11). Centrifuge identified four viruses known to infect humans that exceeded the 
threshold (Figure 3.4). These were: EBOV (n=1), GB virus C (GBV-C, commonly known as 
human pegivirus, n=5), hepatitis B virus (HBV, n=1), and human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV, n=5). A HBV and HIV co-infection was identified in patient SL-024. At least one virus 
was identified by Centrifuge in eleven of the 36 patient samples sequenced. Of the three 
patients that were EBOV positive by qRT-PCR, only one patient had ≥0.01% total reads 
classified as EBOV by Centrifuge (SL-096). The other patients, SL-044 and SL-090, had 
eight and one EBOV-specific read(s), respectively. In the remaining 25 patients, no 









Figure 3.4 Viruses identified in the Sierra Leone cohort using Centrifuge, shown as a 
percentage of the total sequencing reads from each patient sample. The threshold 




3.3.2.3 IDENTIFICATION OF VIRUS-SPECIFIC SCAFFOLDS FROM DE NOVO ASSEMBLY 
Following removal of human reads, de novo assembly and subsequent data analysis 
were performed as described in section 2.11. 10/36 samples contained scaffolds with 
homology to a pathogenic human virus, the remaining 26 samples did not contain any 
such scaffolds. Scaffolds with protein sequence homology to GBV-C, HBV, human 
herpesvirus-8 (HHV-8), HIV-1 and EBOV Zaire were identified (Table 3.6). A complete list 
of scaffold details including length, coverage and matching accessions is provided in 
Appendix 5.  
 
Sample ID GBV- C HBV HHV-8 HIV-1 EBOV Zaire 
SL-014 2 - - - - 
SL-017 - - - 23 - 
SL-024 - 3 - 2 - 
SL-071 3 - - - - 
SL-080 6 - - - - 
SL-093 4 - - - - 
SL-096 - - - - 8 
SL-097 - - - 14 - 
SL-110 - - - 92 - 
SL-117 - - 1 - - 
Table 3.6 A summary of the number of de novo assembled scaffolds with protein 




3.3.2.4 IDENTIFICATION OF VIRUS-SPECIFIC READS BY MAPPING TO REFERENCE GENOMES 
Mapping to multiple reference genomes identified reads specific to DENV-4, EBOV, GBV-
C, HBV, HIV, RVFV, YFV and ZIKV (Table 3.7). In some cases, very few internal control 
(MS2) reads were present but other virus-specific reads were present in relatively large 
numbers, for example sample SL-110 which contained 135,835 reads mapping to HIV, 







DENV-4 EBOV GBV-C HBV HIV RVFV YFV ZIKV MS2 
SL-007         8 
SL-009   6  532 2   4 
SL-013  2   4    180 
SL-014   101,234 2 2    6 
SL-017   9 2 35,686    6 
SL-018     2      
SL-023  2 2     284 8 
SL-024   14 25,604 1,127    12 
SL-029  4         
SL-041           
SL-043  8         
SL-044   313  12      
SL-046   624 4 6      
SL-058 2  32 4   8  2 
SL-063   10      12 
SL-065         2 
SL-071   250   8     
SL-073        2   
SL-074           
SL-078     8    18 
SL-080   4,396      20 
SL-082           
SL-086   18        
SL-090  6   14  2  54 
SL-091     6      
SL-093   129,663      103 
SL-095         18 
SL-096  3128       12 
SL-097     7,048    12 
SL-098         10 
SL-104           
SL-108         91 
SL-110   6  135,835      
SL-113           
SL-116         4 
SL-117     12    2 
 
Table 3.7 Virus-specific sequencing reads from Sierra Leonean metagenomic 
sequencing of febrile patient plasma, identified by mapping to virus reference 




For samples containing virus-specific reads, genome coverage was assessed at 1x and 5x 
coverage, and read coverage across the genome was plotted for samples containing a 
virus with ≥20% genome coverage at 5x coverage (Figure 3.5). GBV-C was present in five 
samples (SL-014, SL-044, SL-046, SL-080 and SL-093, 34.0 – 99.7% genome coverage, 
Figure 3.5A), HIV in 5 samples (SL-009, SL-017, SL-024, SL-097 and SL-110, 71.6 – 91.8% 
genome coverage, Figure 3.5B), HBV in one sample (SL-024, 100.0% genome coverage, 
Figure 3.5C) and EBOV in one sample (SL-096, 45.5% genome coverage, average 
coverage depth at each base was 55 reads, Figure 3.5C). To investigate the presence of 
the HHV-8 scaffold from sample SL-117, non-human reads were mapped to reference 
















Figure 3.5 Coverage of viral genomes from metagenomic sequencing from patient 
plasma samples, generated by mapping reads to a reference genome. The red dotted 
line indicates 5x coverage. A) GBV-C genome coverage from five patient plasma samples. 
B) HIV genome coverage from five patient plasma samples. C) HBV (above) and EBOV 




3.3.2.5 SUMMARY OF VIRUSES DETECTED BY METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
In summary, through a combination of taxonomic classification, de novo assembly and 
mapping to reference genomes, EBOV (n=1), GBV-C (n=5), HBV (n=1) and HIV (n=5) were 












coverage 1x (%) 
Genome 






SL009 HIV 168 0.01 532 81.4 48.6 0 na 
SL014 GBV-C 44,261 2.69 101,234 99.3 97.7 2 342-8949 
SL017 HIV 13,194 0.96 35,686 97.4 95.8 23 306-2022 
SL024 
 
HBV 22,023 1.42 25,604 100.0 100.0 3 558-2530 
HIV 88 0.01 1,127 90.7 71.6 2 767-1426 
SL044 GBV-C 118 0.01 313 80.1 34.0 0 na 
SL046 GBV-C 258 0.02 624 72.5 52.4 0 na 
SL080 GBV-C 1,913 0.17 4,396 96.6 89.3 6 323-3249 
SL093 GBV-C 51,303 2.08 129,663 99.7 99.7 4 314-5861 
SL096 EBOV 1,479 0.04 3,128 57.4 45.8 8 536-2974 
SL097 HIV 3,992 0.27 7,048 74.9 71.6 14 322-1446 




Table 3.8 Summary of viral reads identified from Sierra Leonean patient plasma samples by metagenomic sequencing. The threshold used for 





3.3.3  COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF GBV-C, HBV AND HIV SEQUENCES 
3.3.3.1 GB VIRUS C 
Patient GBV-C consensus sequences were analysed using BLASTn to identify the most 
closely related genome sequences from the NCBI nr/nt database. All five genomes were 
most closely related to genomes from Sierra Leonean patients with EBOV and GBV-C co-

















Date sampled Reference 
SL-014 KM670099.1 
GB virus C isolate G3765.2 
polyprotein 
97.00 92.79 Sierra Leone 14/06/14 (413) 
SL-044 KM670101.1 
GB virus C isolate G3850 
polyprotein gene, complete 
cds 
26.00 94.29 Sierra Leone 18/06/14 (413) 
SL-046 KM670107.1 
GB virus C isolate G3826 
polyprotein gene, complete 
cds 
46.00 92.34 Sierra Leone 16/06/14 (413) 
SL-080 KM670102.1 
GB virus C isolate G3825 
polyprotein 
82.00 94.63 Sierra Leone 16/06/14 (413) 
SL-093 KM670109.1 
GB virus C isolate G3808 
polyprotein 
99.00 92.36 Sierra Leone 15/06/14 (413) 
 




3.3.3.2 HEPATITIS B VIRUS 
The single HBV genome originated from a 38-year-old patient from Port Loko district, 
who also had an HIV infection. The full-length HBV consensus sequence was most similar 
to a genotype E strain originating from a patient in Guinea in 2006 (100% query 
coverage, 98.7% sequence identity, BLASTn). To confirm the genotype and put the 
sequence in the context of the wider picture of HBV phylogeny, the patient sequence 
was aligned with representative HBV genomes and the resulting phylogenetic tree 
confirmed that the HBV genome from patient SL-024 clusters with sequences from the 
genotype E group (Figure 3.6). Poor resolution within the genotype E group precluded 






Figure 3.6 Molecular phylogenetic analysis of 213 complete HBV genomes. The 
evolutionary history was inferred by using the Maximum-Likelihood method based on 
the Tamura-Nei model (414) in MEGA7 (415). The single sequence generated from this 







3.3.3.3 HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS 
The five HIV-positive patients identified in this study originated from two districts; Port 
Loko (n=3) and Bombali (n=2). All five were adults aged 21-39 years old (Table 3.10). The 
HIV genome sequences generated ranged from 75-99% coverage. All genomes showed 
high similarity to sequences belonging to HIV-1 group M, strongly suggesting that the 
patient strains also belong to this group (Table 3.10).  Sequence similarity in the pol gene 
was assessed in an effort to determine viral subtypes for HIV genomes SL-017 and SL-
110. Genomes SL-014, SL-024 and SL-097 were excluded from this analysis because the 
pol gene was not present with sufficient depth of coverage (5x coverage at all positions). 
SL-017 was most similar to subtype CRF02_AG across the pol gene, SL-110 was most 
similar to CRF02_AG throughout the majority of the gene however a small region 







Patient district Patient age 












SL-009 Port Loko 21 EU786671.1 92.55 33.00 Spain 2006 M 
SL-017 Port Loko 28 AB485635.1 93.5 92.00 Djibouti nd M 
SL-024 Port Loko 38 AB485634.1 92.24 67.00 Djibouti nd M 
SL-097 Bombali 38 KM050646.1 93.86 28.00 Zambia 2000 M 
SL-110 Bombali 39 AB485634.1 92.58 94.00 Djibouti nd M 
 









Figure 3.7 Plots showing the similarity of a number of HIV-1 subtypes to two HIV-1 
sequences generated from Sierra Leone patient samples SL-017 and SL-110. Plots were 
generated using the Recombinant Identification Program (RIP) (385). Each patient 
sequence was aligned against a custom RIP background, consisting of representative 
sequences for HIV subtypes A1, A2, A6, B, C, G, CRF02_AG, CRF06_cpx and CRF09_cpx 
(colours indicated in legend). The x-axis (k) represents the query sequence position at 
the centre of the moving window (400 bp). The y-axis, s(k), shows the similarity between 
that window of sequence and each of the background sequences. The two bars across 
the top of the graph represent the ‘best match’ (lower bar, the background sequence 
with the highest similarity to the query) and the significance of this match (upper bar). 
The upper bar shows colour at positions where the best match is significantly better 
than the second match. 
 
3.3.4  INVESTIGATION OF EBOLA VIRUS POSITIVE RESULTS 
The detection of EBOV RNA in eight patient samples using qRT-PCR is concerning, 
because (to the best of the author’s knowledge) these patients would have been treated 
as EBOV negative following a negative qRT-PCR result in the field. To investigate whether 
the discrepancy in qRT-PCR results could have occurred due to assay sensitivity issues 
stemming from primer/probe mismatches, the SL-096 EBOV genome sequence was 
analysed to look for primer/probe mismatches in the relevant assays. 
Primer/probe sequences for the RealStar Filovirus Screen RT-PCR Kit 1,0 (Altona 
Diagnostics, UK), targeting the L gene, are not publicly available. Primer/probe 




Primer/probe sequences were aligned with the SL-096 EBOV genome sequence and a 
closely related reference sequence (Zaire_Makona_2014, accession KM233070.1), 
which was used to map patient reads and generate the SL-096 consensus sequence. The 
Trombley primer/probe sites were missing from the SL-096 sequence as no reads 
covered this area of the genome, however, the reference genome sequence was 
identical to the Trombley primer/probe sequences (Table 3.11). The pan-EBOV 
primer/probe sites were present in the patient genome; no mis-matches were detected 



















NP Primer F565 Zaire TCTGACATGGATTACCACAAGATC 518-541 Yes 
Site not 
present 
NP Primer R6405 Zaire GATTGTTCGGCAAAGAGTCATCC 594-571 Yes 
Site not 
present 





L Primer FiloA_Ebola AAGCMTTTCCHAGCAAYATGATGGT 13,340-13,364 Yes Yes* 
L Primer FiloB_Ebola ATGHGGTGGATTATAATAATCACTDACATG 13,632-13,603 Yes Yes 
L Probe FAMEBO_DEGEN FAM-CCRAAATCATCACTBGTRTGGTGCCA-MGB 13,411-13,436 Yes Yes 
 
Table 3.11 Primer and probe details for two EBOV qRT-PCR assays. Altona (no primer/probe details available) and Trombley assays were used in the 
field laboratories, Trombley and Panning assays were used in this project. Refseq = reference sequence KM233070. *Site only partially covered at 5x 
coverage (8 bases have 5x coverage or less. The minimum coverage is 4x. At each position, all reads show the same base, this base matches the 




To investigate whether the change from the Altona assay to the Trombley assay could 
be related to these potentially missed EBOV cases, the dates the samples were taken 
were looked at. Seven of the eight EBOV-positive samples were collected and tested 
before the date the laboratories changed from the Altona to the Trombley assay, 
suggesting they were tested using the Altona assay (Figure 3.8). The sample that was 
collected and tested in February (SL-055), following the assay change, has the highest 
Cq value of all EBOV-positive samples (Cq 35.9) and is close to the limit of detection of 
the Trombley assay. In contrast to the retrospective EBOV-positive/field EBOV-negative 
samples, the ten samples that tested EBOV-inconclusive by qRT-PCR (Table 3.3) show no 



















Figure 3.8 Timeline showing the date of collection and qRT-PCR testing for the eight 
patient samples that tested negative upon initial testing in the field, then positive 
upon subsequent testing during this project. Colour indicates the field laboratory 
samples were tested in. Black dashed line indicates the time at which laboratories 




3.4  DISCUSSION 
3.4.1  RT-PCR/PCR TESTS DETECTED PLASMODIUM, EBOLA VIRUS AND LEPTOSPIRA IN 
FEBRILE PATIENTS 
Pathogen detection in a cohort of 120 Sierra Leonean febrile patient plasma samples 
began with an effort to detect eleven pathogens known to circulate in Africa at present 
or in the past, using RT-PCR/PCR assays. Prior to discussing results, some anomalies 
require attention with regard to the patient samples. Sample SL-072 is labelled in the 
metadata as an ‘unknown swab’, however, it has a Plasmodium RDT result, which is only 
possible from a blood sample. It seems likely that there was an error when recording 
metadata and that this sample is in fact blood, however it is not possible to know this 
for certain therefore results for this sample should be treated with caution. Sample SL-
070 showed an abnormally high MS2 qRT-PCR Cq value, subsequently progressing to 
become MS2 negative in repeat tests, therefore RT-PCR/PCR results for this sample 
cannot be relied upon as there could be inhibiting substances present in the sample.  
RNA from patient samples was tested using qRT-PCR, RT-PCR and PCR assays targeting 
individual pathogens and Leptospira (n=1), Plasmodium (n=22) and EBOV (n=8) was 
detected. Leptospirosis is a relatively common bacterial infection with a worldwide 
distribution, transmitted through contact with urine from infected animals. Despite its 
common occurrence, little is known about the true incidence in affected areas (289). 
The detection of Plasmodium in 22 patients is consistent with the wider incidence of 
malaria in Sierra Leone. Malaria was the cause of the highest proportion of disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) in Sierra Leone in 2014, 2015 and 2017 (45). Malaria 
prevalence in this study cohort is 18%, markedly lower than the national average of 36% 
in 2014-2015 (45). The reasons for this are likely to be multi-factorial and it’s possible 




exposure to EBOV. In just over 1 in 10 samples tested, there is a difference between the 
field RDT Plasmodium result and the RT-PCR result from this project. 6.7% of the samples 
positive by RT-PCR were negative by RDT. Conversely, 4.2% of RDT-positive sample were 
RT-PCR-negative.  
Abbott manufactures both RDTs used in the field laboratories. The sensitivity of the 
BinaxNOW RDT for P. falciparum is stated by the manufacturer as 99.7% and specificity 
is 94.2% (for parasitaemia levels >5,000 parasites/µl) (416). The manufacturer states 
that the SD Bioline Malaria Ag P.f. RDT sensitivity is 99.7% for P. falciparum and 95.5% 
for non-P. falciparum species. The specificity is 99.5% (417), however, it is not clear what 
detection method the RDTs were compared against. A study comparing sensitivity and 
specificity of three RDTs (including both Abbott devices) with PCR for Plasmodium 
detection determined the sensitivity and specificity of the RDTs to be lower; 71-75% and 
80-84%, respectively (418).  
The RT-PCR used in this study is based on an assay capable of detecting all four 
plasmodium species (362). The assay is reported to detect to a limit of one parasite in 
50 ml of whole blood and in comparative studies was shown to be more sensitive than 
a microscopy-based method (362). Without a direct comparison of the RDT method with 
the RT-PCR using a panel of known Plasmodium positive/negative samples, it is not 
possible to meaningfully compare the sensitivity and specificity of the two methods. 
Furthermore, data on which RDT was used to test each patient sample in the field was 
not available. 
The lack of detection of CCHFV, RVFV and ZIKV is consistent with current information on 




been reported from Sierra Leone to date (419). Similarly, no outbreaks of RVFV have 
been reported, although the WHO classifies the country as at risk based on virological 
and/or serological evidence (420). Although the ZIKV vector is present, no cases of 
infection have been reported to date (421).  
Cases of yellow fever have been reported from Sierra Leone, most recently in 2011, 
however vaccination campaigns have helped keep incidence low (422). Rickettsial 
disease is described throughout Africa, resulting from infection with a variety of 
bacterial species (423). Published information on the distribution and frequency of 
rickettsial infections in Sierra Leone specifically is not available, with the exception of a 
single paper from 1986 showing that 5.3% of the cohort tested were seropositive for 
antibodies to spotted fever-group Rickettsiae (424). 
LASV is endemic in Sierra Leone and much of surrounding West Africa. Transmission is 
usually by contact with infected rodents or rodent excrement, infections are known to 
follow a seasonal pattern in which outbreaks typically occur between December and 
March (104). Given that the samples were taken during LASV season and the clinical 
signs of disease overlap considerably with EBOV, it seemed likely that LASV would be 
detected in some patients in this study, however, no cases of infection were identified. 
CHIKV has been identified in nearly 40 countries to date, including those in sub-Saharan 
Africa (425). The virus caused outbreaks during the 1950s-1970s (426), then seemingly 
disappeared during the 1980s before re-emerging in the early 2000s (427,428). CHIKV 
was detected by serosurveillance in Sierra Leone in 1972 (429), then again in 2012 in the 
town of Bo where anti-CHIKV IgM antibodies were detected in 400 people (430). Despite 




Leone and dengue fever is ubiquitous throughout the tropics (22). The samples in this 
study were collected during the dry season, during which the risk of transmission viruses 
with mosquito vectors are lower (22). This could explain the lack of detection of 
arboviruses such as CHIKV and DENV in this study. 
 
3.4.2  EBOV RNA WAS DETECTED IN PATIENTS DEEMED EBOV-NEGATIVE IN THE FIELD 
Despite all samples testing EBOV-negative using qRT-PCR in the field, eight patient 
samples tested retrospectively positive for EBOV by qRT-PCR and a further ten samples 
gave an inconclusive result. The high Cq values of the EBOV-positive samples indicate a 
low level of viral RNA, which could be the reason they were not detected in the field 
during initial testing. A field study by Broadhurst et al. (431) assessed the utility of an 
EBOV RDT by comparing sensitivity and specificity with the Altona qRT-PCR, which at the 
time was established in the two field laboratories involved in the study. The authors 
explain that during the study, they became aware that the Altona assay had imperfect 
sensitivity. This was discovered when the Trombley assay was used in conjunction with 
the Altona assay to test 16 samples that showed discordant results between the RDT 
and the Altona assay. Six samples tested positive by the Trombley assay (Cq value range 
29.1–39.8), one of the six also tested newly positive by the Altona assay (Cq value 28.4) 
(431). The authors suggest that there is a drop-off in sensitivity in the Altona assay above 
a Cq value of approximately 30. This fits with the results from the EBOV-positive samples 
in this project, from which a Cq value range of 30.9-35.9 is observed using the Trombley 
assay. This, coupled with the timescale of the change from Altona to Trombley in the 
field laboratories, suggests that these samples may have been tested using the less 




It is worth noting that a number of the EBOV-positive (2/8) and inconclusive (4/10) 
samples are labelled as ‘follow-up (treatment centre)’ in the ‘sample status’ field of the 
metadata. An ‘original’ sample means that the blood sample was drawn from the patient 
on first admission to the ETC. Despite enquiries, it has not been possible to determine 
the exact meaning of ‘follow-up (treatment centre)’. One possibility is that the patient 
was referred from another medical facility or ‘holding centre’, in which case the sample 
is akin to an ‘original’ sample. Another possibility is that the patient previously had a 
EBOV-positive qRT-PCR result and this sample is a follow up blood sample from the 
convalescing patient. In the latter case, the implications of a positive test result differ 
from the former, as the patient would have been a known EBOV positive and treated as 
such.  
Three EBOV-positive patient samples were sequenced using the metagenomic 
approach. Of the three, one sample (SL-096) produced sufficient EBOV-specific reads to 
generate a partial consensus sequence, covering 46% of the genome at an average 
depth of 55 reads per base. This depth of coverage is consistent with data from a 
previous study that compared qRT-PCR Cq values with the average sequence depth in 
179 clinical samples (40).  
The pan-EBOV qRT-PCR primer/probe sequences were compared with the patient SL-
096 EBOV sequence, confirming that there were no mismatches in either the patient 
sequence or a closely related reference sequence and confirming that this assay is 
suitable for use with this patient cohort. For the assays used in the field (Altona and 
Trombley) it was not possible to assess primer/probe suitability effectively. For the 
Altona assay this was because the primer/probe sequences are unavailable due to its 




the SL-096 sequence. Although the closely related reference sequence showed 100% 
match to the primer/probe set, it is not possible to know if there were polymorphisms 
present in the patient sequence which could have had a negative impact on assay 
sensitivity. 
It is difficult to improve the coverage of the patient EBOV genome using metagenomic 
sequencing because the amount of viral RNA in this particular set of patient samples is 
low. Of the EBOV-positive samples identified by qRT-PCR, sample SL-096 had the lowest 
Cq value and therefore should contain the highest amount of RNA. Metagenomic 
sequencing generated 46% of the EBOV genome at 5x coverage and 57% at 1x coverage 
and it is unlikely that sequencing additional samples with higher Cq values would result 
in improved coverage, furthermore, this is not a cost-effective way of generating this 
data. Another approach, such sequencing amplicons from a multiplex tiling PCR primer 
scheme (343), would be a better way forward.  
 
3.4.3  METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING DETECTED HIV, HBV AND HUMAN PEGIVIRUS IN 
FEBRILE PATIENTS 
Metagenomic sequencing of 36 febrile patient plasma samples produced viral genome 
sequences for GBV-C (n=5), HIV (n=5), HBV (n=1) and EBOV (n=1). A complete HBV 
genome was generated from patient SL-024; a 38-year-old from Port Loko who was co-
infected with HIV. Sierra Leone is considered a high-endemic area for HBV; the 
estimated prevalence in Africa as a whole is 6.1% (432). Previous studies of different 
groups in Sierra Leone identified antibodies in 18% of primary school children (433), 6% 
of pregnant women of middle and high socio-economic class (434), and 13-15% of blood 




study shows high similarity to HBV genotype E. This is consistent with results of a meta-
analysis of >900 publications of HBV genotyping data which showed that genotype E is 
predominant in West Africa and is responsible for 17.6% of HBV infections globally, 97% 
of which occurred in sub-Saharan Africa (436).  
HIV prevalence during 2018 in Sierra Leone was 1.5% in adults aged 15-49, with an 
estimated 63,000 adults and 6,600 children living with HIV infection (402). A study 
investigating HIV prevalence in suspected EVD patients from 2015 observed a high 
prevalence (17.6%) among 678 EVD-negative patients tested using antibody detection 
methods (437). HIV prevalence in the present study cohort is considerably lower at 4.2%. 
It’s possible that some HIV-positive patients were not detected in the present study, for 
example in cases where patients were on an effective antiretroviral therapy regimen 
and viral load was very low. This is a limitation of using a nucleic acid-based method to 
detect infection, and further confirmatory testing would be required to produce an 
accurate prevalence figure. It is also possible that variation in prevalence exists through 
the country, and/or that the relatively small sample size does not accurately reflect the 
true prevalence in the population.  
HIV as a species has very high genetic diversity (438), therefore an agnostic 
metagenomic approach is an advantage for detecting this virus. Prior knowledge of the 
viral sequence is not required, and the sequence data generated can be used to identify 
viral group, subtype and recombinants. This information is useful for tracking viral 
evolution and epidemiology (439). Both HIV and HBV were identified in patient SL-024, 
demonstrating the utility of the metagenomic sequencing method for detecting co-
infections. It is possible that the presence of one virus would have been missed if 




attributed solely to the detected virus, potentially resulting in sub-optimal patient 
management. Data on HIV-1 subtype prevalence in Sierra Leone is relatively sparse, 
however one study looking at 2015 HIV-positive patients from Freetown determined 
that the majority (83%) were infected with HIV-1 subtype CRF02_AG (386). In this study, 
for patient sequences that had sufficient coverage, HIV-1 subtype was identified by 
comparing the pol gene sequence to known subtypes using RIP. This revealed that both 
patient sequences were most similar to CRF02_AG across the majority of the gene, with 
one strain showing greater homology to subtype A1 across a small portion of the gene.  
GBV-C, also known as human pegivirus C (genus Pegivirus, family Flaviviridae), is a 
human virus with a worldwide distribution and is considered to be non-pathogenic 
(440). Previous studies have estimated the global prevalence of GBV-C between 1-13% 
(441–444) with higher prevalence in developing countries, approaching 20% in some 
areas (445,446). A study looking at GBV-C EBOV co-infection in patients during the West 
Africa EBOV outbreak (412,413) identified 13/49 patients with such a co-infection. Of 
the GBV-C-positive patients, 53% survived EBOV infection in contrast with only 22% of 
GBV-C-negative patients (413). This association between survival and GBV-C infection 
was confounded by an association with age, however, it warrants further investigation. 
Interestingly, a similar association between co-infection and improved outcome has 
been made between HIV and GBV-C co-infection in AIDS patients (446,447), potentially 
due to reduced T-cell and B-cell activation in HIV-infected individuals (447,448). Despite 
evidence for an increased prevalence of GBV-C in HIV-positive people (440), the present 
study did not identify any such co-infections. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the GBV-C 




sampled in Sierra Leone in June 2014, from patients co-infected with EBOV and GBV-C 
(412,413).  
 
3.4.4  LIMITATIONS 
The nature of the metagenomic sequencing method is such that contaminants are 
commonly sequenced; introduced during sampling, in the laboratory or present in 
reagents (308). It is important to control for these in order to rule out false positive 
results. Determining whether reads are contaminants can be challenging, particularly in 
instances where the number of reads is very low. This is a challenge that must be 
overcome if metagenomic sequencing is to successfully transition into routine use 
within a clinical diagnostic setting (313).  
In the present study contaminants were controlled for by sequencing a NTC that 
underwent the same random amplification, library preparation, sequencing and data 
analysis protocols. This method has previously shown to be effective, for example, a 
metagenomic virus discovery workflow was used in an attempt to identify a viral cause 
of disease in cattle exhibiting symptoms of unknown aetiology (449). Parvovirus-like 
sequences were identified in multiple samples, however, these were confirmed to be 
contaminants following the detection of an identical sequence in the negative extraction 
control and confirmatory testing using qRT-PCR (449). 
To date, no standardised threshold values exist for the analysis of metagenomic 
sequencing data. Establishing thresholds can be achieved in individual laboratories by 




(313), which is necessary when establishing a workflow for diagnostic purposes. For the 
purposes of this research project, threshold values were informed by the NTC results.  
Bacteriophage MS2 was used as an internal control for the metagenomic sequencing 
assay, from the point of extraction through to sequencing. The presence of MS2-specific 
reads confirmed that the assay performed as expected, and conversely a lack of MS2-
specific reads suggested sub-optimal assay performance. Compared with other samples 
using this control previously processed in the same laboratory (including the Ecuadorian 
plasma samples described in chapter 4), very low numbers of MS2-specific reads were 
generated by sequencing. However, it is clear from the results from individual samples 
that sequencing did successfully produce viral reads, but no/very few MS2-specific 
reads. For example, sample SL-110 produced 135,835 HIV-specific reads, but only four 
MS2-specific reads. This could be because of the high levels of HIV RNA diluting the MS2 
signal. This can also happen in samples that have high levels of background sequence, 
for example because of variability in cell lysis prior to plasma separation, or variability in 
sample storage and handling conditions (450). MS2 input concentration (1.45e+5 pfu) 
was optimised as an internal control for qRT-PCR rather than metagenomic sequencing. 
It is likely that this concentration was simply too close to the limit of detection of the 
sequencing assay, and therefore future optimisation of the MS2 control specifically for 
metagenomic sequencing would be beneficial. 
In instances where no MS2-specific reads or viral reads are present, the assay must be 
considered to have failed; this occurred in one of the 36 samples sequenced (SL-104). 
One possible explanation for the low numbers of MS2-specific reads observed in general 
is the longer processing time compared to that of the Ecuadorian samples. The Sierra 




transferred to a CL3 laboratory for the remainder of the procedure. This meant that 
these samples spent longer in AVL buffer than the Ecuadorian samples, and AVL buffer 
has been shown to have a detrimental effect on RNA integrity, which deteriorates 
quickly at room temperature (450). Another possibility is the presence of inhibiting 
substances in some plasma samples that were not removed during the RNA extraction 
process (451). However, RNA sequences were present at some level in all samples, as 




CHAPTER 4: PATHOGEN DETECTION IN FEBRILE ECUADORIAN PATIENTS  
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1  ECUADOR 
Ecuador is situated on the coast of north-western South America, bordering Peru on the 
east and south, and Colombia on the north, on a similar latitude to Sierra Leone and 
Guinea. Its land area is almost 250,000km2 and the population is estimated at 16.3 
million people (census 2016) (394). Ecuador is an upper middle-income country, defined 
by a gross national income per capita of 3,896-12,055 USD, but has a wide range of socio-
economic groups including indigenous populations (396). Ecuador is a republic and is 
split into 24 provinces (Figure 4.1), which are divided into cantons (452). Quito is the 
capital city, however, provinces are ‘zoned’ together (452). This chapter focusses on the 
detection and characterisation of pathogens in a cohort of 196 febrile patients with 
acute undifferentiated febrile illness, from Esmeraldas province in Ecuador, 2016. The 
province is located in the north-west of the country on the coast (Figure 4.1) and belongs 
to zone 1, along with Carchi, Imbabura and Sucumbios provinces. The climate and terrain 
in Ecuador varies throughout the country; with a tropical climate along the coastal plain, 
tropical climate with flat to rolling eastern jungle in the Amazonian lowlands, and a 
cooler climate inland at higher elevation in the inter-Andean central highlands (452). 
Almost half the Ecuadorian population is located in the Andean basins and valleys; the 











Figure 4.1 Map showing the 24 provinces of Ecuador. The orange star shows the 
location of the medical centre in Esmeraldas province, at which febrile patient plasma 





4.1.2  PUBLIC HEALTHCARE AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
Ecuador’s national healthcare system was established in 1967 and historically struggled 
to provide adequate care, ranked by the WHO for healthcare efficiency as 111th out of 
221 countries in the year 2000 (454), with government instability, corruption, funding 
and legal restrictions all contributing factors (455). Healthcare reform occurred in 2008, 
following the implementation of a new constitution that aimed to provide free-of-
charge, high quality healthcare by allowing the government better control and oversight 
of public health, with increased budget and system reform (455). As a result, Ecuador 
was ranked 20th for healthcare efficiency in 2014 (455). The healthcare system functions 
as three major sectors: 1) public, which provides free services for everyone, 2) social 
security, which is available to working-class people and their families via tax paid by 
employers, and 3) a private system, which is used by the 3% of Ecuadorian citizens 
classified as upper- and middle-class (456). The Ecuadorian Ministry of Health (MoH) is 
responsible for the services provided by both public and private entities (456).  
Life expectancy in Ecuador was 74 and 79 years for men and women, respectively, in 
2016 and the mortality rate under the age of five years old was 14/1000 live births (457). 
Over the past decade, mortality from communicable diseases in Ecuador decreased, 
with an incidence of 96.1 deaths per 100,000 people in 2008, falling to 74.5 per 100,000 
in 2016 (458). HIV infection and AIDS-related illness were the leading causes of 
communicable disease-related death in Ecuador in 20-44 years olds in 2014 (459). In 
2018, 44,000 people were living with HIV infection, 2,200 new infections occurred and 
<1000 people died because of AIDS (460). The incidence of TB in Ecuador was 44 




preceded by a decline in incidence from the year 2000 (461). Drug resistant TB is a 
problem, with Ecuador showing the fourth highest percentage of rifampicin-resistant 
or multidrug-resistant TB cases in the Americas (462). 
Successful control campaigns have been implemented against a number of endemic 
tropical diseases of clinical and economic importance in Ecuador, including the parasitic 
infections Chagas disease and Onchocerciasis, for which no cases have been reported 
since 2010 (463). Human rabies cases resulting from dog bites are well controlled, 
however transmission from vampire bats has been reported more recently and poses 
an ongoing risk (464,465). Cases of leptospirosis have risen in recent years, which fits 
with the trend seen globally. Reasons for this include an increase in intensive farming, 
poor sanitation and effluent management, as well as El Niño events that lead to 
increased temperature and number of static water sites (463).  
Historically, malaria was a major cause of infection but between 1990 and 2011 
incidence reduced by >75% thanks to a nationwide elimination programme which is still 
active (466), and by 2018, reports of malaria were restricted to the Amazon region (467). 
During a similar time period, cases of dengue fever increased, expanding from urban 
areas into previously unaffected rural areas (221). Re-emergence of DENV in Ecuador 
occurred in 1998, with cases peaking in 2000 then fluctuating over subsequent years. 
Trends of both malaria and dengue fever incidence in Esmeraldas province match those 
seen at the country-level (468). DENV serotypes 1, 2, 3 and 4 have circulated in Ecuador 
(469), with DENV-1 and DENV-4 detected in Esmeraldas. Furthermore, an introduction 
of DENV-4 to Esmeraldas from Colombia in 2004 led to the spread of this serotype into 
the rest of the country (468). It has been postulated that Esmeraldas might be a key 




the rest of Ecuador (468,470,471). DENV infection in southern coastal Ecuador is highly 
seasonal (472). Disease incidence correlates with vector density and is highest during 
the hot rainy season of February to May (472,473), and epidemics of disease occur as a 
result of the increased air temperature associated with El Niño events (472). 
DENV, CHIKV and ZIKV are all transmitted via the mosquito vector Aedes aegypti which 
is endemic in Ecuador and much of South America (474), and circulation of all three 
arboviruses have been documented in Ecuador (381,472,474–476). Following the 
introduction of CHIKV into the Americas in 2013, three reports of autochthonous CHIKV 
transmission in Ecuador were made at the end of 2014 (381,477), which preceded 
almost 30,000 infections in 2015 (477). Since then cases have decreased dramatically, 
but the potential for transmission still exists due to the wide distribution of the vector. 
Malaria awareness is high due to the country’s previous history of infection, and fever 
is often still assumed to be a result of Plasmodium infection (468). However, the 
downward trend of malaria and the emergence of other infections with similar 
symptoms, including DENV, CHIKV and ZIKV, mean that a change in awareness is needed. 
It is important that resources and facilities are available, in terms of laboratories and 
assays, to be able to accurately determine infectious causes of fever and therefore 
inform an effective patient treatment plan. It is also necessary to consider that the 
incursion and spread of emerging pathogens not previously seen in the country can 
cause infections without detection.  
Multiple pathogens have been detected in Ecuadorian febrile patients through direct 
detection (pathogen antigen or nucleic-acid) or indirect detection (antibodies), including 




virus, St. Louis encephalitis virus, Leptospira, Rickettsia, Brucella, Coxiella and 
Plasmodium (381,468,476,478–481). 
 
4.1.3  ZIKA VIRUS OUTBREAK IN THE AMERICAS 
The detection of ZIKV in Ecuador in 2016 was part of a larger outbreak that spread across 
the Americas following the introduction of the virus to Brazil in March 2015 (482), 
demonstrating the potential for extensive spread of an emerging virus through a naïve 
population. Data provided by affected countries showed that in South America, the 
worst-affected region, the number of cases peaked early in 2016, with over 30,000 cases 
reported in one week (272). Central America experienced a peak of cases around the 
same time, but at a much lower level (around 4,000 cases a week) (272). Compared with 
South America, the Caribbean reported fewer but more stable numbers of cases weekly, 
with a peak in mid-2016 (272). North America reported cases from 2015-2018, the 
majority of which were returning travellers, however, presumed local transmission was 
reported from the states of Florida and Texas, in addition to a small number of sexually 
transmitted cases (483). The USA territories of Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Samoa 
were also affected (273). Although a low level of local transmission is still possible, the 
ZIKV outbreak is now widely considered to be over, with a decline in reported cases in 
2017 which was attributed mainly to acquired immunity within the affected populations 
(484).  
Ecuador reported its first laboratory-confirmed ZIKV cases in epidemiological week (EW) 
2 of 2016, from the provinces of Guayas and Manabi (475), the latter of which borders 




of Public Health and Research at the Ecuador Ministry of Public Health, using a 
combination of serology (IgM ELISA) and molecular detection (qRT-PCR) methods (475). 
Cases continued to increase weekly from EW 16, culminating in a peak of 320 cases 
during EW 25 in mid-June 2016 (Figure 4.2) (475). Following this there was a decline in 
the number of cases. Interestingly, during the early part of 2017 when the majority of 
countries in South America were reporting a decline in cases, Ecuador reported an 
increase between EWs 4 and 20 (272). As of September 2017, Ecuador reported 
autochthonous transmission of ZIKV in 17 of the 24 provinces in the country. During the 
last 8 weeks for which data is available (EW 24 to 31 of 2017), on average 68 cases were 
reported weekly (475). During the outbreak, Esmeraldas province showed one of the 




Figure 4.2 ZIKV cases (suspected and confirmed) reported to the Ecuador Ministry of 




On April 16th 2016 a major earthquake took place in Ecuador, occurring between the 
Nazca and South American plates and measured at a magnitude of 7.8 (485). The 
disaster resulted in approximately 30,000 injuries and 700 deaths, with coastal 
Esmeraldas and Manabi the worst affected provinces (486). Natural disasters can 
influence the incidence of infectious diseases in the affected population due to a 
combination of factors, including the rapid movement of people from one area to 
another, and poor hygiene conditions due to the breakdown of sanitation infrastructure 
(485). Vector-borne diseases in particular may increase because of changes in conditions 
that increase the density or number of the vector or bring people into closer contact 
with it. For example, increased mosquito populations were seen in Haiti following the 
2010 earthquake, because debris increased the number of available vector breeding 
sites (stagnant water reservoirs), which led to a rise in malaria incidence (487,488). A 
study investigating ZIKV incidence following the earthquake in Ecuador in 2016 
demonstrated that there was a significant increase in autochthonous ZIKV cases 
following the earthquake (controlled for socioeconomic and climatic variables), 
particularly in severely affected cantons (485). This natural disaster is likely to have 
contributed to the incidence of ZIKV in Ecuador during the outbreak and highlights the 
importance of natural disasters and increased incidence of infectious disease. This 
project aims to identify other causative agents of illness in febrile patients from 







4.1.4  AIMS 
The plasma samples used in this study were taken during the time of the ZIKV outbreak 
in 2016 and were routinely tested at the time of sampling for ZIKV, DENV and CHIKV 
using qRT-PCR. The majority of patients were negative for all three viruses. The aim of 
this chapter was to detect causative pathogens in these patients using a combination of 
targeted RT-PCR/PCR testing, followed by metagenomic sequencing of RT-PCR/PCR-
negative patients. Used in conjunction with one another, these methods can detect both 
known and as of yet unknown causes of fever, with a focus on RNA viruses. The 
characterisation of identified viruses using whole genome sequencing and virus isolation 
provides essential information on viral genetics that can be used for further analyses. 
Genome sequences were made publicly available online, and isolated viruses were 
deposited in national virus collections with the aim of enhancing future surveillance 




4.2  METHODOLOGY: SAMPLE SELECTION FOR METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
Total RNA from 196 febrile Ecuadorian patient plasma samples collected in 2016 were 
tested for CHIKV, DENV (serotypes 1-4), MAYV, YFV, ZIKV, Leptospira, Plasmodium, 
Rickettsia and internal control MS2 using a panel of RT-PCR/PCR-based assays. Following 
testing, 18 samples from the patient cohort were selected for metagenomic sequencing. 
Two samples were selected based on their inconclusive RT-PCR/PCR test results; sample 
D-087 (Cq values 35-39.9 for DENV and CHIKV) and sample D-124 (Cq values 35-39.9 for 
ZIKV and CHIKV). These samples were selected with the intention of identifying virus 
specific reads for the pathogens in question and generating virus genome sequences. 
The additional sixteen samples were selected from the group of patients for which no 
infectious agent had been identified by RT-PCR/PCR testing, using the following criteria: 
1. Minimum number of days of fever; to maximise the chance of detecting 
pathogen RNA. 
2. Maximum fields of metadata available. 





4.3  RESULTS 
4.3.1  RT-PCR/PCR TESTING OF FEBRILE PATIENT PLASMA 
Positive cases (Cq value <35) were identified for ZIKV (prevalence 11.2%, n=22), DENV 
(prevalence 2.0%, n=4) and Leptospira (prevalence 0.5%, n=1) (Figure 4.3). In addition, 
several potentially positive cases (Cq value 35-39.9) were identified (ZIKV n=15, DENV 
n=3, CHIKV n=2 and Leptospira spp. n=1, Figure 4.3). Two potential co-infections were 
observed; patient D-087 (DENV and CHIKV) and D-124 (ZIKV and CHIKV), although high 
Cq values (34-36) were observed for all three pathogens. No cases of MAYV, YFV, 
Plasmodium or Rickettsia were identified. 152 samples were negative for all the 
pathogens that were tested for. All samples were positive for internal control MS2. A 


















Figure 4.3 RT-PCR/PCR assay test results. Cq values from pathogen positive (Cq <35) 
and potentially-positive (Cq 35-39.9) patient samples tested by qRT-PCR. 152/196 





Plasma samples that had a Cq value of 35-39.9 for CHIKV, DENV or ZIKV were tested for 
IgM antibodies against the virus in question using qualitative commercial IgM capture 
ELISA assays (see section 2.6). Detection of IgM antibodies indicates a recent infection 
and can help clarify high Cq qRT-PCR results. Two samples were tested for anti-CHIKV 
IgM; one was borderline and one was negative (Table 4.1). Two out of three samples 
tested for anti-DENV IgM were positive, and only two of 12 samples tested for anti-ZIKV 
IgM were positive (Table 4.1). Taking the qRT-PCR and IgM antibodies results together, 

















Sample ID IgM test Result qRT-PCR Cq value 
D-087 CHIKV Negative 36.6 
D-124 CHIKV Borderline 35.8 
D-009 DENV Positive 36.5 
D-087 DENV Positive 35.3 
D-099 DENV Negative 38.3 
D-041 ZIKV Positive 36.5 
D-055 ZIKV Negative 36.1 
D-080 ZIKV Negative 37.1 
D-095 ZIKV Negative 36.3 
D-109 ZIKV Negative 37.4 
D-118 ZIKV Negative 35.1 
D-136 ZIKV Negative 37.5 
D-139 ZIKV Negative 35.7 
D-149 ZIKV Negative 35.4 
D-156 ZIKV Positive 35.5 
D-186 ZIKV Negative 35.3 
D-209 ZIKV Negative 37.4 
 
Table 4.1 Anti-CHIKV, -DENV and ZIKV- IgM antibody results from Ecuadorian patient 
plasma samples with qRT-PCR Cq values of 35-39.9 for the virus in question. Tests were 




4.3.2  VIRUS DETECTION BY METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
Eighteen patient RNA samples were sequenced in total. Two of these; D-087 and D-124, 
showed putative co-infections as determined by RT-PCR/PCR and were sequenced 
metagenomically with the aim of confirming or refuting this by looking for reads specific 
to the pathogens implicated, in addition to screening for other viruses. The remaining 
16 samples were RT-PCR/PCR-negative for all pathogens tested for. 
The total number of reads generated per patient sample ranged from 45,190 to 
2,176,382 (mean = 1,097,957, Table 4.2). On average, 56% of reads were of human origin 
(minimum 8.75%, maximum 91.90%), and 17% were of microbial origin (minimum 
0.43%, maximum 79.70%). The mean number of viral reads per sample was 1.07% 
(minimum 0.01%, maximum 4.13%). All samples contained reads belonging to internal 


































D-001 2,176,382 60.50 1.13 1.09 0.04 944 0.02 
D-002 1,442,421 71.70 6.39 6.20 0.19 2,526 0.10 
D-005 1,695,587 91.90 4.74 4.62 0.12 1,438 0.07 
D-010 1,665,762 50.10 5.48 5.29 0.18 2,893 0.09 
D-014 1,412,807 48.60 0.43 0.42 0.01 180 0.01 
D-018 752,271 50.40 19.00 18.10 0.90 6,428 0.47 
D-020 1,377,949 33.40 50.30 46.10 4.13 56,771 2.40 
D-029 1,606,349 85.20 3.54 3.49 0.05 4 0.00 
D-030 1,376,838 52.50 3.89 3.19 0.64 8,790 0.33 
D-035 1,065,425 57.00 4.62 4.04 0.53 5,613 0.28 
D-040 1,516,950 52.80 1.66 1.62 0.04 598 0.02 
D-047 1,244,665 68.40 4.51 4.04 0.47 5,805 0.25 
D-074 1,397,452 69.00 14.20 12.40 1.75 24,293 0.98 
D-075 45,190 65.70 4.86 4.26 0.59 246 0.30 
D-087 462,977 38.8 46.30 43.4 2.95 7,031 0.98 
D-091 109,193 49.30 34.80 31.40 3.33 3,514 2.04 
D-124 356,780 8.75 79.70 77.9 1.62 63 0.01 
D-131 58,227 55.00 19.20 17.30 1.77 954 0.96 
Mean 1,097,957 56.06 16.93 15.83 1.07 7,116 0.52 
Table 4.2 Sequencing read statistics for Ecuadorian 2016 patient sequencing data, 
classified using Centrifuge. The percentage read data was generated using the Pavian 




4.3.2.1 IDENTIFICATION AND REMOVAL OF CONTAMINANT SEQUENCES 
Reads matching pathogen sequences that were present in the negative extraction 
controls (n=5) and/or the no template control (n=1) were identified as potential 
contaminants and excluded from further analyses (Table 4.3). These were CHIKV and 
IAV.  
 





Present in NXCs and NTC. Frequently 
handled in the laboratory. 
12 
IAV 
Present in NXCs. Frequently handled in the 
laboratory. 
13 
Table 4.3 Contaminants identified in metagenomic sequencing data.  
 
4.3.2.2 TAXONOMIC IDENTIFICATION USING CENTRIFUGE 
Centrifuge identified three pathogenic human viruses present at a level exceeding 0.01% 
of the total reads; OROV, DENV-1 and hepatovirus A virus (HAV, previously named 
Hepatitis A virus). 5,076 OROV-specific reads (0.63% of total reads) and 473 DENV-1-
specific reads (0.06% of total reads) were identified from sample D-087. Prior qRT-PCR 
testing did not include an OROV assay. 478 HAV-specific reads were identified from 
sample D-005 (0.02% of total reads). No viruses known to infect humans were identified 






4.3.2.3 IDENTIFICATION OF VIRUS-SPECIFIC SCAFFOLDS FROM DE NOVO ASSEMBLY  
Following the removal of human reads, reads were de novo assembled and analysed as 
described in section 2.11.5. 16/18 samples did not contain any scaffolds with homology 
to a pathogenic human virus. The exceptions were D-005, from which two scaffolds 
showed homology to HAV, and D-087, from which scaffolds showed homology to OROV 
and DENV-1 (Table 4.4), in agreement with the Centrifuge results. 13/18 samples 
contained at least one scaffold matching internal control MS2, the exceptions were 
















Family Genus Species 
D-005 38 1410 3.55 
NP_041007.1, 
NP_041008.1 
Picornaviridae Hepatovirus Hepatovirus A 
D-005 107 1126 5.51 
NP_041007.1, 
NP_041008.1 
Picornaviridae Hepatovirus Hepatovirus A 
D-087 2 3433 31.07 NP_982304.1 Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Oropouche virus 
D-087 5 2873 14.61 NP_982303.1 Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Oropouche virus 
D-087 22 1521 20.43 NP_982304.1 Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Oropouche virus 
D-087 185 610 8.89 NP_982305.1 Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Oropouche virus 
D-087 418 386 16.52 NP_982303.1 Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Oropouche virus 
D-087 6 2867 39.52 NP_059433.1 Flaviviridae Flavivirus Dengue virus-1 




4.3.2.4 IDENTIFICATION OF VIRUS-SPECIFIC READS BY MAPPING TO REFERENCE GENOMES 
Non-human reads from the 18 patient samples were mapped to multiple reference 
genomes, selected for their relevance to the patient cohort (see section 2.11.4). Of the 
13 viruses included, reads from six were identified (DENV-1, DENV-2, DENV-3, DENV-4, 
HAV, OROV, Table 4.5). Viral reads were identified in six patient samples; D-005 (HAV, 
OROV, DENV-2), D-010 (DENV-2, OROV, DENV-3), D-020 (DENV-2, OROV, DENV-3, DENV-
4), D-029 (DENV-2, OROV), D-087 (DENV-1, OROV) and D-124 (DENV-2, Table 4.5). Most 
virus-specific reads were present at a very low frequency (<150 reads) except for HAV 
from D-005, for which 1,550 reads were identified, covering 39% of the genome at 5x 
depth (Figure 4.4), and OROV and DENV-1 in D-087. The remaining patient samples 














Sample ID DENV1 DENV2 DENV3 DENV4 HAV OROV RVFV MS2 
D-001        1012 
D-002        3282 
D-005  66   1550 76  2922 
D-010  120 2   34  3104 
D-014        251 
D-018        8110 
D-020  134 2 2  26  67171 
D-029  42    28  4 
D-030        11573 
D-035        6050 
D-040        758 
D-047        6846 
D-074        32462 
D-075        254 
D-087 486 2    9942  8292 
D-091        4282 
D-124  2      76 
D-131        1208 
 
Table 4.5 Virus-specific sequencing reads identified by mapping metagenomic 
sequencing reads from 18 Ecuadorian febrile patient plasma samples to a panel of 
virus reference sequences. MS2 reads act as an internal control. Colour indicates 









Figure 4.4 Coverage of the HAV genome (7,446 nt), generated by mapping sequencing 
reads from sample D-005 to a HAV reference sequence (X75216.1). Red dotted line 




Mapping reads from sample D-087 to a DENV-1 reference genome (NC_001477.1) 
resulted in 1123 reads mapping, the majority of which were located within a single 732 
nucleotide (nt) region spanning a region of the polyprotein gene coding for non-
structural protein NS4B and NS5 RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (Figure 4.5). An OROV 
consensus sequence was generated by mapping reads from the patient sample to 
reference sequences for each of the three genomic segments (S: KP691632.1, M: 
KP052851.1, L: KP691612.1), which resulted in coverage of 69%, 76%, and 79% of S, M, 
and L OROV segments, respectively (Figure 4.6).  
During the mapping process, a BLASTn analysis revealed that the OROV S segment 
sequence from patient D-087 was very similar to Iquitos virus (IQTV), a reassortant 
orthobunyavirus that contains S and L segments similar to OROV and a novel M segment 
belonging to the Simbu virus serogroup (489). To confirm that the genome from the 
patient belonged to OROV not IQTV, mapping to an IQTV genome (strain MIS-0397; 
KJ866386.1, KJ866387.1 and KJ86638.1) was performed. Reads mapped to the S and L 
segments with similar coverage to that seen in the OROV mapping, however only two 
reads mapped to the IQTV M segment, confirming that the origin of the reads is OROV.  
Despite the CHIKV qRT-PCR result for D-087, no CHIKV-specific reads were identified by 
any bioinformatic method. No reads were detected by taxonomic assignment and none 
mapped to any of the five CHIKV genomes chosen from varying geographical locations, 
including a Colombian CHIKV sequence from 2016 (KX496989.1). The CHIKV primer and 
probe sequences from the screening qRT-PCR assay were assessed for homology to the 
scaffolds from the SPAdes assembly using BLASTn but no similarities were found. 










Figure 4.5 Coverage of the DENV-1 genome, generated by mapping sequencing reads 
from sample D-087 to a reference sequence (NC_001477.1). Red dotted line indicates 









Figure 4.6 Coverage of OROV genomic segments (S, M, L), generated by mapping 
sequencing reads from sample D-087 to reference sequences (S: KP691632.1, M: 




4.3.2.5 SUMMARY OF VIRUSES DETECTED BY METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
In summary, two viruses; HAV and OROV, were detected in two separate patients from 
the 18 patient RNA samples sequenced (Table 4.6). Their presence was determined 
using a combination of taxonomic classification, mapping to viral reference sequences 
and de novo assembly of reads. A small fragment of DENV-1 was also identified in the 
OROV-positive patient, and although coverage of the genome was very low, the positive 
anti-DENV IgM result for this patient (Table 4.1) in combination with the sequence data 
suggests the patient had a recent DENV infection. There was no evidence of other 

























D-005 HAV 478 0.02 1550 39.0 38.6 2 1126-1410 
D-087 OROV S 5052† 0.7† 296 68.9 60.5 1 610 
D-087 OROV M 5052† 0.7† 2646 93.1 84.7 2 386- 2873 
D-087 OROV L 5052† 0.7† 7000 76.9 75.4 2 1521-2422 
 
Table 4.6 A summary of viruses identified from Ecuadorian patient plasma samples using metagenomic sequencing. The mapping and assembly 
figures are based on data stripped of human reads. OROV mapping was performed to the OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 genome, HAV mapping was 
performed using genome X75216.1. The threshold used for detection was ≥20% 5x genome coverage. †Centrifuge does not discriminate between viral 




4.3.3  ISOLATION OF VIRUS FROM PATIENT PLASMA 
Virus isolation was attempted from five samples containing viral RNA, identified by RT-
PCR/PCR assays or metagenomic sequencing. Sample D-087 was selected because OROV 
was detected, D-124 was selected because of a potential co-infection (ZIKV and CHIKV), 
D-004 was DENV qRT-PCR-positive, and three ZIKV qRT-PCR-positive samples (D-121, D-
124, D-194) showing the lowest ZIKV Cq values in the cohort were chosen. Isolation was 
undertaken in Vero and C6/36 cells (see section 2.15.2). Positive control viruses and 
negative control cells (media only) were cultured at the same time (see section 2.15.5). 
At days 5, 7, 11 and 14 post-infection, supernatants were sampled and cell monolayers 
were observed for CPE. RNA extracted from supernatants was tested using qRT-PCR for 
the expected virus, to detect changes in quantity of viral RNA over time.  
OROV RNA increased over time in the D-087 culture, measured by a decrease in qRT-
PCR Cq value between days 5 and 7 (no Cq value at day 0), suggesting viral replication 
(Figure 4.7A). CPE was observed at 5 days post-infection (dpi) (Figure 4.7B), the severity 
of which increased by 7 dpi, at which point the culture was frozen to lyse cells and 
subsequently harvested (see section 2.15.3). Virus titre was determined by plaque assay 
(see section 2.15.4). Plaques were observed (Figure 4.7C) and titre calculated as 1.56e+7 
pfu/mL. 
ZIKV RNA increased over time in the D-121 and D-124 cultures, measured by a decrease 
in qRT-PCR Cq values (Figure 4.8A). CPE was observed in both cultures, progressing in 
severity from 5 dpi to 14 dpi (Figure 4.8B). To increase the titre and volume of the virus 
stocks, ZIKV strains D-121 and D-124 were passaged a second time in C6/36 cells (see 
section 2.15.2). Plaques were observed (Figure 4.8C) and titres calculated as 3.3e+5 




No meaningful change in Cq value was seen in the D-004 and D-194 cultures (DENV and 
ZIKV qRT-PCR positive, respectively), suggesting that viable virus was not present. All 
control viruses demonstrated RNA replication as expected and no evidence of viral RNA 
replication was observed in the negative controls. Table 4.7 summarises the isolation of 










Figure 4.7 Isolation of OROV from patient sample D-087. A) OROV RNA replication in 
P1 cultures over 14 days. Cq values from D-087 cultures and the positive control are 
shown. Vero culture was terminated upon the observation of severe CPE at 7 dpi. B) 
Observation of CPE at 5 dpi in Vero cells. OROV+ denotes the positive control. C) Plaques 









Figure 4.8 Isolation of ZIKV from patient samples D-121 and D-124. A) ZIKV RNA 
replication in P1 cultures over 14 days. Cq values from D-121 and D-124 cultures and the 
positive control are shown. B) Observation of CPE in C6/36 cells. ZIKV+ denotes the 
positive control. C) Plaques formed by D-121 and D-124 ZIKV in a Vero cell monolayer, 





Sample ID Suspected virus 
qRT-PCR Cq value 







D-004 DENV-1 33.45 No No n/a 
D-087 CHIKV 36.63 No No n/a 
D-087 DENV-1 35.33 No No n/a 
D-087 OROV n/a Yes*† Yes* Yes 
D-121 ZIKV 26.74 Yes† Yes† Yes 
D-124 CHIKV 35.76 No No n/a 
D-124 ZIKV 34.54 Yes† Yes† Yes 
D-194 ZIKV 28.11 No No n/a 
Table 4.7 Virus isolation results from five febrile patients, measured by viral RNA replication, observation of CPE, and plaque assay. *Replication in 




4.3.4  COMPLETE GENOME SEQUENCING OF VIRUS ISOLATES 
4.3.4.1 OROV/EC/ESMERALDAS/087/2016 
Following the isolation of OROV from patient D-087 in Vero cells, the complete genome 
sequence was generated from RNA extracted from P1 supernatant, using the 
metagenomic approach described earlier. Mapping to reference sequences resulted in 
28.0%, 12.2% and 21.1% of the total 1.6 million reads mapping to segments S, M and L, 
respectively. Average depths of coverage were 55,532; 4,954 and 5,674 for S, M, and L 
segments, respectively. Terminal untranslated region (UTR) sequences were confirmed 
by RACE and Sanger sequencing (see section 2.12). The strain was named 
OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016, consensus sequences were annotated and submitted 
to GenBank (MF926352.1, MF926353.1, MF926354.1). The S segment (952 bp) contains 
2 overlapping open reading frames (ORFs) encoding the nucleoprotein and non-
structural protein. The M segment (4,387 bp) contains a single ORF encoding a 
polyprotein. The L segment (6,852 bp) contains a single ORF encoding the RNA-
dependant RNA polymerase. The final sequences were used as references to map the 
sequencing reads from the patient sample, which increased coverage of the M segment 
















Figure 4.9 Coverage of OROV genomic segments (S, M, L) from patient sample D-087, 
generated by mapping sequencing reads to the complete genome sequence from 
cultured isolate OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 (S: MF926352.1, M: MF926353.1, L: 





RNA extracted from ZIKV D-121 P1 C6/36 supernatant was sequenced using the same 
metagenomic approach. An almost complete genome sequence was generated, with 
27% of the total 1.5 million reads mapping to ZIKV reference sequence KX879603.1. The 
sequence covers the entire coding region and the majority of the 5’ and 3’ UTRs, 
however, their lengths were not confirmed. The strain was named 
ZIKV/EC/Esmeraldas/121/2016 and the annotated consensus sequence submitted to 
GenBank (Table 4.8). An attempt was made to generate genome sequence from 
cultured ZIKV D-124, however almost no ZIKV-specific reads were present, most likely 
because the titre of the virus was so low (5.00e+2 pfu/mL).  
 
4.3.4.3 POSITIVE CONTROL ISOLATES 
Genomes from the positive control viruses DENV-1 TC861(HA), CHIKV S27 Petersfield 
and OROV NCPV: 1409261v were sequenced for comparison with patient sequences to 
detect cross-contamination. In addition, DENV/EC/Esmeraldas/210/2014, isolated from 
a febrile Ecuadorian patient from 2014, was sequenced to provide a relevant strain to 
use as a reference sequence for mapping. These genomes were made publicly available 


















S27 Petersfield CHIKV, complete genome MF580946.1 
NCPV: 1409261v 








OROV, complete L 
segment 
MF620129.1 


















Table 4.8 Genome sequences generated from virus isolates using the metagenomic 




4.4  DISCUSSION  
4.4.1  RT-PCR/PCR TESTING DETECTED DENV, ZIKV AND LEPTOSPIRA  IN FEBRILE PATIENTS  
Pathogen detection in 196 Ecuadorian febrile patient plasma samples was initiated by 
testing extracted RNA for eight pathogens known to circulate in Ecuador or South 
America at present or in the past. Nucleic acid from Leptospira (n=1), ZIKV (n=22) and 
DENV (n=4) was unequivocally detected (Cq <35), in addition to several potentially 
positive cases (Cq 35-39.9). Plasma samples with CHIKV, DENV and ZIKV qRT-PCR Cq 
values of 35-39.9 were tested for IgM antibodies. The presence of IgM confirms a recent 
infection, however, the absence of IgM does not preclude an infection, because it’s 
possible that sampling occurred at a time where viraemia had declined to an almost 
undetectable level, and IgM antibodies had yet to rise to a detectable level. Recent 
infection was confirmed by detection of IgM in 2/3 and 2/12 patients for DENV and ZIKV, 
respectively, but no positive IgM results were obtained for either of the two CHIKV query 
patients. Taking these results into account, the prevalence of Leptospira, ZIKV and DENV 
was 0.5%, 12.2% and 3.1%, respectively.  
Leptospira has a wide global distribution (289) that includes Ecuador. A previous study 
of AUFI in the Amazon basin region of the country identified leptospirosis as the most 
commonly diagnosed infection (alongside malaria), with 40/272 patients testing positive 
(480). Risk factors associated with leptospirosis are inadequate sewage disposal and 
water treatment (289). Esmeraldas city is located on the coast, has relatively good 
infrastructure, and the majority of the canton is urban, with only 18.7% of the land 
classed as rural (490). This makes it likely that fewer leptospirosis risk factors are present 
in Esmeraldas compared with other areas of the country, reflected in the low number of 




antibodies was not performed, which would identify previous leptospirosis infections 
rather than solely the current ones detectable by PCR. 
The detection of ZIKV RNA in 12% of the patient samples in this study reflects the wider 
picture of ZIKV in Ecuador, where a high incidence was observed in Esmeraldas province 
during a time at which ZIKV had only recently been detected in the country. The 
relatively large number of cases detected is not unexpected because the febrile patients 
presented to the medical centre in the months leading up to the peak of ZIKV cases 
observed in mid-June 2016 (272). 
The relatively low prevalence of DENV cases in the cohort is interesting. Over previous 
decades, a change in the major infectious causes of fever has been observed in north-
western Ecuador, with prevalence of malaria falling and dengue fever rising (468). 
Seasonality of DENV infection in coastal Ecuador involves annual and two-yearly peaks 
in incidence, which can be influenced by El Niño events (472,491). DENV seasonality in 
rural Ecuador involves an annual peak in mid-March (21), correlating with the rainy 
season occurring from February to May (472,473). In 2015, the year preceding the 
sampling for this study, a large spike in DENV cases was observed with 42.5 thousand 
cases reported (492), coinciding with a very strong el Niño event (493). It’s possible that 
population immunity following 2015 was high and this is reflected in the low number of 
cases identified in the present study. Similar reasoning may explain the lack of CHIKV 
cases detected. The number of infections reported from Ecuador as a whole in 2016 was 
1,195 (477), approximately a 30-fold decrease from the previous year.   
Differences in prevalence between the study cohort and Ecuador as a whole could be 




or vector abundance, to name just a few. Although the prevalence of pathogen RNA 
detected in febrile patients is interesting, the underlying causes are multi-factorial and 
difficult to identify definitively, therefore the observations made above must be viewed 
as speculative. Furthermore, interpretation of the RT-PCR/PCR results in a wider context 
is constrained by practical factors such as the relatively small sample size and the lack of 
information on the residence of most patients. However, the primary aim of the RT-
PCR/PCR testing was to identify known agents and rule out samples for metagenomic 
sequencing, which was performed for the most part on samples with negative RT-
PCR/PCR results with a view to detecting novel or unexpected viruses.  
 
4.4.2  OROPOUCHE VIRUS WAS DETECTED IN A FEBRILE PATIENT FROM ECUADOR 
Two potential co-infections, observed in patients D-087 (DENV and CHIKV) and D-124 
(ZIKV and CHIKV), were investigated using metagenomic sequencing. OROV was 
unexpectedly detected in patient D-087, identified initially from taxonomic assignment, 
then by mapping to reference sequences, resulting in approximately 75% coverage of 
the genome across all three genomic segments. This was further corroborated by the 
identification of OROV-specific scaffolds generated from de novo assembly of reads. In 
addition to OROV and in agreement with the qRT-PCR result, a small fragment of DENV-
1 sequence was detected from D-087, however isolation of DENV in vitro was 
unsuccessful. Anti-DENV IgM antibodies were detected using ELISA, suggesting a recent 
DENV infection in this patient. No CHIKV reads or anti-CHIKV IgM antibodies were 
identified, suggesting that the high Cq qRT-PCR result was non-specific, although the 
possibility of an infection that was below the limit of detection of metagenomic 




detection, cannot be ruled out. Despite extensive efforts to identify a pathogenic agent 
using taxonomic assignment, mapping to reference genomes and de novo assembly, no 
viral sequence was identified from sample D-124. 
Oropouche orthobunyavirus is an enveloped, single-stranded, negative-sense RNA virus 
belonging to the Orthobunyavirus genus within the Peribunyaviridae family. The OROV 
genome is segmented; the small (S) segment contains two overlapping ORFs coding for 
the viral nucleocapsid protein (N) and a second non-structural protein (NSs), the 
medium (M) segment encodes two glycoproteins (Gn and Gc) and a nonstructural 
protein (NSm), and the large (L) segment encodes the viral RNA-dependent RNA 
polymerase (176). Due to the segmented nature of the genome, reassortment is well-
documented. In nature this can result in the occurrence of reassortant viruses, a number 
of which have been previously identified and characterised (494), including OROV-like 
reassortants (489,495). One such reassortant is IQTV, isolated from a febrile patient in 
the Peruvian city of Iquitos in 1999 (489). OROV and IQTV share S and L segments but 
have a different M segment (489). To check the genome sequence from the patient 
belonged to OROV and not IQTV, reads were mapped to an IQTV reference genome. No 
coverage of the M segment was achieved using the IQTV reference genome, which 
confirmed the virus species as OROV, highlighting an additional advantage of using 
metagenomics over qRT-PCR alone.  
In humans, OROV causes a self-limiting febrile illness known as Oropouche fever. Cases 
of infection have been documented in Brazil, Peru, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago, 
but prior to this study evidence of OROV in Ecuador had not been demonstrated either 
by detection of viral RNA or virus isolation. Two studies have demonstrated the presence 




et al. (2009) detected antibodies in 1/304 febrile patients sampled between 2001-2004 
in the Pastaza province in the Amazon basin of Ecuador. Although virus isolation in Vero 
cells was unsuccessful (no CPE was observed), an OROV immunofluorescent assay 
subsequently performed on the cells did detect OROV (480). Forshey et al. (2010) 
detected antibodies in 2/350 febrile patients from Guayaquil, sampled between 2003-
2007, although the result for one patient was considered presumptive because less than 
a 4-fold difference was measured between acute and convalescent serum samples 
(479). 
The detection of OROV sequence in patient sample D-087 was confirmed by isolation of 
OROV in Vero and C6/36 cells, measured by an increase in viral RNA over a period of 7 
days (Vero) and 14 days (C6/36). The presence of high titre infectious virus, quantified 
by plaque assay on Vero cells, was confirmed in the P1 Vero cell supernatant. 
Sequencing RNA extracted from supernatant resulted in the complete virus genome 
sequence, named OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016. Terminal sequences were 
confirmed by RACE to complete the genome. The genetic organisation of this strain is 
similar to that previously described for OROV (28). The sequence was submitted to the 
GenBank database and the isolated virus was banked with the NCPV, making it available 
for use by the wider scientific research community.  
The complete OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 genome sequence was used to re-map 
reads from the clinical sequencing data, which improved coverage of the M segment, 
but not the S or L segments. Interestingly, the OROV M segment was recently shown to 
have two distinct lineages within South America; lineage 1 representing central-eastern 
strains, and lineage 2 representing western strains (363). These were thought to diverge 




(363). The original mapping M segment reference sequence (strain 
BeAn19991, KP052851.1) belongs to lineage 1, whereas the Ecuadorian M segment 
belongs to lineage 2. The divergence in M segment sequences probably explains the 
lower M segment coverage from the original mapping. 
Patient D-087 was a 41-year-old male patient who experienced fever, headache, joint 
pain, muscle pain and nausea in April 2016, when he presented at the medical centre in 
Esmeraldas and gave a blood sample for routine testing. The patient confirmed to 
collaborating researchers at the Universidad San Francisco de Quito (USFQ), in Ecuador, 
that he had been in Esmeraldas for more than three months. Furthermore, he had not 
travelled outside the province during that time, making it extremely likely that this 
infection was acquired in Esmeraldas. Interestingly, personal communications with Dr. 
Sonia Zapata, an entomologist at USFQ, suggest that the Culicoides paraensis midge; the 
primary vector of OROV transmission in urban outbreaks, is absent from the Pacific 
Coast region in which Esmeraldas is situated. This raises the question of the role of other 
insect vectors in this region, such as Culex species mosquitoes, which have been 
implicated in urban OROV transmission (180). The detection and isolation of OROV from 
patient sample D-087 constitutes the first direct detection of OROV in Ecuador (380). 
The utility of metagenomic sequencing for virus identification from febrile patients has 
been demonstrated by several studies (316,496–498). This approach is becoming more 
practicable as costs decrease, the major benefit being the ability to detect unexpected 






4.4.3  METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING DETECTED HEPATITIS  A VIRUS IN A FEBRILE PATIENT 
Metagenomic sequencing of RNA from 16 febrile patients with negative RT-PCR/PCR 
results was undertaken with the aim of detecting causative viruses. Despite applying 
multiple methods of data analysis encompassing taxonomic identification of reads, 
mapping to reference sequences and de novo assembly of reads, no evidence of 
causative viruses was present in 15/16 patient samples. The exception was sample D-
005, from which 39% of the HAV genome was generated, strongly suggesting an 
infection in this patient.  
The presence of internal control MS2 reads in patient samples was more consistent 
within the Ecuadorian cohort compared with the Sierra Leone cohort. As stated in 
chapter 3, this could be due to differences in sample processing, resulting from 
constraints related to containment level (the Ecuadorian samples could be processed at 
CL3, whereas the Sierra Leone samples had to be processed at CL4). All Ecuadorian 
patient samples contained MS2 reads, although the number per sample was highly 
variable.  
HAV is a non-enveloped, single-stranded, positive-sense RNA virus belonging to the 
genus Hepatovirus, family Picornaviridae (49). Transmission is by the faecal-oral route 
via contaminated food or water, infection can be asymptomatic or show  symptoms 2-6 
weeks after infection, including fever, nausea, vomiting, diahorrea and jaundice (499). 
More serious cases result in acute liver failure and HAV infection is the most common 
cause of acute liver disease worldwide, with prevalence highly dependent on sanitary 
conditions (499). Ecuador is considered to have an intermediate level of endemicity for 
HAV (500) and as such there is no HAV vaccination campaign implemented in Ecuador 




(502), although it is likely that incidence varies within Ecuador depending on sanitary 
conditions. A study investigating viral diversity in urban streams in the capital city of 
Quito detected HAV sequence in a single water sample (501), whereas a study on 
exposure of indigenous communities to waterborne pathogens in the Amazon region of 
Ecuador detected high seroprevalence rates (503).  
 
4.4.4  ZIKV WAS ISOLATED FROM A FEBRILE PATIENT AND THE COMPLETE GENOME 
SEQUENCE ELUCIDATED 
ZIKV was isolated from patient D-121 following one passage in C6/36 cells, measured by 
an increase in viral RNA over 14 days. One further passage was undertaken to increase 
titre and volume and virus supernatant was quantified using plaque assay. Isolation of 
ZIKV from D-124 was also achieved in C6/36 cells, however, the virus grew to a very low 
titre. Nonetheless, these isolations confirm the presence of infectious virus in the 
plasma of these febrile patients.  
The ZIKV strain isolated from patient sample D-121 was named 
ZIKV/EC/Esmeraldas/121/2016 and was taken forward as a representative Ecuadorian 
ZIKV isolate for whole genome sequencing. The complete coding sequence was 
generated, annotated and is available on GenBank. This strain provides an important 
contribution to the bank of publicly available ZIKV sequences, of which only five of the 
2,953 ZIKV entries in GenBank originate from Ecuador. This addition improves the 
diversity of available sequences, allowing better resolution in analyses of ZIKV ecology 
and genetic relationships.  
Sequencing from cultured ZIKV D-124 was attempted but failed to produce genome 




(351) has shown that sequencing from samples with relatively high Cq values produces 
very low numbers of viral reads. 
 
4.4.5  COMPLETE GENOME SEQUENCES OF CONTROL STRAIN VIRUSES DETERMINED 
In addition to sequencing patient-derived viruses, a number of control viruses were also 
sequenced; CHIKV, DENV-1 and OROV strains held by the NCPV, and one DENV-1 strain 
isolated from a febrile Ecuadorian patient in 2014. The addition of these complete 
genomes to GenBank provides added value for NCPV customers as well as other 
researchers, as the sequences are now freely available. The sequence information has 
contributed to the improved characterisation of the NCPV catalogue. The inclusion of 
these sequences as reference sequences during the metagenomic sequencing data 
analysis was helpful in identifying any potential contaminant sequences, as well as 
providing a contemporary Ecuadorian DENV-1 strain for mapping purposes.  
 
4.4.6  LIMITATIONS 
Although metadata was collected with the patient samples, some valuable fields of 
information are missing for many samples. Most notably, a location of residence and the 
precise date of sampling is missing for the majority of samples. Despite continued efforts 
of collaborating researchers in Ecuador to obtain these details, it has not been possible. 
This makes it difficult to further investigate potential geographical or temporal foci of 
infection.  
RT-PCR/PCR testing was carried out primarily to aid sample selection for metagenomic 




and surrounding areas. A positive result indicates the presence of pathogen nucleic acid 
but does not necessarily confirm an infection, particularly when high Cq values are 
observed. To confirm, undertaking complementary testing such as virus isolation or 
detection of virus-specific IgM antibodies is desirable. Virus isolation and ELISA were 
undertaken on a small number of selected samples, but widescale virus isolation and 
antibody detection did not align with the focus of the project; namely detection and 
investigation of novel or unexpected viruses. 
The limitations relating to metagenomic sequencing and data analysis, outlined in 
section 3.4.4, also apply to pathogen detection in the Ecuadorian cohort. Contaminant 
sequences were controlled for in the same way; by sequencing NXCs from each batch of 
RNA extractions along with a NTC, then analysing the resulting data in the same way as 
the patient samples. This is a good way of ruling out reads that may result from 
laboratory or reagents, however it is possible that pathogen-specific reads originating 
from the patient may be discarded. Differentiating between ‘real’ and ‘contaminant’ 
reads in this instance is very challenging. This study took a conservative approach by 
ruling out all potential contaminant reads in order to avoid misinterpreting or over-




CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPMENT OF MOLECULAR DETECTION METHODS FOR 
OROPOUCHE VIRUS AND SUBSEQUENT DETECTION OF MULTIPLE CASES FROM 
ECUADOR 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
OROV was first isolated from a febrile forest worker in Trinidad and Tobago in 1955 
(177). In subsequent decades the virus has been responsible for over 30 epidemics of 
Oropouche fever in Central and South America, totalling approximately 500,000 
infections (182). Most outbreaks have occurred in Brazil; epidemics occurred in a 
number of municipalities in the state of Pará during the 1960s and 70s (504). In the 
1980s and 90s, outbreaks were reported from other Brazilian states; Amazonas, Amapá, 
Acre, Rondônia, Maranhão and Tocantins (505–510). Since the 2000s, outbreaks in 
regions of Pará and Amazonas states have continued, including the re-emergence of the 
virus in the north-eastern area of Pará state after 26 years without detection (511,512). 
Outbreaks have also been reported in Panama and Peru. A single outbreak was reported 
from a village 50 km from Panama City in 1989 (28). In Peru, OROV was first reported 
from Iquitos City in 1992 (513), then from the Amazon region in 1994 (514). More 
recently, outbreaks were reported from Cusco and the western region of the Peruvian 
Amazon (515,516). 
The molecular detection and isolation of OROV from a febrile Ecuadorian patient using 
metagenomic sequencing, described in chapter 4, was the first time this emerging virus 
was directly detected in Ecuador (380). Although the metagenomic sequencing 
approach is becoming more practicable as costs decrease (44), in most cases the cost 
per sample is still substantially higher than that incurred by conventional detection 
methods such as RT-PCR or ELISA. This is of particular importance considering that 




where public health capacity is often already overstretched. An aim of this chapter was 
to develop a sensitive, relatively low-cost method capable of detecting OROV RNA that 
could be used to test the Ecuadorian patient sample cohort and would be relatively 
straightforward to implement in-country.  
A number of RT-PCR assays capable of detecting OROV are described in the literature 
(361,517–522). The real-time RT-PCR format provides benefits over the conventional 
approach in speed, specificity (particularly when using hydrolysis probes), the ability to 
observe results in real-time, and the ability to relatively quantitate RNA. At the time this 
work was performed, only two of the published assays were in real-time format 
(361,517). Preliminary work had been done at PHE prior to this project to adapt the 
OROV-specific real-time RT-PCR assay targeting the S segment, developed and published 
by Weidmann et al. (2003) (361). The adapted assay successfully amplified OROV RNA 
from the prototype strain TRVL 9760. Following the detection of OROV in patient sample 
D-087 using metagenomic sequencing, the patient RNA was tested using the adapted 
Weidmann assay, however detection of OROV RNA was unsuccessful. This led to the 
qRT-PCR adaptation and development work described in this chapter. 
The objectives of this chapter were to establish whether OROV was present within other 
patient samples from Esmeraldas, Ecuador in 2016, and to characterise any detected 
OROV using whole genome sequencing and virus isolation. Genome sequences were 
used in phylogenetic analyses in an attempt to shed light on the dynamics of OROV in 
Ecuador and neighbouring areas. Complementary to these objectives was the 
development of a nucleic acid amplification assay that has utility both in this project and 




5.2  RESULTS 
5.2.1  DEVELOPMENT OF AN OROV QRT-PCR 
5.2.1.1 PRIMER DESIGN AND TESTING  
Primer and probe sequences from the Weidmann OROV qRT-PCR assay (361) were 
compared with the OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 consensus sequence. Two 
mismatches were identified in the reverse primer (the forward primer and probe were 
identical to the consensus sequence). Two new reverse primers were designed. Primer 
‘EcR’ binds to the same region of the S segment, but the mismatched bases were altered 
to match the Ecuadorian sequence (Table 5.1). Primer ‘Ec2R’ is located at an alternative 
region of the S segment, genome position 179-198 (Table 5.1). This region was identified 
as well conserved from an alignment of known OROV nucleoprotein (N) gene sequences 
(Appendix 7), representing OROV sequences sampled from the 1950s to the late 2000s, 
covering genetic diversity from outbreaks in Trinidad & Tobago, Panama, Peru and 
Brazil. 
Sensitivity of the two newly designed primers was compared to the original using two 
OROV strains from genetically distinct lineages: the OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 
strain and the 1955 prototype Trinidad and Tobago strain TRVL 9760 (KP026179.1 - 
KP026181.1). Ten-fold dilution series of RNA from both strains were tested using the 
adapted qRT-PCR (conditions in section 2.7.4). The original reverse primer (OROV R) was 
less sensitive to the Ecuadorian strain (detected to 10-4 dilution) compared with the 
prototype strain (detected to 10-6 dilution, Figure 5.1). Primer EcR detected the 
Ecuadorian strain with higher sensitivity compared with the original primer (detected to 
10-7 dilution and 10-4 dilution, respectively) but was less sensitive to the prototype strain 












Oligo name Sequence (5' - 3') 
Start 
position 




OROV F CATTTGAAGCTAGATACGGACAA 118 140 23 59 39 (361) 
OROV R CCATGGGCCTCGATG 225 211 15 52 67 (361) 
EcR CCATGGGCCGCGACG 225 211 15 57 80 This study 
Ec2R CATCTTTGGCCTTCTTTTRG 198 179 20 54-56 40-45 This study 
OROV P CAATGCTGGTGTTGTTAGAGTCTTCTTCCT 146 175 30 69 43 (361) 
 





Figure 5.1 Sensitivity analysis of three reverse primers as part of the OROV qRT-PCR assay development. Cq values are shown for ten-fold serial 
dilutions of OROV RNA, from the prototype strain (KP026181.1), and the Ecuadorian strain OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 (MF926352.1). Three 




In the absence of an extensive panel of OROV strains to test against, primer Ec2R and 
the original OROV R primer were aligned with all publicly available (n=149) existing 
OROV N gene sequences to identify mismatches that may indicate reduced sensitivity 
for certain strains (Appendix 7). 19 strains had mismatch(es) to the forward primer (17 
strains with a single mismatch, 2 strains with two mismatches), 21 strains had a single 
mismatch to the probe, and 26 strains had mismatch(es) to the original OROV R primer 
(20 strains = one mismatch, 6 strains = two mismatches, Table 5.2). In contrast, no strain 
had more than one mismatch to reverse primer Ec2R; however, the number of strains 
with a single mismatch was higher (n=41, Table 5.2). Reverse primer Ec2R was selected 
for use in the qRT-PCR assay because of the improved sensitivity observed for both the 












1 17 20 41 21 
2 2 6 0 0 
>2 0 0 0 0 
Table 5.2 Mismatches to oligonucleotide sequences observed from an alignment of 
149 OROV N gene sequences. Values are the number of sequences with mismatches to 






5.2.1.2 ASSAY OPTIMISATION AND VALIDATION 
As explained in section 2.7.3, unless a substantial improvement in sensitivity was 
demonstrated (>2 Cq), primer/probe/MgSO4 conditions were set to comply with those 
standardised by the Rare and Imported Pathogens Laboratory (RIPL). This ensured that 
the assay could be easily incorporated into the RIPL test protocol for returning UK 
travellers.  
Optimal primer, probe and MgSO4 concentrations were determined using RNA from 
strain OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016. Optimal conditions were defined as those giving 
the lowest Cq value across the range tested. From the primer concentrations tested 
(multiple combinations at 1 µM, 3 µM, 9 µM and 18 µM), the optimal concentration for 
the forward and reverse primer was 18 µM (Cq 26.20), identical to the RIPL standard 
concentration Table 5.3). The probe concentration was tested from 5 µM to 25 µM and 
the optimal concentration was 5 µM (Cq 24.59). However, the RIPL standard of 12.5 µM 
gave a relatively similar result (Cq 26.15) and was therefore adopted (Table 5.3). The 
optimal condition of MgSO4 was 85 mM (Cq 27.30), however the RIPL standard (no 
added MgSO4) gave a similar result (Cq 28.20) and again was adopted (Table 5.3). Cross-
reactivity to RNA from 23 virus species (Table 5.4) and a panel of negative human sera 
was assessed, no cross-reactions were observed.  
 Optimal RIPL standard 
Parameter Concentration Test result (Cq) Concentration Test result (Cq) 
Primers 18 µM 26.20 18 µM 26.20 
Probe 5 µM 24.59 12.5 µM 26.15 
MgSO4 85 mM 27.30 None added 28.20 




Virus family Virus genus Virus species 
Arenaviridae Mammarenavirus Tamiami mammarenavirus 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Powassan virus 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus West Nile virus 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Yellow fever virus 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Karshi virus 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Usutu virus 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Dengue virus serotype 1 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Dengue virus serotype 2 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Dengue virus serotype 3 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Dengue virus serotype 4 
Flaviviridae Flavivirus Zika virus 
Nairoviridae Orthonairovirus Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever orthonairovirus 
Nairoviridae Orthonairovirus Issyk-Kul virus 
Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Batai orthobunyavirus 
Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus La Crosse orthobunyavirus 
Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Inkoo virus 
Peribunyaviridae Orthobunyavirus Tahyna virus 
Phenuiviridae Phlebovirus Bhanja virus 
Phenuiviridae Phlebovirus Severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome virus 
Phenuiviridae Phlebovirus Rift Valley fever phlebovirus 
Togaviridae Alphavirus Chikungunya virus 
Togaviridae Alphavirus Mayaro virus 
Togaviridae Alphavirus O'nyong-nyong virus 




5.2.1.3 DETERMINING THE OROV QRT-PCR LIMIT OF DETECTION 
To determine the absolute detection limit of the optimised qRT-PCR assay, a ten-fold 
dilution series of synthetically generated OROV RNA (711 bp region of the 
OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 S segment encompassing the N and Ns ORFs, see 
section 2.7.3); was tested in triplicate. Mean Cq values were used to construct a 
standard curve (Figure 5.2). A linear relationship between mean Cq value and log RNA 
copy number was observed and the absolute limit of detection of the assay was 10 




Figure 5.2 Absolute quantitation was performed from a standard curve generated 
from a ten-fold serial dilution of a synthetic OROV RNA standard. Each data point is 
the mean Cq value from three separate experiments. Error bars indicate standard 




5.2.2  RETROSPECTIVE QRT-PCR TESTING FOR OROV IN THE ECUADOR 2016 PATIENT 
COHORT 
The optimised, validated qRT-PCR was shown to be sensitive for the Ecuadorian OROV 
strain to a limit of 10 RNA copies. The assay was used to screen the entire febrile patient 
Ecuador 2016 cohort (n=196) which identified a total of six patient samples (3.1% 
prevalence) positive for OROV, including the original sample D-087 (Table 5.5). 5/6 
patients were male, age data was only available for 2/6 patients (Table 5.5). The length 
of time patients reported experiencing fever prior to blood sampling (2-7 days) inversely 

















D-057 M 35 3 25.66 1.3e+9 
D-087 M 41 7 36.26 9.6e+3 
D-155 M nd 2 25.75 1.2e+9 
D-171 F nd 2 26.75 6.0e+8 
D-206 M nd 4 30.87 2.0e+7 
D-210 M nd 3 29.18 9.2e+7 
 
Table 5.5 Ecuadorian OROV-positive patient samples, determined by OROV S segment 
qRT-PCR. Genome copies/mL plasma are estimated based on the absolute quantitation 










Figure 5.3 The inverse correlation between the number of days of fever experienced 
by OROV-positive patients prior to blood sampling, and OROV genome copies/mL 




5.2.3  WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING OF OROV PATIENT GENOMES 
To confirm the OROV qRT-PCR results and generate genome sequences from the five 
additional OROV-positive patients, metagenomic sequencing was undertaken as 
described in sections 2.8 and 2.9. The reads from each patient were mapped to the 
complete OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 genome sequence. Sequencing resulted in 
coverage ranging from 63.5 – 99.4% of the OROV genome for all five samples (Table 5.6, 
Figure 5.4), however, only two reads from D-206 mapped to the S segment sequence. 
The proportion of reads mapping to the OROV reference sequence varied between 
samples but loosely correlated with the number of OROV genome copies/mL (Figure 
5.5).  
To detect co-infections with other viruses in the additional five OROV-positive samples, 
sequencing data was analysed as previously described in Chapter 4, using a combination 
of taxonomic assignment of reads (Centrifuge), mapping to a range of relevant virus 
reference genomes, and de novo assembly of reads (see section 2.11). No other viruses 





















D-057 870,960 33.95 99.41 100.00 98.68 99.80 
D-155 24,274 5.29 84.61 82.14 86.30 83.87 
D-171 145,146 15.63 94.79 95.80 94.73 94.69 
D-206 277,019 5.60 63.50 0.00 78.62 62.64 
D-210 733,986 26.12 87.40 88.76 97.54 80.72 
 
Table 5.6 Mapping statistics for the five additional OROV-positive patient plasma samples. Coverage cut off was a minimum of five reads. Reads 










Figure 5.4 OROV genome coverage generated from six OROV positive patient plasma samples, using a metagenomic sequencing 
approach. Reads were mapped to reference sequences OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 (MF926352.1- MF926354.1). A) OROV genome 
coverage shown as the number of reads at each genomic position. Plots are separated by genome segment (S, M, L). Red dashed line 
indicates 5x coverage. B) OROV genome segment (S, M, L) coverage (%). qRT-PCR Cq value is given at the top of each plot. Coverage is 









Figure 5.5 The correlation between the proportion of sequencing reads mapped to an 
OROV reference genome, and the number of OROV genome copies/mL in the patient’s 




5.2.4  ISOLATION OF OROV AND ANALYSIS OF VIRUS GENOME SEQUENCES 
OROV was successfully isolated from all five OROV positive patient plasma samples 
following one passage in Vero cells. S segment copy numbers for all samples increased 
by at least 5 logs, to approximately 1.0e+12 copies/mL at 72 hours post-infection (Figure 
5.6), demonstrating OROV genome replication. 
RNA was extracted from the isolated viruses and metagenomic sequencing was 
performed. Reads were mapped to the OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 genome 
sequence and consensus sequences were generated from the mapped reads using Quasi 
bam (see section 2.11.3). Complete OROV genomes were generated for all five isolates. 








Figure 5.6 OROV genome copies increased over 96 hours in Vero cells, demonstrating OROV genome replication in five independent 




The six Ecuadorian OROV genomes were aligned to compare nucleotide identity. The 
genomes were 99.7-100% identical to one another in the S segment and 99.9-100% 
identical in the M and L segments. Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) were 
observed at 33 positions throughout the genome, all of which occurred in coding regions 
(Table 5.7). Protein sequences were aligned to compare amino acid identity. The N 
protein was identical between isolates, whilst isolate D-206 showed a single amino acid 
substitution in the NSs protein (Table 5.8). Isolate D-210 showed two amino acid 
substitutions in the M protein, and three other isolates (D-057, D-155 and D-206) 
showed one substitution in this protein (Table 5.8). Two isolates (D-155 and D-210) 
showed a single amino acid substitution in the L protein (Table 5.8). A total of eight 
substitutions were observed, five of which constituted a reactive (R) group change 




















329 S G G G G A G 
551 S T C C C C C 
689 S A G G G G G 
1501 M A A T A A A 
1751 M T T T T C T 
2038 M C C C C T C 
2230 M A A A A A G 
2363 M T C T T T T 
2403 M A G G G G G 
2810 M G R* G G G G 
2859 M A A A A A G 
3290 M T T C T T T 
4028 M C C C C C A 
4124 M G G A G G G 
4313 M T T T T C T 
4340 M G A A A A A 
4490 M T C C C C C 
6129 L T C T T T T 
6174 L A A A A G A 
6200 L A A A A A G 
6579 L G G G G A G 
7599 L T C C C C C 




9235 L T T T T T C 
9336 L G G A G G G 
9571 L A A G A A A 
9591 L G A G G G G 
10039 L A G G G G G 
10737 L A A A G A A 
10791 L C C C C C T 
11133 L C T C C C C 
11208 L C C C C A C 
11733 L C C C C T C 
 
Table 5.7 SNPs identified between six Ecuadorian OROV genomes (sequenced from P1 




Protein Isolate Codon Consensus AA SNP AA R group change 
NSs D-206 88 C Y None 
M (Gn) D-155 173 Q L Polar / non-polar 
M (NSm) D-206 352 A V None 
M (NSm) D-210 416 K R None 
M (NSm) D-057 464 A T Non-polar / polar 
M (Gc) D-210 626 T A Polar / non-polar 
L D-210 273 D G Acidic / non-polar 
L D-155 1397 T A Polar / non-polar 
Table 5.8 Amino acid variation between six Ecuadorian OROV genomes. AA = amino 
acid. Gn = glycoprotein Gn. NSm = non-structural protein NSm. Gc = glycoprotein Gc. 
Bunyavirus Gn, NSm and Gc protein positions are taken from GenPept entry 
AGH07923.1. R group = reactive group. 
 
OROV genome sequences from patient and cultured material were compared to identify 
SNPs incurred during passage. The number of SNPs ranged from one (D-057) to 15 
(sample D-155, Table 5.9). The majority of changes were from a base where there was a 
mixed population in the patient (defined as no one base occupying >80% of reads), to 
either a different mixed population, or a majority population (majority defined at a base 
occupying >80% reads at a position) in the cultured isolate. The complete list of SNPs is 
given in Appendix 8. Changes from a majority population in the patient were less 
common, seen at two (D-171 and D-210) to five (D-087) positions, with sample D-057 




polymorphisms between patient and cultured sequences was conserved between 
isolates (M segment position 59, Appendix 8). 
 
OROV strain S SNPs M SNPs L SNPs Total SNPs 
D-057 1 0 0 1 
D-087 1 6 5 12 
D-155 2 6 7 15 
D-171 1 2 3 6 
D-206 nd 2 7 9 
D-210 0 2 5 7 
Table 5.9 A summary of the number of SNPs present in each OROV genome segment 





5.2.5  PHYLOGENETIC ANALYSIS OF ECUADORIAN OROV GENOMES 
Phylogenetic analysis of the Ecuadorian OROV genome sequences in the wider context 
of OROV sequence diversity was investigated by aligning a representative Ecuadorian 
OROV sequence (OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016) with OROV complete coding 
sequences from Genbank (n=112 S segments, n=24 M segments, n=23 L segments. These 
include two IQTV isolates). Maximum Likelihood phylogenetic trees revealed that all 
three Ecuadorian segment sequences cluster with Peruvian sequences. The most closely 
related strain was IQE-7894, isolated from Peru in 2008 (KP795084.1-KP795086.1, Figure 
5.7 and Figure 5.8). The Ecuadorian OROV N gene is also closely related to that of two 
IQTV strains isolated in Peru (Figure 5.7), however, the genetic divergence from IQTV 
seen in the M and L segments (Figure 5.8) confirms that the Ecuadorian strains are 
OROV, not IQTV. The Ecuadorian and closely related Peruvian N gene sequences do not 


















Figure 5.7 Maximum Likelihood tree for the OROV N gene (S segment). Roman 
numerals indicate genotypes as previously described for OROV (28). FigTree 1.4.2 












Figure 5.8 Maximum Likelihood trees showing genetic relationships between 
complete coding sequences of A) OROV M segments and B) L segments. Sequences are 
coloured by country of origin. Dark blue = Brazil, red = Peru, light blue = Ecuador, green 
= Panama, pink = Trinidad and Tobago. The tree is drawn to scale, with branch lengths 
measured in the number of substitutions per site. Node support from 100 bootstrap 




5.2.6  DEVELOPMENT OF AN OROV MULTIPLEX TILING PCR PRIMER SCHEME 
Clinical samples with lower levels of viral RNA can present challenges in generating 
complete genome sequences using a metagenomic sequencing approach (Table 5.5, 
Figure 5.4). To address this, a set of primers capable of amplifying the entire OROV 
genome was designed using the ‘Primal Scheme’ algorithmic method described by Quick 
et al. (351) (see section 2.13).  
The OROV multiplex tiling PCR primer scheme was tested using two Ecuadorian OROV 
strains (RNA from clinical sample D-057 and RNA from cultured strain 
OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016) and the prototype strain, which has considerable 
sequence divergence from the former strains. A negative control (nuclease-free water) 
was included. Primer pools were tested at concentrations of 10 μM and 100 μM to 
determine which generated the highest concentration of DNA. Amplified products were 
quantified using Qubit dsDNA HS assay (ThermoFisher Scientific, UK, Table 5.10) and 
visualised via agarose gel electrophoresis (Figure 5.10). 
Bands of approximately 400 bp were observed for all samples except the NTC. The 
Ecuadorian strains produced more concentrated DNA products (Table 5.10), which was 
expected as the scheme was designed based on the D-087 genome sequence. The 
prototype OROV genome was amplified but not as efficiently. The 100 μM primer pools 
produced more concentrated products than the 10 μM pools (Figure 5.10). cDNA 
libraries were prepared for NGS from the D-057 and prototype strain OROV amplicons 







 DNA (ng/μl) (10μM primer) DNA (ng/μl) (100μM primer) 
Sample 
ID 
Pool 1 Pool 2 Pool 1 Pool 2 
D-057 28.0 21.2 39.4 25.2 
D-087 23.6 17.5 56.8 37.4 
Prototype 1.6 1.4 8.1 4.6 
NTC 0.2 Too low 1.5 1.1 
 
Table 5.10 DNA concentration (ng/µl) of OROV primer scheme PCR amplicons, 




Figure 5.9 Agarose gel electrophoresis showing OROV primer scheme PCR amplicons. 
1kb = DNA ladder. 1 = D-057, 2 = prototype strain, 3 = D-087 strain, -ve = NTC. For each 
sample, products from both primer pool 1 and pool 2 are shown. The expected amplicon 




>99% of all three Ecuadorian OROV genome segment sequences were generated 
directly from clinical sample D-057 (a cut-off value of 20x read depth was used), with 
average depth of coverage of 7,075, 9,894 and 7,381 for the S, M and L segments, 
respectively (Figure 5.11). For the OROV prototype strain, 98% of the S segment (average 
depth of coverage 126,860), 93% of the M segment (average depth of coverage 119) 
and 92% of the L segment (average depth of coverage 189) were obtained, despite the 
considerable sequence divergence from the Ecuadorian strains. Multiplex tiling PCR 





Figure 5.10 Genome coverage of two OROV strains (Ecuadorian strain OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 MF926352.1 - MF926354.1, and prototype 
strain KP026179.1 - KP026181.1), sequenced using a MinION (Oxford Nanopore), from multiplex tiling PCR amplicons. Plots are separated by genome 




5.2.7  FOLLOW-UP TESTING OF FEBRILE PATIENTS FROM 2017 
Following the identification of OROV in multiple patients from Esmeraldas in 2016, RNA 
extracted from plasma samples collected from febrile patients from Esmeraldas in 2017 
(n=62) were tested for OROV, CHIKV, DENV serotypes 1-4, MAYV, YFV, ZIKV and 
Rickettsia using the qRT-PCR assays described previously (see section 2.4). Internal 
control MS2 was added prior to RNA extraction, the efficiency of which was checked 
using qRT-PCR to detect MS2 RNA. No sample was positive (Cq <35) for any of the 
pathogens tested for and all were positive for the internal control. 
Six samples were selected for metagenomic sequencing with the aim of detecting a virus 
not targeted by a qRT-PCR assay. Selection was based on the observation of a late (Cq 
>35) or abnormal amplification in a qRT-PCR assay, or a short period of fever prior to 
blood sampling (Table 5.11), which may suggest a more recent infection thereby 
increasing the chances of detecting a causative pathogen. Sequencing was undertaken 
using the metagenomic approach described in section 2.8, followed by sequencing using 
a MinION (see section 2.10).  
The number of sequencing reads per patient sample ranged from 35,870 to 117,109 
(mean = 59,769). On average, 56% of reads were of human origin (minimum 36.3%, 
maximum 68.5%), and 17.3% were of microbial origin (minimum 4.6%, maximum 
35.3%). The mean number of viral reads per sample was 10.4% (minimum 3.2, maximum 
22.5%). All samples contained reads belonging to internal control bacteriophage MS2 
(Table 5.11). Reads were analysed using Centrifuge which identified GBV-C in 2/6 
samples and MS2 internal control in all samples (Table 5.11). Human reads were mapped 
and removed from the data prior to de novo assembly (see section 2.11.5), which 




to relevant virus reference genomes (see section 2.11.3) identified reads mapping to 
GBV-C and MS2 reference sequences (Table 5.11), no other viruses were identified.  
Reads from patient samples D-245 and D-271 were mapped to the most closely related 
GBV-C sequences (identified using BLASTn), resulting in 88% 1x genome coverage from 















D-222 ?DENV1-3 MS2 3.7 2315 2 1661 & 2674 MK213795.1 2950 V00642.1 




D-237 ?OROV MS2 6.1 8748 0 n/a n/a 11283 V00642.1 
D-245 2-day fever 
GBV-C 3.3 2705 1 7152 U45966.1 475 KR131788.1 
MS2 1.7 1379 0 n/a n/a 1832 V00642.1 
D-215 3-day fever MS2 14.9 7961 1 2160 MK213795.1 10203 V00642.1 
D-271 ?OROV 
GBV-C 1.5 3042 1 8457 D90601.1 692 KR131788.1 
MS2 0.3 617 0 n/a n/a 763 V00642.1 
Table 5.11 Ecuadorian patient samples from 2017 selected for metagenomic sequencing. GBV-C was identified in 2/6 samples from a combination of 









Figure 5.11 Coverage of GBV-C genomes from patient samples D-245 and D-271, 
generated by mapping sequencing reads to reference sequences (U45966.1 and 




5.3  DISCUSSION 
5.3.1  A MODIFIED OROV QRT-PCR IDENTIFIED MULTIPLE CASES OF INFECTION IN FEBRILE 
ECUADORIAN PATIENTS 
Following the detection of OROV in a febrile Ecuadorian patient described in chapter 4, 
there was a requirement for a qRT-PCR assay with good sensitivity for existing strains 
including the Ecuadorian strain. A previously published assay (361), capable of detecting 
the OROV prototype strain, could not detect OROV RNA in patient sample D-087 despite 
the identification of a substantial portion of the genome using metagenomic sequencing 
and virus isolation in vitro. To address this, the primer/probe sequences were compared 
to the OROV/EC/Esmeraldas/087/2016 S segment sequence and two mismatches to the 
reverse primer were detected. It was hypothesised that these mismatches resulted in 
poor sensitivity for the Ecuadorian strain. Subsequent design and testing of two 
alternative reverse primers demonstrated that reverse primer Ec2R (which bound to an 
alternative conserved region of the S segment) was more sensitive for both the 
Ecuadorian strain and the prototype strain than the original reverse primer. 
As part of the optimisation and validation of the qRT-PCR assay, the absolute limit of 
detection for Ecuadorian strain OROV RNA was assessed and the assay was determined 
to be highly sensitive, with a limit of detection conservatively stated at 10 copies of RNA. 
Detection below this threshold was achieved, but less reliably, probably because of the 
stochastic nature of nucleic acid present in dilutions below 1e+1. The OROV S segment 
is shared by a number of reassortant orthobunyaviruses including IQTV, which circulates 
in neighbouring Peru and can cause Oropouche fever (489). The modified assay has the 




RNA from 196 Ecuadorian febrile patient plasma samples from 2016 were tested for 
OROV using the modified qRT-PCR and a total of six samples (including the original 
sample D-087) were OROV-positive. Estimations of the number of genome copies/mL of 
plasma, based on the absolute quantitation, revealed a range of RNA plasma 
concentrations from 9.6e+3 to 1.3e+9 copies/mL, inversely correlated with the number 
of days of fever experienced by the patient prior to blood sampling. This fits the clinical 
picture of OROV infection in which the onset of symptoms is accompanied by a high level 
of viraemia (182), following which viral titres in the blood reduce significantly. 
Observations from OROV-infected Brazilian patients showed a reduction of 72% on the 
third day, and 44% and 23% on the fourth and fifth days following onset of symptoms 
(180). One patient in the present study was sampled after a reported 7 days of fever, 
with 9.6e+3 OROV genome copies/mL plasma; still easily within the detection range of 
the optimised assay.  
 
5.3.2  SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS OF OROV GENOME ARE DETECTABLE DIRECTLY FROM 
CLINICAL MATERIAL USING METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING 
The initial identification of OROV from patient sample D-087 using metagenomic 
sequencing, from which OROV RNA was not detectable using a published OROV qRT-
PCR, highlights the challenges in developing amplification-based detection assays for 
pathogens with limited genome sequence data, and the benefits offered by unbiased 
sequencing technologies. Sequencing directly from OROV-positive patient plasma 
resulted in coverage of 63.5-99.4% of the OROV genome, demonstrating that 
metagenomic detection of OROV is possible from patient plasma samples with viral RNA 




effective for both detection and characterisation of OROV genomes from clinical 
samples. Genome copies/mL loosely correlated with the proportion of sequencing reads 
that mapped to the OROV genome, however large variability in the latter metric was 
observed, which has been reported for other arboviruses sequenced from clinical 
material (321). This likely reflects variation in the level of host background RNA present 
in samples. The absence of S segment sequence from sample D-206 is likely due to the 
stochastic nature of the metagenomic sequencing method, which is exacerbated for 
smaller fragments (S segment 952 bp). The S segment is detected by qRT-PCR and is 
present in the sequencing of the virus directly cultured from this sample. 
 
5.3.3  SIX COMPLETE ECUADORIAN GENOME SEQUENCES WERE GENERATED FROM 
ISOLATED VIRUS 
Following one passage in Vero cells, which was necessary to isolate and amplify OROV, 
complete OROV genome sequences were obtained from cell culture supernatants. It is 
well-documented that mutations occur during passaging in vitro (8) and passaging was 
limited to minimise the number of mutations between patient and cultured virus 
genomes. Analysis of intra-sample variation revealed a number of positions with a mixed 
population of variants present in the patient genome, which progressed to a majority 
population in the cultured genome. Majority-to-majority changes were rare, and only 
one of the 49 SNPs observed between patient and cultured genomes was seen in two 
individual strains, suggesting that these changes are due to random selection during 
propagation rather than a reflection of a shared selective pressure within the cultures. 
An alignment of the Ecuadorian consensus sequences revealed that 33 SNPs were 




corresponded to just eight non-synonymous amino acid substitutions, five of which 
constitute a reactive group change (three in the M segment and two in the L segment) 
and therefore may influence the structure or function of the protein. Two of these occur 
in the OROV glycoproteins, which play important roles in virus adaptation because of 
their interaction with the host immune system (523). The collaborative work performed 
on the evolutionary analysis of OROV demonstrated an increased number of sites under 
positive selection on the OROV Gc protein compared to other OROV proteins (363), 
however further studies are required to investigate any selective pressure at this site. 
 
5.3.4  OROV GENOME ANALYSES SUGGEST OROV HAS BEEN CIRCULATING UNDETECTED IN 
ECUADOR 
Analysis of the Ecuadorian OROV S, M and L genomic segment sequences revealed that 
all three are most closely related to isolates from Peru from the 1990s and 2000s. Strain 
IQE-7894 is particularly closely related, isolated from a patient close to Iquitos city, Peru, 
in 2008. OROV was previously classified into four genotypes based on N gene nucleotide 
sequences (28,521), representing distinct genetic linages circulating in the Americas 
(521). As of 2017, genotype I was detected in Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil; genotype 
II in Panama, Peru, and Brazil; genotype III in Brazil and Peru, and genotype IV exclusively 
in Brazil (Figure 5.12) (28). This classification can be useful for looking at OROV 
epidemiology, however it is based on a small region of the genome. Furthermore, the 
Ecuadorian N gene sequences and the closely related Peruvian sequences do not cluster 
with any of the pre-defined genotypes. The generation of complete viral genomes using 
metagenomic sequencing or a multiplex tiling PCR, as opposed to the small fragments 




epidemiological analyses (524). The utility of this approach was exemplified in the 
present study by making it possible to rule out the Ecuadorian sequences as belonging 
to reassortant OROV-like virus IQTV. Despite having a closely related N gene sequence, 
the genetic divergence observed in the L and particularly the M segment demonstrated 
that the Ecuadorian strains belong to OROV. However, the S segment similarity to IQTV 
and OROV isolates originating nearby to Iquitos city raises the possibility that OROV was 
introduced to Ecuador across the Peru–Ecuador border. Further studies are needed to 




Figure 5.12 The distribution of OROV genotypes in the Americas, based on 114 N gene 




The six Ecuadorian sequences were incorporated into a comprehensive analysis of the 
evolution of OROV in South America, as part of a collaboration with Oxford University 
(363). Phylogenetic analyses were performed using all available S, M and L OROV 
sequences, representing OROV cases and outbreaks from Trinidad & Tobago, Panama, 
Peru and Brazil. The addition of the Ecuadorian sequences meant that this dataset 
covered the complete sampled history of the virus from the mid-1950s to the present 
day (n=149 S, n=64 M, n=64 L). Maximum Likelihood trees demonstrated that the 
Ecuadorian sequences cluster in a well-supported monophyletic group (363), separate 
from other genomes but most closely related to Peruvian isolates, confirming the 
previous observations (Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8). 
Evolutionary timescale analyses of the OROV genome segments suggested that OROV 
first emerged in the early-to-mid 20th century (363). Furthermore, the M segment has 
an older common ancestor than the S and L segments; two M segment lineages diverged 
in the 17th century then diversified in the early to mid-1900s (Figure 5.13A). The 
differences in time to most recent common ancestor (TMRCA) between genome 
segments is a result of genetic reassortment that occurs when different orthobunyavirus 
strains or species infect the same cell and produce progeny virions with reassorted 
genome segments. Topological differences in the evolutionary rate trees for the 
different segments suggested multiple reassortment events occurred during the 
evolution of OROV in South America, however, no reassortment events related to the 
Ecuadorian sequences were observed (363). The TMRCA of the Ecuadorian OROV 
sequences was estimated to be late-2011 (95% credible intervals: 2009-2015), mid-2011 
(95% credible intervals: 2008-2015) and early 2014 (95% credible intervals: 2011-2016) 




The WHO define an outbreak as the occurrence of disease cases in excess of what is 
normally expected in a particular time and place (525). The monophyletic clustering of 
the Ecuadorian genomes suggests an outbreak of Oropouche fever occurred in 
Esmeraldas in 2016. Urban outbreaks usually result from a human infection that occurs 
via a bite from an infected insect in a forested area where the sylvatic OROV 
transmission cycle is present (28). Movement of the infected person into an urban 
setting in which a competent vector species (thought to be Culicoides paraensis) is 
present facilitates onwards transmission from person-to-person, resulting in explosive 
outbreaks (183). The majority of Esmeraldas canton is urban, but 18.7% is rural (490), 
providing potential opportunities for sylvatic circulation of OROV and interactions 
between infected insects and humans.  
The OROV cases from Esmeraldas could have occurred via multiple introductions from 
an animal reservoir, or in a transmission chain from person-to-person (facilitated by a 
vector in both scenarios). The former seems most feasible because there is 
approximately five years’ worth of genetic diversity between the two most distantly 
related Ecuadorian S sequences (Figure 5.13B). Some sequences are more closely 
related than others, but given that patients typically show levels of viraemia sufficient 
to infect C. paraensis for only 3-4 days from the onset of symptoms (28), and the 
timescale of genetic differences between the Ecuadorian sequences is months to years, 
there is no clear evidence of a human-to-human transmission chain.  
The Ecuadorian sequences share a MRCA somewhere between 2008 and 2016. This 
ancestor could have existed in Ecuador or elsewhere, possibly Peru based on the genetic 
similarity to the 2008 Peruvian genome.  The collection of OROV sequences used in this 




unsampled diversity, meaning the picture of OROV in South America (and most-likely 
Ecuador) is under-sampled and incomplete. The fact that anti-OROV IgM antibodies 
were detected in patient samples from Pastaza province (480) and Guayaquil (479), 
which are approximately 350 km apart and both approximately 450 km from 
Esmeraldas, suggests OROV circulation within Ecuador is not restricted to Esmeraldas. 
Furthermore, the time of these detections (2001-2007) predates the earliest credible 
TMRCA of the Ecuadorian sequences discovered in this study. This points to the 
existence of other, unsampled lineages of OROV that may have been circulating in 
Ecuador prior to the lineage identified from patient samples from Esmeraldas. However, 
it is important to note that antibody-based detection methods are less specific than 
molecular detection assays, and antibodies to viruses in the Simbu serogroup to which 
OROV belongs frequently cross-react with multiple other members of the group 
(526,527). It is possible that antibody cross-reactivity with other orthobunyavirus 
species or OROV reassortants could have been responsible for the detections from 
Pastaza province and Guayaquil. The availability of more OROV genomes, particularly 
from Ecuador, would help further elucidate the relationships between the Ecuadorian 
genomes. 
Where OROV circulates in nature is not well understood, it is possible that transmission 
to a person occurred in Esmeraldas or elsewhere in Ecuador, where OROV is circulating 
undetected. Another possibility is that infection of the human index case occurred in 
Peru, with subsequent travel of the infected person to Ecuador where transmission was 
established and has continued undetected. Without the exact locations of the patient’s 
residences in Esmeraldas, and their travel histories, it is difficult to speculate as to the 




A further uncertainty is the mode of transmission from person-to-person in Esmeraldas, 
if this did occur. As first discussed in chapter 4, the primary vector in urban transmission, 
C. paraensis, is reported to be absent there (S. Zapata, personal communication, 31st 
August 2017). Certain mosquito species may play a role in transmission, but studies 
show inefficient transmission (180,528). An investigation of potential OROV vector 
species in Esmeraldas would be highly informative.  
Transmission of viruses within the Peribunyaviridae family is documented to occur by 
insect vector (mosquitoes and culicoid flies (529)) and there is no evidence of other 
routes of transmission from person-to-person, however, this does not rule out the 
existence of other modes of transmission. Many orthobunyaviruses have a wide range 
of vertebrate hosts, including rodents (530), but it is not known whether direct contact 
with contaminated rodents or other host species leads to human infection. However, 
hantaviruses, which also belong to the order Bunyavirales, primarily infect humans via 
direct contact with their rodent reservoirs (146). Furthermore, secondary routes of 
transmission may be masked by the higher numbers of cases resulting from the 
dominant transmission route. For example, sexual transmission of ZIKV was only 
discovered in 2008, decades after the virus was first discovered, following infection of a 
woman in the USA via sexual transmission from her husband who had recently 
contracted ZIKV in Senegal. Despite a large outbreak of ZIKV in Yap island the previous 
year (2007), during which 70% of the islands’ inhabitants were infected (270), this route 
of transmission was only discovered from this unusual case of ZIKV infection in Colorado, 













Figure 5.13 Time-calibrated and evolutionary rate analysis of the OROV genome.  A) 
Comparison of the OROV genome segments showed that the M segment has an older 
common ancestor than the S and L segments (L1 and L2 = Lineage 1 and Lineage 2, 
respectively) B) Evolutionary timescale analysis of the S and L segments. The posterior 
probabilities (PP) of each node is shown based on a greyscale colour scheme (0.0 PP = 




5.3.5  FOLLOW-UP TESTING OF FEBRILE PATIENTS FROM 2017 DID NOT DETECT OROV 
No cases of OROV or any other virus tested for by qRT-PCR were detected during follow-
up testing of 62 febrile patient samples from Esmeraldas in 2017. Previous outbreaks of 
Oropouche fever have been episodic and self-limited in nature (28); the six cases 
identified from 2016 could represent an outbreak or outbreaks that ended that year. 
Alternatively, if OROV transmission did occur in Esmeraldas in 2017, the lack of detection 
could be related to the limited sample size of the 2017 cohort. Furthermore, the majority 
of samples tested from 2017 were taken in June/July, whereas the OROV positive 
samples from 2016 (that dates are available for) were taken in April. If there is a seasonal 
component to OROV outbreaks in Ecuador, as is seen in Brazil where outbreaks are 
usually reported in the wet season (28), this difference could be relevant as the wet 
season in Ecuador ends in May. Outbreaks in Brazil have been shown to exhibit an 
epidemic dispersal process involving transmission of OROV to multiple locations close 
to the region in which the virus was first detected (28,511,531). This is proposed to result 
from the movement of viraemic people into areas where the vector is present, 
facilitating onward transmission (28). A larger-scale study is necessary to determine 
whether a similar process exists in Ecuador, and the prevalence and distribution of OROV 
in the Ecuadorian population. 
Metagenomic sequencing of six patient samples from 2017 did not identify any 
pathogenic viruses, but did identify GBV-C in two patients, from which 70% and 88% 
coverage of the genome was generated. Previously introduced in chapter 3, where it 
was detected in multiple Sierra Leonean patients, the human pegivirus GBV-C has a 
worldwide distribution and is more prevalent in developing countries (445,446), 




5.3.6  DEVELOPMENT OF OROV DETECTION ASSAYS AND IMPLEMENTATION IN ECUADOR 
BUILDS CAPACITY FOR THE DETECTION OF EME RGING VIRUSES 
In addition to the OROV qRT-PCR developed in this study, a multiplex tiling PCR primer 
scheme was designed that amplifies the entire genome of OROV using RT-PCR. This 
scheme produced genome sequence from both Ecuadorian OROV and the genetically 
divergent prototype strain with good depth of coverage. It is a useful tool for generating 
genome sequence from clinical material with very low amounts of viral RNA. In the 
present study, the resulting amplicons were sequenced using the ONT MinION, which 
(as previously discussed) is highly portable and requires relatively low start-up costs, 
making it suitable for use in resource-limited settings.  
A key outcome of this project was to support existing in-country laboratories by 
identifying circulating viruses and additional assays to include in surveillance and 
diagnostic testing. In line with this, training was provided to researchers at USFQ, both 
in-country and during a visit to PHE Porton Down, initiating the implementation of the 
OROV qRT-PCR assay alongside a number of other relevant qRT-PCR assays. 
Furthermore, training in the metagenomic sequencing approach using a portable 
MinION sequencer was provided. Although the cost associated with metagenomic 
sequencing may be prohibitive for frontline diagnosis in developing countries, it can be 
used in prospective screening studies to identify potential issues with qRT-PCR assays, 
as demonstrated here, providing essential genome information that allows for assay 
adaptation. These activities fall in line with the actions promoted by WHO for effective 
response to the threat of emerging viruses, including advancing research in prevention, 
surveillance and control of virus infection; developing, strengthening and implementing 
integrated surveillance systems for virus infection; and strengthening the capacity of 




developed as part of this project will be valuable tools for laboratories performing viral 
diagnostics and surveillance in the Americas. 
 
5.3.7  LIMITATIONS 
RNA from two strains of OROV were available for use in assay optimisation and 
validation. Despite best efforts, no other strains could be accessed for inclusion in the 
validation process, therefore it cannot be definitively stated that the molecular assays 
detect the full range of OROV strains present in nature. However, for the qRT-PCR, an 
alignment of all publicly available strains showed that the majority of sequences are 
homologous to the primer/probe sequences, suggesting that based on sequence 
similarity the assay is likely to be suitable. Further validation using a wider range of 
strains would improve the qRT-PCR and multiplex tiling primer scheme.  
The identification of OROV-positive febrile patients in this study was based on nucleic-
acid detection methods, which provide useful information in the form of viral genome 
sequence. Future studies incorporating OROV antibody detection would be useful for 
understanding the prevalence of OROV in the Ecuadorian population. Although a 
number of anti-OROV IgM and IgG ELISA assays are described in the literature 
(479,509,513,514,532), these are produced ‘in-house’ by individual laboratories and are 
therefore difficult to standardise. At present no OROV ELISA assays are commercially 
available, however this would be useful and allow comparison of results between 
studies.   
The OROV genomes sequenced directly from patients are incomplete, therefore the 




phylogenetic analyses. It’s possible that differences between the patient and cultured 
sequences could have a limited confounding effect at the very smallest scale of analysis; 
when looking at the relationships between the Ecuadorian genomes themselves. The 
missing regions of the OROV patient genomes (1-36% of the genome), could include 
further SNPs between the patient and cultured genomes that it is not possible to know 
about. Conversely, approximately half of the SNPs identified between the patient and 
cultured genomes are ‘mixed population’ to ‘majority population’ changes (26/49). For 
certain positions this may simply reflect the low depth of coverage of the patient 
genome; meaning the few reads present do not represent the true proportion of 
variation in base at that position. Or, for positions with high coverage, the data truly 
represents the more diverse viral population within the patient which is subsequently 
lost in culture because of selective pressure to adapt to the new environment. 
Differences between patient and cultured genomes is a further reason to sequence 
directly from patient samples using metagenomic sequencing where possible. As stated 
in results, SNPs between patient and cultured genomes appear to be randomly 
distributed and therefore should not affect the analysis significantly. Nonetheless, no 
firm conclusions are drawn about the relationships between the Ecuadorian genomes, 
in part for this reason.   
 
5.3.8  SUMMARY 
The detection of six OROV cases from patients local to Esmeraldas, Ecuador, in 2016, 
provides further evidence that OROV is responsible for an unrecognised burden of 
human disease in previously unreported areas. It is likely that cases of Oropouche fever 




to that of other viral, protozoan, and bacterial diseases previously reported to circulate 
in the country (28,476,480,481). This work highlights the need for increased surveillance 
for OROV in Ecuador; the virus should be considered when diagnosing Ecuadorian 
patients with febrile illness. Effective diagnostic assays are needed that can differentiate 
between emerging pathogens sharing common clinical descriptions and circulating in 
the same area. Very little is known about the dynamics of OROV in Ecuador or its 
endemicity in neighbouring regions; this detection of OROV in multiple Ecuadorian 
febrile patients warrants further investigation into the prevalence, associated vectors, 




CHAPTER 6: OROV REPLICATION IN BIOLOGICALLY RELEVANT CELL TYPES 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
Despite causing more than half a million cases of Oropouche fever in the Americas since 
its discovery in the 1950s, OROV transmission and pathogenesis is poorly understood 
compared to that of other arboviruses. A search for “Oropouche virus” in the PubMed 
database yielded 84 articles, compared with 13,903, 6,329 and 4,161 articles for 
“dengue virus”, “Zika virus” and “chikungunya virus”, respectively.  
Two OROV transmission cycles are known to exist, based on field studies and laboratory 
experiments. The sylvatic cycle is maintained in the forest between vertebrate reservoir 
hosts and vectors (181) (Figure 6.1). Reservoir hosts include the pale-throated sloth 
(Bradypus tridactylus), non-human primates (Callithrix spp. and Alouatta caraya), 
rodents (Proechimys spp.) and possibly some wild bird species (387,504,505,508,533). 
Which insect vectors are involved in sylvatic transmission is not clear, although OROV 
was isolated from mosquito species Aedes (Ochlerotatus) serratus in Brazil and 
Coquilletidia venezuelensis in Trinidad (28,505).  
The urban, or epidemic, cycle occurs between human hosts and insect vectors (Figure 
6.1). The biting midge Culicoides paraensis is the primary vector in these cycles, based 
on evidence that C. paraensis can transmit OROV from infected to susceptible hamsters 
(534), and from viraemic patients to hamsters (181,505). However, a low isolation rate 
(1:12,500) has been reported from the field during epidemics (505) which is at odds with 
the number of human cases observed. Entomological surveys from the outbreak locality 
of Iquitos, Peru, showed that C. paraensis was present but no infected midges were 
detected (516). This raises the question of whether there are other insect vectors 




detected in small numbers of these mosquitoes in the 1960s (180), then again in febrile 
patients and Cx. quinquefasciatus from the same location in Brazil in 2011-2012 (534). 
However, in the laboratory the efficiency of OROV transmission by Cx. quinquefasciatus 
is low (528).  
The dynamics of OROV in Ecuador are completely unknown. The detection of six OROV-
positive patients from Esmeraldas in 2016, the genomes from which cluster together 
phylogenetically, suggests that an outbreak occurred in Esmeraldas. However, C. 
paraensis is thought to be absent from the Pacific Coast region in which Esmeraldas is 
situated. This is based on entomological collections performed since 2009 which 
identified C. paraensis in the Amazon region of the country only (S. Zapata, personal 
communication, 17th October 2017). This fits with the previously described distribution 
of C. paraensis in South America (535), in which the midge is present in the south and 
Amazon areas of Ecuador. Further studies into alternative OROV vectors, perhaps 
through a combination of screening field collections and performing vector competence 






Figure 6.1 OROV transmission cycles. Reproduced from Travassos da Rosa et al. (2017) 
(28). 
 
OROV pathogenesis is also not well understood and it is not known which cell types the 
virus replicates in during human infection. Viraemia is detected during the acute phase 
of infection (28) and virus has been detected in peripheral blood leukocytes from 
patients (536). Less frequently, OROV has been recovered from cerebrospinal fluid from 
patients experiencing a less typical, more severe form of disease involving encephalitis 





Some aspects of OROV pathogenesis have been studied using small animal models; 
hamsters and mice (28). Early experiments in hamsters intra-cerebrally inoculated with 
OROV showed infection resulted in liver lesions, hepatocyte necrosis and Kuppfer cell 
hypoplasia, suggesting that OROV is able to travel from the brain to the liver via the 
blood (392). A more recent study in the hamster model detected high titres of virus in 
the liver and brain following subcutaneous inoculation (393). In vitro studies have 
demonstrated OROV replication in a handful of human derived cell types; as well as cell 
types from other species (Table 2.27). 
A recent study of OROV morphogenesis provided novel insights into the assembly 
pathway of OROV in HeLa-I cells and identified host components essential for viral 
replication (388), demonstrating that OROV recruited host endosomal sorting complex 
required for transport (ESCRT) machinery to the site of Oropouche viral factory units at 
the Golgi cisternae. This machinery was required for membrane remodelling, essential 
for efficient viral assembly and budding. These kinds of studies are important for 
understanding the OROV replication cycle, however, they are constrained by the 
requirement for cell lines and viruses that are easily manipulated in the laboratory and 
are often not representative of a natural infection. Studies using low-passage, wildtype 
virus and biologically relevant cell types may provide insights that are more relevant to 
a natural infection.  
BST-2 (also known as tetherin) is an interferon stimulated gene that has broad inhibitory 
activity against enveloped viruses. Orthobunyaviruses with human tropism (including 
OROV) are restricted by sheep BST-2, but not by human BST-2, whilst for 
orthobunyaviruses with ruminant tropism the opposite is true (391). The mechanism 




of envelope glycoprotein that is incorporated into virions egressing from infected cells 
(391). This was the first identification of a host determinant of species susceptibility to 
bunyavirus infection and provides insight into adaptations required for these viruses to 
cross species barriers. 
This chapter aims to identify cell types that are susceptible and permissive for OROV 
replication. As a step towards understanding what other insect species may transmit 
OROV, a study was performed to identify insect-derived cell lines that support OROV 
replication in vitro. These cell lines were from mosquito species Ae. agypti, Ae. 
albopictus, Anopheles gambiae and Cx. quinquefasciatus, and the biting midge 
Culicoides v. sonorensis. Mammalian cell lines Vero and BHK-21 were also included, as 
these have previously been shown to support OROV replication (185,387,388). To 
understand which human cell types may be involved in the natural course of OROV 
infection, an attempt to identify human primary cell types and cell lines permissive for 
OROV replication was made. Skin fibroblasts and keratinocytes, peripheral blood 
mononuclear cells (PBMCs), and hepatocytes were assessed on the basis that these cell 
types are likely to be biologically relevant based on the OROV route of transmission and 




6.2  RESULTS 
6.2.1  OROV REPLICATION IN INSECT AND MAMMALIAN CELL LINES 
OROV replication in insect and mammalian cell lines was assessed over seven days using 
a multiplicity of infection (MOI) of 0.1, determined as suitable for OROV growth curve 
experiments based on pilot experiments in human cells and on published work (185). 
OROV genome replication was assessed using qRT-PCR to measure changes in the 
relative quantity of viral RNA present in the supernatant (see section 2.16.2.3). The 
production of infectious virions was assessed by measuring viral titres in the supernatant 
using a plaque assay (see section 2.15.4). 
 
6.2.1.1 ASSESSMENT OF OROV GENOME REPLICATION 
OROV genome replication was observed in all three Ae. aegypti cell lines by 1 dpi, 
followed by a substantial increase by 2 days post-infection (dpi, Figure 6.2). After 2 dpi, 
OROV RNA continued to increase but at a slower rate. In the AE cell line, a plateau in 
OROV RNA was reached between 4 and 7 dpi (Figure 6.2). A similar trend in OROV 
genome replication to that seen in the Ae. aegypti cell lines was observed in both Ae. 
albopictus cell lines over the 7-day period. Substantial genome replication was observed 
by 1 dpi, which continued whilst tapering off over the remainder of the time-course 
(Figure 6.2). The quantity of OROV RNA was higher in supernatants from U4.4 cells 
compared to C6/36 cells, first observed at 1 dpi then increased at 2 dpi and maintained 
through days 3 and 4 post-infection (Figure 6.2).  
Substantial OROV genome replication, represented by a decrease of approximately 10 
Cq values, was observed 2 dpi in both mammalian cell lines, although this was delayed 




observed after 2 dpi, corroborated by the similar virus titres measured at 4 dpi (Figure 
6.3). No OROV genome replication was observed in cell lines from Cx. quinquefasciatus 
(HSU), Anopheles gambiae (Sua) or Culicoides v. sonorensis (KC, Figure 6.2).  
 
Figure 6.2 OROV genome replication in Ae. aegypti, Ae. albopictus, mammalian and 
other insect cell lines (HSU: Cx. Quinquefasciatus, Sua: Anopheles gambiae and KC: 
Culicoides v. sonorensis), assessed by relative quantity of OROV RNA measured at 0, 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 days post-infection (dpi). Error bars represent the standard deviation 




6.2.1.2 ASSESSMENT OF INFECTIOUS VIRUS IN CELL LINES SHOWING OROV GENOME 
REPLICATION 
Infectious viral titres were assessed in cell lines that showed evidence of OROV genome 
replication by qRT-PCR. Viral titres in supernatants from Ae. aegypti cell lines increased 
from 1000-3000 pfu/mL at 0 dpi to between 2e+6 pfu/mL and 2e+7 pfu/mL at 4 dpi, with 
titres from Aag-2 cells approximately one log higher than the other cell lines (Figure 6.3). 
The higher quantity of OROV RNA measured in Ae. albopictus U4.4 cells compared to 
C6/36 cells at 4 dpi was reflected by a higher titre of infectious virus, which was almost 
10-fold higher than that from C6/36 cells (Figure 6.3). From 0 to 4 dpi, viral titres 






Figure 6.3 OROV replication in Ae. aegypti, Ae. albopictus and mammalian cell lines, assessed by measuring viral titre at 0 and 4 dpi. Error bars 




6.2.2  OROV REPLICATION IN HUMAN CELLS 
OROV replication in human primary cells and cell lines was assessed using an MOI of 0.1. 
Genome replication was assessed by measuring intracellular viral RNA using qRT-PCR 
and viral titres were measured in supernatants using a plaque assay. 
 
6.2.2.1 ASSESSMENT OF OROV GENOME REPLICATION 
An initial experiment assessed OROV growth in fibroblasts, hepatocytes and PBMCs over 
a 72-hour period. PBMCs isolated from seven healthy volunteers were used. OROV 
genome replication was observed in fibroblasts and hepatocytes, but not in PBMCs 
(Figure 6.4). OROV RNA in fibroblasts increased substantially between 0 and 24 hours 
posti-infection (hpi), after which it plateaued (Figure 6.4). In hepatocytes, OROV RNA 
increased between 0 and 24 hpi, plateaued, then decreased after 48 hours (Figure 6.4), 
probably reflecting the condition of the infected cells at this point in the experiment, 
although it was not possible to check for cytopathic effect (CPE) because of biosafety 
constraints within the CL3 laboratory. There was no evidence of OROV genome 
replication in PBMCs; the amount of OROV RNA remained the same from 0 to 24 hpi, 






Figure 6.4 OROV genome replication in human fibroblasts, hepatocytes and PBMCs, assessed by relative quantity of OROV RNA measured at 0, 24, 




Based on results from the initial 72-hour experiment, a second experiment was 
performed in triplicate, focussing on the 0-36 hpi period because the majority of virus 
genome replication was observed between 0-24 hours. PBMCs were not assessed 
further because of the absence of OROV replication observed previously. In addition to 
fibroblasts and hepatocytes, two primary keratinocyte cell lines were assessed. 
OROV genome replication was first observed in fibroblasts between 6 and 12 hpi. 
Genome replication after 12 hpi is at a slower rate than that seen in the preceding 6 
hours, and greater variation was observed between replicates at 12 and 36 hpi (Figure 
6.5). Genome replication in hepatocytes was observed as early as 6 hpi, earlier than in 
fibroblasts (Figure 6.5). A roughly linear increase in OROV RNA was observed until 24 
hpi, after which it began to plateau (Figure 6.5). For both primary keratinocyte cell lines, 
a small increase in OROV RNA was observed between 12 and 24 hpi, which then 






Figure 6.5 OROV genome replication in human fibroblasts, hepatocytes and keratinocytes, assessed by relative quantity of OROV RNA measured at 




6.2.2.2 ASSESSMENT OF INFECTIOUS VIRUS IN CELL LINES WITH OROV GENOME REPLICATION 
In agreement with the qRT-PCR data, a high viral titre was measured in fibroblasts at 24 
hpi (1.2e+6 pfu/mL), a substantial increase from 0 hpi (2.2e+2 pfu/mL, Figure 6.6). 
Similarly, the viral titre in hepatocytes increased substantially by 24 hpi (Figure 6.6), also 
in agreement with the qRT-PCR data (Figure 6.5). There was no evidence of OROV 
replication in PBMCs (Figure 6.6). The relatively high titre of OROV observed at 0 dpi is 
related to the experimental design; it was not possible to remove the virus inoculum 
because the PBMCs were maintained in suspension rather than adhered to a plate. In 
both keratinocyte cell lines, no infectious virus was detected at either timepoint, 






Figure 6.6 OROV replication in human fibroblasts, hepatocytes and PBMCs, assessed by viral titres measured at 0 and 4 dpi. Error bars represent the 




6.2.3  CELL VIABILITY 
As previously stated, it was not possible to check for CPE because of biosafety 
constraints within the CL3 laboratory. As an alternative, cell viability counts using mock-
infected cells were taken at each timepoint during the human cell time-course 
experiments, to control for lack of virus replication due to sub-optimal cell health. Mean 
cell viability (averaged across all experimental timepoints) of 70% and above was 
considered adequate, however, in some instances the low number of cells available for 
counting made it difficult to obtain a reliable viability count. Therefore, for cells that 
showed no evidence of OROV replication, the capability of these cell types to support 
OROV replication is not ruled out because it cannot be definitively said that the results 
were not influenced by sub-optimal cell health. 
 
6.2.4  SUMMARY 
OROV can replicate in cell lines derived from Ae. aegypti (n=3), Ae. albopictus (n=2), non-
human mammals (n=2), and transformed human hepatocytes (n=1), as well as primary 
human fibroblasts (Table 6.1). No evidence of replication was observed in cell lines from 
Anopheles gambiae, Culex quinquefasciatus, Culicoides v. sonorensis, or in primary 













Aag-2 Embryonic Aedes aegypti Yes Yes 
AE Unknown Aedes aegypti Yes Yes 
AF319 Embryonic Aedes aegypti Yes Yes 
C6/36 Embryonic Aedes albopictus Yes Yes 
U4.4 Embryonic Aedes albopictus Yes Yes 
Sua4a-2 Larvae Anopheles gambiae No No 
HSU Ovary Culex quinquefasciatus No No 








African green monkey Yes Yes 
1BR3 Fibroblast Human Yes Yes 
HEKn Keratinocyte Human No No 
HPEkp Keratinocyte Human No No 
PBMC PBMC Human No No 
HepG2 Liver, HCC Human Yes Yes 
 




6.3  DISCUSSION 
6.3.1  OROV REPLICATES IN CELL LINES FROM AEDES AEGYPTI  AND AEDES ALBOPICTUS   
The experimental results described in this chapter demonstrated that wildtype 
Ecuadorian OROV is able to replicate in cell lines derived from Ae. Aegypti and Ae. 
albopictus; both important insect vectors of other arboviral diseases circulating both in 
Ecuador and globally. Few studies have looked at the capability of mosquito species 
Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus to transmit OROV. Screening of 311 Aedes 
mosquitoes (collected from the area local to the original febrile patient’s residence in 
Trinidad) did not detect virus in any mosquito tested. OROV was recovered from Aedes 
mosquitoes parenterally inoculated with OROV in the laboratory (7/7 Ae. scapularis and 
4/4 Ae. serratus), but transmission to mice did not occur (177). Another study 
investigating whether Ae. albopictus mosquitoes can become infected and transmit 
OROV in a laboratory setting detected virus in a small proportion of mosquitoes that had 
fed on a viraemic hamster, but none transmitted virus to mice (540). These studies were 
performed in the 1960s and 1990s, respectively, so further experiments using 
contemporary mosquitoes and OROV strains would provide better understanding of the 
picture today. 
Ae. aegypti is considered to be the most important arboviral vector of the past century, 
in large part because of its ability to transmit multiple clinically important emerging 
viruses including DENV, CHIKV, YFV and ZIKV (473,541,542). This species is widespread 
throughout Ecuador, though not present at high altitudes, and does well in heavily 
urbanised environments where breeding sites tend to be plentiful (Figure 6.7) (543). The 




coastal and interior regions of the country, which corresponds with the distribution of 
mosquito vector species (543). 
AF319 is a clonal cell line derived from embryonic Ae. aegypti that has a defective RNA 
interference (RNAi) response resulting from an introduced homozygous Dicer 2 (Dcr2) 
mutation (544). Conversely, the Aag-2 Ae. aegypti cell line of embryonic origin is RNAi 
competent (545,546), whereas the origin and immunocompetence of AE cells is 
unknown. Despite the differences in RNAi competence, OROV replicated in all three cells 
lines, suggesting that OROV may be able to circumvent innate immunity pathways 







Figure 6.7 The ecological distribution of Ae. aegypti in Ecuador, based on household 
entomological surveys conducted by the Ecuadorian Ministerio de Salud Pública from 
2000-2012. Reproduced from Lippi et al. (2019) (543). 
 
Ae. albopictus, vector for CHIKV and DENV and a potential vector for a number of other 
arboviruses (547–549), was identified in Ecuador in 2017 for the first time in the highly 
populated city of Guayaquil on the Pacific coast (550). Its geographic distribution and 
contribution to arbovirus transmission across the country is unknown. C6/36 and U4.4 
cell lines are both sub-clones of an original culture derived from embryonic Ae. 




(554), whereas U4.4 cells have a fully functional RNAi response (555). Virus propagation 
in U4.4 cells usually results in much lower titres that those seen in C6/36 cells (556–558). 
Conversely, in this study higher levels of viral RNA and infectious OROV were observed 
in U4.4 cells compared to C6/36 cells, suggesting that OROV may be able to effectively 
circumvent Ae. albopictus innate immune defences to establish an infection. 
The OROV replication observed in Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus cell lines suggests that 
these mosquito species have the potential to become infected with OROV. Whether or 
not they are competent vectors, meaning virus is capable of escaping the midgut and 
reaching the salivary glands where it can be transmitted to another host, is poorly 
understood due to the paucity of available data. The present data suggests that in vivo 
vector competence studies in both mosquito species, using a contemporary OROV 
strain, would be highly informative.  
Cx. quinquefasciatus, a proposed secondary vector of OROV in urban epidemics and a 
known vector of flaviviruses West Nile virus and Saint Louis encephalitis virus (559–561), 
is prevalent in tropical and sub-tropical areas globally, including Ecuador (Figure 6.8) 
(562,563). OROV replication was not detected in the Cx. quinquefasciatus ovary-derived 
HSU cell line (564). This somewhat contradicts previous findings that Cx. 
quinquefasciatus mosquitoes can be infected in the laboratory (although this could 
result from differences between cell culture and the whole organism) (528), and is at 
odds with the isolation of OROV from Cx. quinquefasciatus mosquitoes collected in the 
field (180). However, the observation was based on a single experiment and further 






Figure 6.8 Distribution of Cx. quinquefasciatus based on 1402 occurrence records. 
Reproduced from Samy et al. (2016) (565). 
 
Anopheles spp. mosquitoes are major vectors of Plasmodium falciparum and the 
primary species responsible for malaria transmission in South America is Anopheles 
darlingi (566,567). Anopheles spp. have been detected throughout Ecuador, although 
not at high altitudes (568). Anopheles spp. are vectors of O’nyong nyong virus (569) and 
a number of other pathogenic human viruses have been detected in them (570–572), 
including those belonging to the Orthobunyavirus genus (573,574). This study used 
Anopheles gambiae-derived (Sua4a-2) cells (575), though no evidence of OROV 
replication was observed.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no cell lines from C. paraensis have been 
established. Cell lines from related species C. variipennis and C. v. sonorensis, the vectors 
of bluetongue virus, are available and the present study used the C. v. sonorensis-
derived KC cell line (576) to investigate OROV replication. The lack of replication seen 
may reflect the differences between Culicoides species, and further studies in C. 




species. In agreement with previous studies (185,387–389), OROV replication was 
observed in mammalian cell lines Vero and BHK-21. 
 
6.3.2  OROV REPLICATES IN PRIMARY HUMAN FIBROBLASTS AND A HUMAN HEPATOCYTE 
CELL LINE 
It was hypothesised that fibroblasts and keratinocytes from human skin would support 
OROV replication. The skin is the primary site of infection following a bite from an 
infected vector, and presumably leads to OROV entering the blood stream and 
subsequent viraemia, but little is known about OROV replication in this site. Studies of 
other arboviruses with similar transmission routes showed that ZIKV replicates in human 
skin fibroblasts (577), and ZIKV and DENV-2 replicate in human keratinocytes (282). The 
present experiments showed that OROV replicates in normal, non-transformed adult 
primary human skin fibroblasts (1BR3 cells), corroborating the observation made by 
Varela et al. (391) and supporting the hypothesis that this cell type could be an initial 
replication site for OROV. Conversely, no replication was observed in two human 
primary epidermal keratinocyte cell types (HEKn and HPEKp cells). 
OROV is hepatotropic in small animal models (182,189,393), but little is known about 
liver involvement in human disease, mainly because fatalities from OROV have not been 
recorded therefore there has been no opportunity to study this. Symptoms consistent 
with liver disease are not commonly reported in OROV patients, though a recent case 
study described hepatic manifestations including altered liver enzymes, secondary to 
OROV-associated aseptic meningoencephalitis (184). Furthermore, OROV replicates in 
the human hepatocarcinoma cell line HuH-7 (390). In this study, high levels of OROV 




viral titre observed in any of the human cell lines tested, suggesting that human 
hepatocytes could be a site of OROV replication. It would be informative to repeat this 
experiment using primary human hepatocytes, which are more representative of normal 
human hepatocytes. 
Contrary to previous observations that OROV was present in peripheral blood 
leukocytes from OROV-infected patients and can replicate in macrophage-like cells 
(390,536), no increase in OROV RNA nor infectious virus was detected from PBMCs 
isolated from seven healthy volunteers and infected with OROV. De Souza Luna et al. 
detected OROV RNA (using qRT-PCR) and OROV antigen (using indirect 
immunofluorescence, Figure 6.9) from buffy coats isolated from patient blood samples, 
but it was not determined exactly which cell types OROV antigen was observed in (536). 
The disparity between the present observation and that of de Souza Luna et al. could be 
explained by the difference in sample type. PBMCs (used in this study) are a mixed 
population of mononuclear cells comprising lymphocytes (T cells, B cells, NK cells) and 
monocytes. Peripheral blood leukocytes (used in the de Souza Luna et al. study) contain 
mononuclear cells in addition to granulocytes (neutrophils, basophils, and eosinophils) 
that have multi-lobed nuclei. If OROV antigen in the patients resided in granulocytes but 
not mononuclear cells, this could explain the different observations. Alternatively, a 
modest amount of OROV replication in PBMCs could have occurred undetected in the 
present experiment. It was not possible to remove OROV following inoculation without 
compromising the viability of the PBMCs, therefore substantial viral RNA and infectious 
virus was present from inoculation. If OROV replicated in a minor population of PBMCs, 




Performing indirect immunofluorescence or flow cytometric analysis on OROV-infected 
PBMCs would help to clarify this further. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 Indirect immunofluorescence for OROV performed on buffy coat smears. A) 
negative control, B) OROV-positive patient. Green = OROV antigen, red = cell nuclei. 
Modified from de Souza Luna et al. (2016) (536). 
 
Previous studies of OROV replication kinetics in HeLa cells revealed that intracellular 
viral titres at 6 hpi were low, following which they rapidly increased, peaking at 24 hpi 
(388). In this study a similar pattern was observed in primary human fibroblasts, albeit 
through measuring intracellular OROV RNA. The low amount of viral RNA measured at 
0-6 hpi probably reflected the virus eclipse phase, followed by substantial genome 
replication by 12 hpi. Interestingly, this eclipse phase is not observed in OROV-infected 
hepatocytes, suggesting that this happens earlier than 6 hpi, pointing to a faster 
replication cycle than that seen in other cell types. 
Our experiments have some advantages over those performed previously. The virus 




undergone minimal passages in cell culture. Most previous studies have used the OROV 
prototype strain BeAn19991 (Brazil 1960) (187,388–390,578), or recombinant viruses 
(185), which have limited relevance to current circulating strains. Where possible, 
primary cells were used that have biological relevance to the OROV mode of 
transmission, rather than transformed cell lines or less relevant cell types. Lack of OROV 
replication in the cell types tested in these studies does not rule out a role in OROV 
infection because the number of experiments and methods performed was limited. 
Rather, positive results demonstrate a potential role in the OROV life cycle that warrants 




6.3.3  LIMITATIONS 
In vitro virus studies provide useful information under conditions in which is it relatively 
easy to control and manipulate variables. However, they do not represent a natural 
infection, in which there is far more complex interplay between virus, multiple cell types 
and tissues, and most importantly the host immune system. Results from the present in 
vitro studies of OROV replication should be viewed in this context and used to inform 
further studies. 
 
6.3.4  FUTURE WORK 
The experiments described in this chapter provide preliminary data on which further 




transmission, and the role of various human cell types in OROV infection and 
pathogenesis.  
This study demonstrated that OROV replicates in cells from Ae. aegypti and Ae. 
albopictus, two important mosquito species that are known vectors of arboviral diseases 
and are widespread globally. The competence of these species in transmitting OROV is 
currently unknown, but the impact of OROV transmission by Aedes spp. on public health 
is likely to be significant. Based on this data, it is recommended that OROV vector 
competence studies in Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus are undertaken. 
The dynamics of OROV in Ecuador are not understood. To better understand if and how 
OROV transmission is occurring in Esmeraldas and in Ecuador as a whole, active 
surveillance studies sampling insects from targeted areas should be undertaken. 
Screening captured insects for OROV RNA using the qRT-PCR assay developed in this 
project may identify insect species relevant to OROV transmission in Ecuador, leading to 
improved understanding of the risk factors associated with disease and how to control 
them to reduce the risk to public health. 
This study showed that OROV is capable of replicating in primary human fibroblasts and 
a human hepatoma cell line, suggesting that these cell types that may be relevant to the 
course of infection in humans. Further studies to understand infection at the site of virus 
inoculation, the skin, would be informative for understanding how OROV interacts with 
the human innate immune system in order to escape the tissues and disseminate via the 
bloodstream. It is essential to study the mechanisms by which OROV infects humans and 





CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
7.1  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
The major aims of this thesis were to: 1) establish whether pathogenic viruses were 
present in two cohorts of febrile patients from low- and middle-income countries, 2) 
characterise the viruses identified and 3) perform subsequent research to further 
knowledge relevant to emerging infectious disease. The third aim was dependant on 
virus identification results, which shaped the focus of the project as it progressed. The 
anticipated outcomes of the project were: 1) support for existing in-country laboratories 
by identifying circulating viruses and recommending additional assays to include in 
surveillance and diagnostic testing, 2) protection of UK public health from imported 
infectious diseases by identifying pathogens that may be a risk to those returning from 
endemic countries, and 3) enhancement of future surveillance efforts and collaborative 
research programmes by banking propagated, clinically significant viruses with national 
curated virus collections.  
 
7.1.1  DISCOVERY OF OROV IN ECUADOR AND DEVELOPMENT OF DETECTION ASSAYS  
The major outcome of this project has been the detection, isolation and sequencing of 
Oropouche virus for the first time in febrile patients from Ecuador. OROV was initially 
detected in a single patient who had remained in Esmeraldas province for more than 3 
months and had a blood sample taken following seven days of fever and other 
symptoms. The clinical picture fitted that caused by multiple pathogens circulating in 
Ecuador, including DENV, ZIKV, and Plasmodium. Testing for DENV, CHIKV and ZIKV in-
country yielded negative results, as did retrospective RT-PCR testing for a more 




of the OROV genome. Virus isolation confirmed the presence of infectious virus in the 
patient sample, and subsequent sequencing from the culture supernatant resulted in 
the first complete OROV genome sequence from Ecuador (380). An established OROV 
qRT-PCR assay (361), however, did not detect viral RNA in the patient sample. The 
availability of OROV genome sequence from the metagenomic sequencing data was 
crucial in identifying primer mismatches between the Ecuadorian OROV sequence and 
the assay reverse primer. The subsequent development of a modified qRT-PCR with high 
sensitivity for both Ecuadorian and prototype OROV strains demonstrated the utility of 
NGS data for the adaptation of detection assays. This modified assay was used to test 
the entire Ecuadorian patient cohort (n=196), detecting a total of six OROV-positive 
patients. Infectious virus was isolated from all positive patient plasma samples and 
subsequent sequencing generated complete genomes from all isolates. In addition to 
the OROV qRT-PCR, a multiplex tiling PCR primer scheme was developed that was 
capable of amplifying complete genome sequences from Ecuadorian and prototype 
OROV strains. This tool could be used to amplify and sequence OROV genomes from 
clinical samples containing low amounts of OROV RNA, providing important genomic 
information in OROV endemic countries.  
The detection of large proportions of the OROV genome from samples with relatively 
high qRT-PCR Cq values (>30) shows that the metagenomic sequencing protocol used in 
this project has very good sensitivity for RNA viruses. A key difference from some 
previous protocols is the use of a SISPA primer with nine random nucleotides (9N) as 
opposed to six. A previous comparison of 6N and 12N SISPA primers for viral RNA 
sequencing demonstrated reduced bias and higher median sequence depth using the 




sequences such as OROV, and future optimisation of the length of random sequence 
used could further improve viral detection. 
The Ecuadorian OROV sequences were included in phylogenetic analyses of OROV 
genomic sequences in the wider context of South America (363). The Ecuadorian 
genomes clustered together in a monophyletic group and timescale analyses showed a 
most recent common ancestor that existed between 2008-2016 (363). This suggests that 
not all Ecuadorian OROV-positive patients were infected from the same source, but by 
different strains, making it likely that the virus has been circulating undetected in 
Ecuador for some time. This hypothesis fits with previous detections of anti-OROV 
antibodies in patients that are geographically and temporally distant from Esmeraldas 
(479,480), suggesting that there is unsampled OROV diversity within Ecuador. 
Entomological collections performed in Ecuador since 2009 have not identified the 
OROV urban vector C. paraensis in Esmeraldas, which is only present in the South and 
Amazon areas of the country. These observations led to the hypothesis that OROV 
transmission occurred in Esmeraldas during 2016, via an unknown insect vector. 
 
7.1.2  ENHANCED KNOWLEDGE OF OROV PATHOGENESIS AND POTENTIAL VECTORS 
Experimental work demonstrated that OROV can replicate in RNAi competent cell lines 
from Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus; both important mosquito vectors of other 
arboviruses (473,541,542,547–549) that have not been thoroughly investigated as 
vectors of OROV. Previously OROV has been isolated from the sylvatic mosquito Aedes 
(Ochlerotatus) serratus in Brazil (28). These preliminary findings warrant further 




competence studies would be highly informative. Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus are 
globally distributed, thrive in urban environments and are anthropophilic (580), making 
them highly effective vectors. If they are capable of transmitting OROV, establishment 
of the virus in a human-Aedes spp. transmission cycle could have extremely serious 
consequences for the spread of OROV globally.  
Knowledge of OROV pathogenesis in humans is limited compared to other arboviruses. 
The hypothesis that OROV replicates in certain human cell types, identified based on the 
route of transmission, previous observations of pathogenesis and the clinical 
presentation of OROV infection, was tested. Experiments demonstrated (see Chapter 6) 
that OROV replicates in primary human fibroblasts, suggesting that this could be a key 
cell type for OROV replication early during infection, following inoculation into the skin 
via an insect vector. No evidence of replication in primary human epidermal 
keratinocytes, or PBMCs, was seen, however as discussed in chapter 6, further 
experiments are required to rule out these cell types as sites of replication. High titres 
of OROV were measured in a human hepatoma cell line, fitting with observations from 
animal models (182,393). Hamsters inoculated subcutaneously with OROV showed 
clinical signs including high temperature, lethargy and shivering, as well as 
histopathological evidence of meningoencephalitis and liver abnormalities, with OROV 
antigen and virions detected in cells from both organs (393). Further studies to 
investigate the role of fibroblasts and hepatocytes in OROV pathogenesis and immune 
response would enhance understanding of this emerging virus and help inform effective 





7.1.3  RETROSPECTIVE TESTING IDENTIFIES EBOV IN FEBRILE SIERRA LEONEAN PATIENTS 
THAT TESTED NEGATIVE IN-COUNTRY 
Febrile EBOV-negative Sierra Leonean patients that had a blood sample taken at an 
Ebola treatment centre were tested using RT-PCR/PCR assays and metagenomic 
sequencing, to identify pathogenic viruses co-circulating at the time of the West African 
Ebola virus outbreak in 2014-2015. Despite these patients testing negative for EBOV at 
the time of sampling, 8/120 tested positive and a further 10 tested inconclusive upon 
retrospective qRT-PCR testing. Metagenomic sequencing was performed on 
representative EBOV-positive samples which yielded almost 60% of the EBOV genome 
from one sample. Following further investigation, it was hypothesised that the low level 
of EBOV RNA in these samples was not detected in-country because a less sensitive qRT-
PCR assay (Altona) was used in the field laboratories at the end of 2014. Sensitivity issues 
were identified in this assay (431), prompting a timely transition to a more sensitive 
assay (Trombley) in January 2015. Seven of the eight retrospective EBOV-positive 
samples were tested prior to January 2015 in-country and all had high Cq values (>30). 
This highlights the challenges and importance of assay selection and implementation in 
outbreak scenarios, and the requirement for ongoing assessment of assay performance. 
Aside from EBOV, RT-PCR/PCR tests identified Plasmodium and Leptospira, but no other 
viral infections.  
 
7.1.4  IDENTIFICATION OF VIRUSES IN PCR-NEGATIVE FEBRILE PATIENTS USING 
METAGENOMIC SEQUENCING PROVIDES PROOF OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE APPROACH 
Metagenomic sequencing of 17 RT-PCR/PCR-negative febrile Ecuadorian patient 




Additionally, human pegivirus GB virus type C was identified in 2/6 febrile patients 
sampled in Esmeraldas in 2017. Metagenomic sequencing of 30 RT-PCR/PCR-negative 
febrile Sierra Leonean patient samples using the same approach identified Hepatitis B 
virus, human immunodeficiency virus type 1 and GBV-C in one, five and seven patients, 
respectively. Furthermore, one patient showed a co-infection of HBV and HIV, 





7.2  TOWARDS PREVENTING AND CONTROLLING EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
Over recent decades an increase in the number of EID events has been recorded, even 
when controlling for increased reporting (5). The detection and isolation of OROV in 
patient samples from Ecuador demonstrates the ongoing emergence of EIDs into areas 
in which they have not previously been detected or the evidence for their existence is 
limited. Because of the relatively mild, self-limiting nature of Oropouche fever, it is 
reasonable to surmise that, following multiple negative test results, treatment of the 
OROV-positive patients in Esmeraldas would have been symptomatic (treating the 
symptoms rather than the cause of infection) and no further investigations would have 
been performed. It is in this way that infectious diseases can spread ‘silently’, 
undetected in areas where other endemic pathogens cause similar clinical spectrums of 
disease.  
Understanding factors that drive the emergence and re-emergence of infectious disease 
is key to preventing and controlling EID events. An essential part of this is implementing 
effective surveillance systems in relevant countries. The identification of OROV in 
Ecuador and the development of effective molecular detection assays is the first-step 
towards understanding the dynamics of the virus in this country and neighbouring areas, 
and these tools could be integrated into testing protocols in hospitals and healthcare 
centres. Assay implementation and capacity building has begun through an ongoing 
collaboration with USFQ, involving training visits both in Ecuador and the UK, through 
which expertise in qRT-PCR and metagenomic sequencing was exchanged. In this way 
this project has fulfilled the anticipated outcome of supporting existing in-country 
laboratories by identifying a circulating virus and providing additional assays to include 




PHE Rare and Imported Pathogens Laboratory, assisting diagnosis in returning UK 
travellers with febrile illness. This fulfils another anticipated outcome; to protect UK 
public health from imported infectious diseases by identifying pathogens that may be a 
risk to those returning from endemic countries. 
Early detection of an EID event can help prevent further spread by controlling the 
outbreak at an earlier stage, when it is more manageable. Effective surveillance requires 
assays that are sensitive for currently circulating virus species and strains, which can be 
challenging in the case of RNA viruses that have a high rate of mutation. Taking 
advantage of newer technologies such as NGS could help detect EID events earlier. At 
present there are challenges associated with implementing a metagenomic sequencing 
approach as a frontline assay in a diagnostic setting, not least of which is the expense 
associated with the required technology and reagents, which can preclude its use in low- 
and middle-income countries. In addition, careful validation work must be performed, 
defining sensitivity and specificity, setting cut-off values and identifying robust negative 
and internal controls. Furthermore, ethical implications regarding human genome 
sequences need careful consideration. Although good progress is being made towards 
this goal, exemplified by the validated clinical metagenomic sequencing assay for 
pathogen detection from clinical CSF samples (334), at present the application is some-
way off being ready for frontline use in many countries that experience EID occurrence. 
That being said, at the present time metagenomic sequencing could be used in 
prospective screening studies to help ensure that diagnostic assays are relevant and 
capable of detecting current strains, a problem highlighted in this project by the inability 
of an established OROV qRT-PCR to detect the Ecuadorian strain of OROV, and the 




In this way, potential issues with current RT-PCR/PCR-based assays would be identified, 
allowing assay adaptation to ensure relevance to current circulating strains. This 
approach would require less stringent validation than frontline diagnostic use, and 
fewer sequencing tests would be required, reducing costs. This kind of screening could 
be performed using a portable sequencing device such as the ONT MinION, the initial 
set-up costs of which are substantially less expensive when compared to benchtop 
sequencing platforms such as Illumina. 
Surveillance for OROV in relevant vector species could help define high risk areas for 
virus transmission and guide public health advice. The identification of OROV insect 
vectors in Ecuador, through collection and qRT-PCR testing, would help define OROV 
transmission dynamics in the country. A project recently funded by the National 
Institutes of Health and carried out at USFQ will investigate the prevalence of 
arboviruses in Ecuador over the next four years. This will include molecular testing of 
cohorts of arthropod species and febrile patients using the OROV qRT-PCR optimised 
during this project. Evidence of OROV replication in Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus cell 
lines suggests that collecting and testing these species for the presence of OROV, in 
addition to the established vector C. paraensis and proposed vector Culex 
quinquefasciatus, would be a good initial strategy for vector identification in Ecuador.  
Effective treatments and vaccines help combat outbreaks of EID once they have been 
established. To develop these, basic research into virus pathogenesis and virus-host 
interactions is essential. Compared to some viral EIDs, OROV is mild in terms of the 
disease it causes in humans, however, the importance of understanding its pathogenesis 
should not be underestimated. Previously, other apparently mild or non-lethal 




discovered link between ZIKV, Guillain-Barré syndrome and microcephaly (276–278), 
which was only uncovered following thousands of cases of infection. Furthermore, 
genome mutations can lead to changes in transmissibility, for example, mutations in the 
CHIKV envelope glycoproteins improved virus fitness in Ae. albopictus, resulting in 
widespread transmission and morbidity (56–58). Previous studies of OROV pathogenesis 
have mostly been undertaken using laboratory adapted virus strains and cell lines. This 
study used a contemporary Ecuadorian OROV strain that was isolated from a febrile 
patient, underwent minimal passages in vitro and therefore is more representative of 
strains circulating in nature. Furthermore, primary human cells were used to investigate 
virus tropism, identifying skin fibroblasts and a hepatocyte cell line as supportive of 
OROV replication. Further studies of the mechanisms that OROV uses to effectively 
enter, replicate, and evade immune responses in these cells could provide targets for 
future therapies.  
As a result of the research activities carried out during this project, clinically significant 
virus isolates have been banked with the National Collection of Pathogenic Viruses, and 
genome sequences were made available online via the GenBank database (as described 
in chapters 4 and 5). This fulfils the anticipated outcome of enhancing future surveillance 
efforts and collaborative research programmes by banking propagated, clinically 




7.3  SUMMARY 
This project has made a novel contribution to the understanding of emerging infectious 
disease by providing conclusive evidence that OROV, a clinically important emerging 
arbovirus, is present in Ecuador, where (based on antibody evidence) it was suspected 
but not previously known to circulate. Furthermore, two molecular assays for the 
detection and characterisation of OROV have been developed and published, which can 
be adopted in relevant countries to enhance OROV surveillance and diagnosis. Novel 
suggestions for potential OROV insect vectors have arisen from experimental work, and 
human cell types with relevance to natural infection were identified. Through an 
ongoing collaboration with USFQ, the capacity for EID detection and surveillance has 
been improved in Ecuador through training delivery, including training in metagenomic 
sequencing. This project has demonstrated the utility of the metagenomic approach in 
detecting an emerging virus in a new area, as well as detecting established viral 
infections in febrile Sierra Leonean patients. I hope that this modest step forward in 
knowledge will provide a base for future research into OROV that may prevent the 
spread of the virus into new areas and lead to better control and reduced burden of 





















SL-001 PL005748 Port Loko 03/04/2015 Blood Kambia nd Negative Negative 65 Follow-up 
SL-002 PL005749 Port Loko 03/04/2015 Blood Kambia nd Negative Negative 32 Follow-up 
SL-003 PL005734 Port Loko 02/04/2015 Blood Kambia Masungbala Negative Positive 20 Original 
SL-004 PL005667 Port Loko 01/04/2015 Blood Kambia nd Negative Negative 24 Follow-up 
SL-005 PL005733 Port Loko 02/04/2015 Blood Kambia Masungbala Negative Positive 20 Original 
SL-006 PL005750 Port Loko 03/04/2015 Blood Port Loko Maforki Negative Negative 35 Follow-up 
SL-007 PL005952 Port Loko 08/04/2015 Blood Kambia Tonko Limba Negative Negative 50 Original 
SL-008 PL06005 Port Loko 10/04/2015 Blood Port Loko Marampa Negative Negative 37 Follow-up 




SL-010 PL001383 Port Loko 04/01/2015 Blood Port Loko Marampa Negative Negative 16 Original 
SL-011 PL000236 Port Loko 13/12/2014 Blood Port Loko Dibia Negative Negative 65 Original 
SL-012 PL000298 Port Loko 13/12/2014 Blood Port Loko Lokomasama Negative Negative 35 Original 
SL-013 PL000317 Port Loko 13/12/2014 Blood Port Loko Kaffu Bullom Negative Negative 28 Original 
SL-014 PL000320 Port Loko 13/12/2014 Blood Port Loko Lokomasama Negative Negative 17 Original 
SL-015 PL000055 Port Loko 07/12/2014 Blood Port Loko Kaffu Bullom Negative n/a 21 Original 
SL-016 PL000076 Port Loko 08/12/2014 Blood Kambia Magbema Negative n/a 3 Original 
SL-017 PL005543 Port Loko 29/03/2015 Blood Kambia Magbema Negative Negative 28 Original 
SL-018 PL005466 Port Loko 28/03/2015 Blood Kambia Samu Negative Negative 15 Original 
SL-019 PL005454 Port Loko 27/03/2015 Blood Port Loko nd Negative Negative 60 Original 
SL-020 PL005453 Port Loko 27/03/2015 Blood Port Loko Maforki Negative Negative 25 Original 
SL-021 PL005468 Port Loko 28/03/2015 Blood Port Loko Maforki Negative Negative 40 Original 
SL-022 PL005471 Port Loko 28/03/2015 Blood Port Loko Lokomasam Negative Negative 45 Original 




SL-024 PL005532 Port Loko 29/03/2015 Blood Port Loko Tms Negative Negative 38 Original 
SL-025 PL005595 Port Loko 30/03/2015 Blood Port Loko Marampa Negative Negative 25 Follow-up 
SL-026 PL001205 Port Loko 02/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Positive 59 Original 
SL-027 PL001204 Port Loko 02/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Positive 60 Original 
SL-028 PL001202 Port Loko 02/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Positive nd Original 
SL-029 PL004836 Port Loko 15/03/2015 Blood Kambia Magbema Negative Negative 75 Original 
SL-030 PL004871 Port Loko 16/03/2015 Blood Kambia Magbema Negative Negative 40 Original 
SL-031 PL004868 Port Loko 16/03/2015 Blood Kambia Magbema Negative Negative 4 Original 
SL-032 PL004916 Port Loko 17/03/2015 Blood Kambia nd Negative Positive 29 Follow-up 
SL-033 PL004853 Port Loko 16/03/2015 Blood Port Loko Maforki Negative Negative 38 Follow-up 
SL-034 PL004840 Port Loko 16/03/2015 Blood Port Loko Kaffu Bullom Negative Negative 72 Follow-up 
SL-035 PL004901 Port Loko 17/03/2015 Blood Kambia Magbema Negative Positive 28 Original 
SL-036 PL004914 Port Loko 17/03/2015 Blood Kambia Tonko Limba Negative Negative 48 Original 




SL-038 PL004962 Port Loko 19/03/2015 Blood Kambia Gbinle-Dixing Negative Negative 45 Original 
SL-039 PL004961 Port Loko 19/03/2015 Blood Kambia Masungbala Negative Negative 19 Original 
SL-040 PL000867 Port Loko 25/12/2014 Blood Port Loko Maforki Negative n/a 35 Follow-up 
SL-041 KT004988 Kerry Town 13/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 20 Original 
SL-042 KT004945 Kerry Town 12/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 25 Original 
SL-043 KT001763 Kerry Town 26/11/2014 Blood WA nd Negative n/a 56 Original 
SL-044 KT001760 Kerry Town 26/11/2014 Blood WA nd Negative n/a 19 Original 
SL-045 KT003310 Kerry Town 26/12/2014 Blood nd K/ARD 346 Negative Negative 63 Original 
SL-046 KT003381 Kerry Town 26/12/2014 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Negative 50 Original 
SL-047 KT003702 Kerry Town 01/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Negative nd Original 
SL-048 KT003745 Kerry Town 02/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Rur 
nd Negative Negative 45 Original 
SL-049 KT003771 Kerry Town 03/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Rur 




SL-050 KT003774 Kerry Town 03/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Negative 18 Original 
SL-051 KT003749 Kerry Town 03/01/2015 Blood nd 369 Negative n/a 25 Original 
SL-052 KT003114 Kerry Town 22/12/2014 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Negative 24 Original 
SL-053 KT003118 Kerry Town 22/12/2014 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Negative 36 Original 
SL-054 KT005148 Kerry Town 19/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative n/a 40 Follow-up 
SL-055 KT005189 Kerry Town 20/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 23 Original 
SL-056 KT005165 Kerry Town 19/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 24 Original 






Negative Positive 25 Original 
SL-058 KT005228 Kerry Town 21/02/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
Urban Negative Negative 70 Original 
SL-059 KT005231 Kerry Town 21/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Positive 47 Original 
SL-060 KT005244 Kerry Town 22/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 73 Original 




SL-062 KT005732 Kerry Town 06/03/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Rur 
nd Negative Negative 46 Original 
SL-063 KT003555 Kerry Town 29/12/2014 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative n/a 16 Original 
SL-064 KT003592 Kerry Town 29/12/2014 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative n/a 35 Original 
SL-065 KT003593 Kerry Town 30/12/2014 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Negative 52 Original 
SL-066 KT003635 Kerry Town 01/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative n/a 53 Original 
SL-067 KT003645 Kerry Town 31/12/2014 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative n/a 29 Original 




nd Negative Positive 8 Original 
SL-069 KT004048 Kerry Town 12/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
Freetown Negative Negative 4 Original 
SL-070 KT004019 Kerry Town 11/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Negative 38 Original 
SL-071 KT003877 Kerry Town 06/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Rur 









nd Negative n/a 3 Original 
SL-073 KT003899 Kerry Town 07/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative n/a 40 Original 
SL-074 KT004305 Kerry Town 20/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Negative 32 Original 
SL-075 KT004308 Kerry Town 20/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Positive 19 Repeat 
SL-076 KT004310 Kerry Town 20/01/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative Positive 16 Original 
SL-077 KT006024 Kerry Town 19/03/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative n/a 48 Follow-up 
SL-078 KT006068 Kerry Town 21/03/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Rur 
nd Negative Negative 42 Original 
SL-079 KT006071 Kerry Town 21/03/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Urb 
nd Negative n/a 15 Follow-up 
SL-080 KT005287 Kerry Town 23/02/2015 Blood 
Western 
Area Rur 
Waterloo Negative Negative 25 Original 




SL-082 MK000730 Makeni 01/01/2015 Blood Bombali 
Gbanti 
Kamaranka 
Negative Negative 21 Original 
SL-083 MK000712 Makeni 31/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Bombali 
Sebora 
Negative Negative 30 Original 
SL-084 MK000722 Makeni 01/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 75 Follow-up 
SL-085 MK000659 Makeni 30/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Paki 
Masabong 
Negative Negative 31 Original 
SL-086 MK000717 Makeni 31/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Makari 
Gbanti 
Negative Negative 25 Original 
SL-087 MK000683 Makeni 31/12/2014 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 60 Original 
SL-088 MK000724 Makeni 01/01/2015 Blood Port Loko Kaffu Bullom Negative Negative 29 Original 
SL-089 MK000720 Makeni 01/01/2015 Blood Port Loko Kaffu Bullom Negative Negative 8 Original 
SL-090 MK000721 Makeni 01/01/2015 Blood Port Loko Koya Negative Negative 30 Original 
SL-091 MK000176 Makeni 15/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Makari 
Gbanti 
Negative Negative 17 Original 
SL-092 MK000169 Makeni 15/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Bombali 
Sebora 




SL-093 MK000173 Makeni 15/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Bombali 
Sebora 
Negative Negative 17 Original 
SL-094 MK000164 Makeni 15/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Makari 
Gbanti 
Negative Negative 9 Original 
SL-095 MK000174 Makeni 15/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Makari 
Gbanti 
Negative Negative 44 Original 
SL-096 MK000227 Makeni 16/12/2014 Blood Bombali 
Bombali 
Sebora 
Negative Negative 17 Original 
SL-097 MK000225 Makeni 16/12/2014 Blood Bombali Sanda Loko Negative Negative 38 Original 
SL-098 MK001870 Makeni 08/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 70 Original 
SL-099 MK001844 Makeni 07/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 18 Original 
SL-100 MK001879 Makeni 08/02/2015 Blood Bombali 
Paki 
Masabong 
Negative Negative 9 Original 
SL-101 MK000863 Makeni 05/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 23 Follow-up 
SL-102 MK000862 Makeni 05/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 65 Follow-up 
SL-103 MK000992 Makeni 10/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 30 Original 
SL-104 MK000999 Makeni 10/01/2015 Blood Bombali 
Bombali 
Sebora 




SL-105 MK000968 Makeni 09/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative Negative 56 Follow-up 
SL-106 MK002142 Makeni 17/02/2015 Blood Bombali 
Paki 
Masabong 
Negative Positive 7 Original 
SL-107 MK002052 Makeni 15/02/2015 Blood nd nd Negative n/a 20 Follow-up 
SL-108 MK002064 Makeni 14/02/2015 Blood Bombali 
Paki 
Masabong 
Negative Positive 60 Original 
SL-109 MK002137 Makeni 17/02/2015 Blood Bombali 
Gbanti-
Kamarank 
Negative Negative 13 Original 
SL-110 MK001420 Makeni 24/01/2015 Blood Bombali 
Bombali 
Sebora 
Negative Negative 39 Original 
SL-111 MK001124 Makeni 14/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative n/a 43 Follow-up 
SL-112 MK001125 Makeni 14/01/2015 Blood nd nd Negative n/a 15 Follow-up 
SL-113 MK001152 Makeni 15/01/2015 Blood Bombali 
Bombali 
Sebora 
Negative Negative 50 Original 
SL-114 MK003121 Makeni 16/03/2015 Blood Port Loko Koya Negative n/a 52 Follow-up 
SL-115 MK005603 Makeni 24/05/2015 Blood Bombali 
Bombali 
Sebora 
Negative Negative 32 Follow-up 




SL-117 MK005609 Makeni 23/05/2015 Blood Tonkolili Yoni Negative Negative 20 Original 
SL-118 MK005610 Makeni 24/05/2015 Blood Tonkolili 
Gbonkolenke
n 
Negative Negative 1 Original 
SL-119 MK005431 Makeni 20/05/2015 Blood Tonkolili 
Gbonkolenke
n 
Negative Positive 5 months Original 
SL-120 MK005432 Makeni 20/05/2015 Blood Tonkolili 
Gbonkolenke
n 




APPENDIX 2: ECUADORIAN PLASMA SAMPLE METADATA, 2016 
Sex: M = male, F = female. Blank cells represent data that was not available.  
Sample ID Location Date Sex Age Fever 
Days of    
fever 










02/03/2016 F 3 Yes 3 Yes No No No No Cq 
D-002 las palmas 02/03/2016 M 62 Yes 4 Yes Yes No No No Cq 
D-003     Yes      No Cq 
D-004 Catalago 10/02/2016 F 8 Yes  Yes No No No No Cq 
D-005  22/01/2016 M 36 Yes  Yes Yes Yes No No Cq 
D-006 Atacames 26/01/2016 M 29 Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-007  12/02/2016 M 36 Yes  Yes Yes Yes No No Cq 
D-008 CS#2 26/01/2016 F 77 Yes  Yes No No No No Cq 
D-009  01/03/2016 M  Yes      No Cq 




D-011  29/02/2016 M  Yes  Yes Yes No No No Cq 
D-012  03/03/2016 M 14 Yes 6 No No No No No Cq 
D-013 Manabí 03/03/2016 M 17 Yes 5 No No No No No Cq 




03/03/2016 M 9 Yes 6 Yes No No No No Cq 
D-016 CS#2 03/03/2016 M 40 Yes 7 No No No No No Cq 
D-017 Es 03/03/2016 M 14 Yes 3 No No No No No Cq 
D-018 CS#2 20/02/2016 M 8 Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes No No Cq 
D-019 CS#2 20/02/2016 M 11 months Yes 8 Yes Yes Yes No No Cq 
D-020 CS Santa 02/03/2016 F 48 Yes  Yes Yes Yes No No Cq 
D-021 Eg 08/03/2016 F 46 Yes      No Cq 
D-022 Eg 15/03/2016 F 66 Yes 7 Yes    No Cq 
D-023 CS#1 25/02/2016 M 54 Yes  Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 




D-026 C.Ext 17/03/2016 F 25 Yes  Yes    No Cq 
D-027 Eg 19/03/2016 M 29 Yes 8 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-028 IESS 21/03/2016 F 2 Yes 7 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-029 Eg 28/03/2016 M 54 Yes 7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-030 C.ext 29/03/2016 M 45 Yes 3 Yes    No Cq 
D-031 CS1 31/03/2016 F 20 Yes 7 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-032 & 31/03/2016 F 44 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-033 Cattelago 31/03/2016 F 16 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-034 C.ext 31/03/2016 M 32 Yes 7 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-035 C.ext 01/04/2016 M 64 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-036 C.Ext 01/04/2016 M 48 Yes 8 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-037 C.ext 01/04/2016 M 23 Yes  Yes    No Cq 
D-038 CS1 01/04/2016 F 34 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 




D-040 C. ext 04/04/2016 F 50 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-041 C.ext 04/04/2016 F 32 Yes 32     No Cq 




05/04/2016 M 47 Yes 7     No Cq 
D-044 C.ext CS 2 05/04/2016 F 22 Yes 8 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-045 CS 1 05/04/2016 F 21 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-047 C.ext  F 63 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-048 Hospital  F 28 Yes 7 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-049 CS1 07/04/2016 F 9 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-050 Cottolego  F 72 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-051 Santa Vans 08/04/2016 F 68 Yes 6 Yes Yes   31.14 
D-052 CS1 08/04/2016 M 21 Yes 5 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-053 Cottolego  M 24 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 




D-055 RV  F 48 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-057  13/04/2016 M 35 Yes 3 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-058 C.ext 11/04/2016 M 2 Yes 7 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-059 C.ext 11/04/2016 M    Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-060 C.ext 11/04/2016 M 66 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes Yes 25.21 
D-061 C.ext 12/04/2016 M 45       No Cq 
D-062 C.ext 12/04/2016 M 27  2 Yes Yes   24.17 
D-064 Cottolego 12/04/2016 F 23 Yes 5 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-065 Cottolego  F 21 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-066 C.ext 13/04/2016 F 43 Yes 7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-067 C.ext  F 35 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-068 IESS  F 34 Yes 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 








D-071 Eg 14/04/2016 F 21 Yes 7 Yes Yes Yes  34.74 




 F 32 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-074 C.ext  F 14 Yes 7 Yes Yes Yes  No Cq 
D-075 Eg  M 19 Yes 5 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-076 CS1 15/04/2016 M 50 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-077 HTDC  F 46 Yes 3 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-078 HDTC  M 35 Yes 7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-079 HDTC  F 57 Yes 6 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-080 HDTC  F 44 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-081 Almendros  M 10 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-082 Almendros  M 7 Yes 7 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-083 Almendros  F 32 Yes 5 Yes Yes   No Cq 




D-085 HosNAE 16/04/2016 F 13 Yes 6 Yes    No Cq 
D-086 C.ext 19/04/2016 M 18 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-087 ISPOL  M 41 Yes 7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Cq 
D-088 CS1  M 52 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-090 C.ext  F 37 Yes 6 Yes Yes   No Cq 
D-091 CS2 21/04/2016 F 37 Yes 4 Yes    No Cq 
D-092 Cs2  F 10 Yes 5     No Cq 
D-093 CS2  F 54 Yes 6     34.79 
D-094 Hospital  M 57 Yes  Yes    No Cq 
D-095 C.ext 22/04/2016 F 23 Yes 5     No Cq 
D-096 CS2 22/04/2016 F 56 Yes 6     No Cq 
D-097 San Pablo  F 22 Yes 5     No Cq 
D-098 Arenal  F 20 Yes 6     No Cq 




D-100 San Pablo  F 25 Yes 5     No Cq 
D-101 CS2  F 24 Yes 6 Yes    No Cq 
D-102 San Pablo  F 6 Yes 6     37.07 
D-103  26/04/2016 F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-104   F  Yes 8     No Cq 
D-105   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-106   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-107   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-108   M        No Cq 
D-109   F  Yes 6     No Cq 
D-110   F  Yes 4     36.39 
D-111   F  Yes 4     36.36 
D-112  27/04/2016 F  Yes 4     No Cq 




D-114  28/04/2016 F  Yes 2     31.49 
D-118  29/04/2016 F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-119   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-121   F  Yes 3     27.63 
D-122  04/05/2016 M  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-123   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-124   F  Yes 4     36.12 
D-125   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-126   F  Yes 2     29.08 
D-127   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-128   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-129   F  Yes 5     No Cq 
D-130   M        No Cq 




D-132   M        No Cq 
D-133   M        No Cq 
D-134   F        No Cq 
D-135   F        33.37 
D-136   F        No Cq 
D-137   F        No Cq 
D-138   F        No Cq 
D-139   M        No Cq 
D-140   F        32.4 
D-141   M  Yes 3     33.11 
D-142   M  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-143   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-144   F  Yes 3     No Cq 




D-146   M  Yes 4     34.48 
D-147   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-148   M  Yes 1     No Cq 
D-149   F  Yes 1     31.98 
D-150           No Cq 
D-151   F  Yes 5     No Cq 
D-152   M  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-153   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-154           No Cq 
D-155   M  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-156   M  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-157   F  Yes 8     No Cq 
D-158   F  Yes 6     No Cq 




D-160   M  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-161   M  Yes 8     No Cq 
D-162   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-164   M  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-166   F  Yes 5     No Cq 
D-167   F  Yes 6     No Cq 
D-168   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-170   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-171   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-172   M  Yes 3     35.49 
D-173   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-174   M  Yes 6     No Cq 
D-175   F  Yes 3     No Cq 




D-177   M  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-181   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-182   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-183   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-184   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-185   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-186   M  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-187   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-189   M  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-190   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-191   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-192   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-193   F  Yes 6     No Cq 




D-195   F  Yes 5     No Cq 
D-196   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-197   M  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-198   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-199   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-200   M  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-201   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-202   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-203   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-204   F  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-205   F  Yes 2     No Cq 
D-206   M  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-207   M  Yes 3     No Cq 




D-209   F  Yes 4     No Cq 
D-210   M  Yes 3     No Cq 
D-212   F  Yes 3     No Cq 




APPENDIX 3: ECUADORIAN PLASMA SAMPLE METADATA, 2017 
Sex: M = male, F = female. Blank cells represent data that was not available. 












D214 Rioverde 17/03/2017 F 18 Yes 5      
D215 Borbon 02/04/2017 M 3 Yes 3      
D216 Rioverde/Palestina  M 3 Yes 5      
D217   M 64 Yes 5      
D218  18/04/2017 M 13        
D219  19/04/2017 F 55        
D220  23/05/2017  RN        
D221 HOSP 06/06/2017 M 22        
D222 CHAMNAGA-BORBON 08/06/2017 F 17 Yes 5      




D224 HOSP 13/06/2017 F 62        
D225 LAS PALMAS 19/06/2017 F 23 Yes 5      
D226 HOSP 20/06/2017 F 75        
D227 QUITO 20/06/2017 F 60 Yes 4      
D228 QUNINDE 22/06/2017 M 17        
D229 QUININDE 22/06/2017 F 32 Yes 2      
D230 QUINIDE 22/06/2017 F 1        
D231 EMERG 25/06/2017 M 63        
D232 NUEVA ESPERANZA 27/06/2017 M 22 Yes 9      
D233 QUINIDE 27/06/2017 M 1 Yes 4      
D234 TOLITA 1 29/09/2017 F 21 Yes 9      
D235 LAGARTO-RIOVERDE 30/09/2017 F 53 Yes 3      
D236 QUNINDE 06/07/2017 F 23        




D238 RIOVERDE 06/07/2017 M 4 months Yes 3      
D239 ATACAMES 06/07/2017 M 20        
D240 ATACAMES 06/07/2017  50        
D241 SAN LORENZO 06/07/2017 F 36 Yes 5      
D242 BORBON 06/07/2017 M 4 months Yes 10      
D243 MANABI 06/07/2017 M 29 Yes 6      
D244 QUINIDE 07/07/2017 M 20 Yes 4      
D245 MEJIA Y MALECON 10/07/2017 M 2 Yes 2      
D246 RIOVERDE 10/07/2017 M 4 months        
D247 LAS PALMAS 14/07/2017 M 8        
D248 SAN RAFAEL 14/07/2017 M 10        
D249 LAS PALMAS 14/07/2017 M 13        
D250 LAS PALMAS 14/07/2017 F 4        




D252            
D253            
D254            
D255            
D256            
D257            
D258            
D259            
D260            
D261            
D262            
D263            
D264            




D266            
D267            
D268            
D269            
D270            
D271            
D272            
D273            
D274            




APPENDIX 4: SIERRA LEONEAN FEBRILE PATIENT SAMPLE RT-PCR/PCR RESULTS 
 n=120. Green = Cq value <35.0, orange = Cq value 35.0 – 39.9, blue = testing performed in-country prior to this study. Samples that underwent 





























SL-001 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.11  
SL-002 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.76  
SL-003 Pos Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.78  




Neg No Ct 34.02 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.24  
SL-006 Neg Neg Neg No Ct 36.04 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.2  




SL-008 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.46  
SL-009 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.99 Yes 
SL-010 Neg Pos Neg No Ct 35.99 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.31  
SL-011 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.11  
SL-012 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.14  
SL-013 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.73 Yes 
SL-014 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.7 Yes 
SL-015 n/a Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.87  
SL-016 n/a Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.87  
SL-017 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.84 Yes 
SL-018 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.01 Yes 
SL-019 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.21  
SL-020 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.07  




SL-022 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 36.3 No Ct 30.22  
SL-023 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.17 Yes 
SL-024 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.75 Yes 
SL-025 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.19  
SL-026 Pos Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 32.32  
SL-027 Pos Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.91  
SL-028 Pos Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.81  
SL-029 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.56 Yes 
SL-030 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.81  




Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.42  
SL-033 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 32.25  







Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.45  
SL-036 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.31  
SL-037 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 32.3  
SL-038 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.89  
SL-039 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.92  
SL-040 n/a Neg Neg 33.55 32.24 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.75  
SL-041 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.22 Yes 
SL-042 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.53  
SL-043 n/a Neg Neg 33.16 32.64 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.69 Yes 
SL-044 n/a Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.5 Yes 
SL-045 Neg Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.58  
SL-046 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.01 Yes 
SL-047 Neg Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.61  







Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.43  
SL-050 Neg Neg Neg No Ct 36.14 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.15  




Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.61  
SL-053 Neg Neg Neg 34.43 34.01 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.61  
SL-054 n/a Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.47  
SL-055 Neg Neg Neg No Ct 35.93 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.53  
SL-056 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 33.89  
SL-057 Pos Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.95  
SL-058 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 32.62 Yes 
SL-059 Pos Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.36  
SL-060 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.06  




SL-062 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.54  
SL-063 n/a Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.68 Yes 
SL-064 n/a Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.31  
SL-065 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.88 Yes 
SL-066 n/a Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.7  
SL-067 n/a Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.62  
SL-068 Pos Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.63  
SL-069 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.92  
SL-070 Neg Neg Neg No Ct 35.82 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 35.56  
SL-071 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.05 Yes 
SL-072 n/a Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.26  
SL-073 n/a Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.45 Yes 
SL-074 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.66 Yes 




SL-076 Pos Pos Neg No Ct 36.54 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.44  
SL-077 n/a Neg Neg No Ct 34.83 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.63  
SL-078 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.61 Yes 
SL-079 n/a Neg Neg No Ct 35.34 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.51  
SL-080 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.74 Yes 
SL-081 Neg Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.79  
SL-082 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.78 Yes 
SL-083 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.71  
SL-084 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.54  
SL-085 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.53  
SL-086 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.66 Yes 
SL-087 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.03  
SL-088 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.43  




SL-090 Neg Neg Neg 34.76 33.31 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.3 Yes 
SL-091 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.33 Yes 
SL-092 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.2  
SL-093 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.18 Yes 
SL-094 Neg Neg Neg 38.14 33.38 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.19  
SL-095 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.42 Yes 
SL-096 Neg Neg Neg 32.21 30.85 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.7 Yes 
SL-097 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.17 Yes 
SL-098 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.75 Yes 
SL-099 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.31  
SL-100 Neg Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.19  
SL-101 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.24  
SL-102 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 27.71  




SL-104 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.72 Yes 
SL-105 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.65  
SL-106 Pos Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.85  
SL-107 n/a Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.43  
SL-108 Pos Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.76 Yes 
SL-109 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.6  
SL-110 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.1 Yes 
SL-111 n/a Neg Neg No Ct 34.81 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.55  
SL-112 n/a Neg Neg No Ct 35.38 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.55  
SL-113 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.41 Yes 
SL-114 n/a Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.53  
SL-115 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.91  
SL-116 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.11 Yes 




SL-118 Neg Neg Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.69  
SL-119 Pos Pos Neg No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.42  




APPENDIX 5: DE NOVO  ASSEMBLED SCAFFOLDS WITH PROTEIN SEQUENCE HOMOLOGY TO HUMAN VIRUSES 
Identified from metagenomic sequencing data from Sierra Leonean plasma samples using Kaiju.  





Matching accessions Family Genus Species 
SL014 1 8949 124.3 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL014 869 342 2.1 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL017 4 2022 30.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 5 1852 72.7 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 37 1111 69.6 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 79 907 37.9 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 122 808 6.5 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 158 741 48.6 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 184 698 9.3 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 334 554 76.5 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL017 391 518 8.1 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 409 509 39.4 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 480 474 8.7 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 568 424 2.5 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 597 413 8.5 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 612 404 8.4 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 621 399 3.4 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 746 344 3.0 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 769 337 3.4 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 802 326 4.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 810 324 5.9 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 820 320 9.2 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL017 835 315 5.2 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL024 2 2530 87.2 YP_009173866.1, Hepadnaviridae Orthohepadnavirus HBV 
SL024 279 599 12.1 YP_009173857.1, Hepadnaviridae Orthohepadnavirus HBV 
SL024 333 558 21.4 YP_009173867.1, Hepadnaviridae Orthohepadnavirus HBV 
SL024 13 1426 2.2 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL024 137 767 2.8 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL071 942 576 2.3 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL071 1049 532 3.1 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL071 1605 381 2.2 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL080 1 3249 14.6 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL080 2 2317 2.9 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL080 16 1499 5.4 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL080 24 1319 4.2 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL080 238 627 4.2 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 




SL093 1 5861 166.5 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL093 2 3221 260.1 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL093 1064 380 6.7 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL093 1261 314 3.2 NP_043570.1, Pegivirus Pegivirus C GBV-C 
SL096 2 2974 6.6 NP_066251.1, Filoviridae Ebolavirus EBOV Zaire 
SL096 22 1703 13.4 NP_066250.1, Filoviridae Ebolavirus EBOV Zaire 
SL096 186 906 7.3 NP_066243.1, Filoviridae Ebolavirus EBOV Zaire 
SL096 268 784 3.8 
NP_066246.1,NP_066247.1,NP
_066248.1, 
Filoviridae Ebolavirus EBOV Zaire 
SL096 289 752 2.2 NP_066251.1, Filoviridae Ebolavirus EBOV Zaire 
SL096 599 536 3.9 NP_066244.1, Filoviridae Ebolavirus EBOV Zaire 
SL097 9 1446 34.5 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 23 1183 4.4 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 28 1147 8.4 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL097 33 1035 9.8 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 36 950 11.1 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 61 758 12.1 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 63 749 20.3 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 71 715 2.5 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 81 663 3.0 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 141 472 7.5 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 169 408 3.8 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 175 401 12.2 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL097 206 322 10.5 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL108 228 652 16.2 NP_059433.1, Flaviviridae Flavivirus DENV-1 
SL110 21 1258 29.6 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 26 1239 192.0 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL110 83 923 255.6 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 96 878 107.2 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 97 874 19.7 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 120 793 128.6 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 131 773 26.3 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 136 766 102.4 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 138 758 11.2 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 164 717 5.9 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 177 694 99.3 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 192 665 10.4 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 199 654 37.4 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 206 647 12.7 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 215 637 23.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL110 253 607 19.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 255 604 10.9 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 259 599 15.0 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 261 598 7.4 NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 272 581 272.7 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 289 561 2.5 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 294 554 75.4 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 296 551 10.4 NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 303 549 63.4 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 316 541 353.4 NP_057853.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 317 541 39.2 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 323 532 2.3 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 328 525 184.3 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL110 335 523 130.8 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 342 517 4.1 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 357 504 28.5 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 363 498 24.0 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 367 495 25.1 NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 368 494 96.1 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 369 494 5.5 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 376 491 7.4 NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 380 490 12.5 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 383 488 92.3 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 408 471 11.8 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 411 469 9.3 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 417 467 16.9 NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL110 457 442 17.8 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 481 421 8.3 NP_057849.4,NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 483 421 4.1 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 487 418 82.6 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 494 412 6.1 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 499 409 40.6 NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 520 401 140.0 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 521 401 14.1 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 522 401 6.8 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 528 399 6.2 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 535 393 5.0 NP_057850.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 540 390 51.8 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 543 389 7.8 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL110 549 385 14.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 558 379 38.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 563 375 30.9 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 564 375 11.6 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 588 360 10.4 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 600 355 9.9 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 613 351 24.4 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 614 351 9.3 YP_009028572.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 618 350 103.5 NP_057851.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 619 350 8.0 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 632 345 23.0 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 634 344 5.5 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 640 342 66.6 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL110 654 337 95.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 655 337 13.4 NP_057851.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 656 337 7.7 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 660 336 296.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 665 333 6.7 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 668 331 107.0 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 674 329 13.2 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 683 325 245.1 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 692 322 6.3 YP_009028572.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 696 321 50.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 697 320 4.2 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 698 319 146.1 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 699 319 28.7 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




SL110 711 314 10.6 NP_057852.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 712 314 4.9 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 722 310 4.7 NP_057856.1, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 726 309 21.8 NP_057849.4, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 
SL110 731 307 4.1 NP_057857.2, Orthoretrovirinae Lentivirus HIV-1 




APPENDIX 6: ECUADORIAN FEBRILE PATIENT RT-PCR/PCR RESULTS, 2016.  
Green = Cq value <35.0, orange = Cq value 35.0 – 39.9, blue = testing performed in-country, prior to this study. Samples that underwent metagenomic 


















D-001 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.87  Yes 
D-002 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.93  Yes 
D-003 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.62   
D-004 No Ct No Ct 33.45 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.27   
D-005 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.37  Yes 
D-006 No Ct No Ct 34.05 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 27.71   
D-007 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.89   
D-008 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.87   




D-010 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.75  Yes 
D-011 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.03   
D-012 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 35.52 No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.45   
D-013 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.41   
D-014 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.03  Yes 
D-015 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.51   
D-016 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.50   
D-017 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct 33.64 No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.42   
D-018 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.1  Yes 
D-019 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.86   
D-020 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.46  Yes 
D-021 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.25   
D-022 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.58   




D-025 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.79   
D-026 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.07   
D-027 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.95   
D-028 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.21   
D-029 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.61  Yes 
D-030 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.87  Yes 
D-031 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.87   
D-032 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.18   
D-033 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 27.9   
D-034 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.03   
D-035 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.26  Yes 
D-036 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.55   
D-037 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.17   




D-039 No Ct 34.66 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.71   
D-040 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.75  Yes 
D-041 No Ct 36.5 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.59   
D-042 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.6   
D-043 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.49   
D-044 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.95   
D-045 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.21   
D-047 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.53  Yes 
D-048 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.01   
D-049 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.01   
D-050 No Ct No Ct 34.8 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.00   
D-051 31.14 30.65 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.53   
D-052 No Ct 32.88 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.78   




D-054 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.13   
D-055 No Ct 36.11 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.74   
D-057 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct 25.66 No Ct 28.79 OROV Yes 
D-058 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.91   
D-059 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.90   
D-060 25.21 34.58 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.96   
D-061 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.11   
D-062 24.17 27.03 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.23   
D-064 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.46   
D-065 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.16   
D-066 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.47   
D-067 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.79   
D-068 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.95   




D-070 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.12   
D-071 34.74 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.38   
D-072 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.21   
D-073 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.16   
D-074 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.57  Yes 
D-075 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.26  Yes 
D-076 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.32   
D-077 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.21   
D-078 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.76   
D-079 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.84   
D-080 No Ct 37.14 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.54   
D-081 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.15   
D-082 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.17   




D-084 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.36   
D-085 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.84   
D-086 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.06   
D-087 No Ct No Ct 35.33 No Ct 36.63 No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct 36.26 No Ct 29.45 OROV Yes 
D-088 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.31   
D-090 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.89   
D-091 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.64  Yes 
D-092 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.02   
D-093 34.79 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.36   
D-094 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.92   
D-095 No Ct 36.32 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.01   
D-096 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.89   
D-097 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.47   




D-099 No Ct 34.97 38.27 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.22   
D-100 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.05   
D-101 No Ct No Ct 32.34 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 27.72   
D-102 37.07 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.37   
D-103 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.15   
D-104 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.96   
D-105 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.51   
D-106 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.99   
D-107 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.95   
D-108 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.38   
D-109 No Ct 37.41 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.55   
D-110 36.39 34.18 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.02   
D-111 36.36 34.67 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 27.63   




D-113 32.39 30.18 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.66   
D-114 31.49 29.32 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.62   
D-118 No Ct 35.14 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.34   
D-119 No Ct 34.52 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.39   
D-121 27.63 26.74 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.55 ZIKV  
D-122 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.13   
D-123 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.05   
D-124 36.12 34.54 No Ct No Ct 35.76 No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.55 ZIKV Yes 
D-125 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.80   
D-126 29.08 29.6 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.56   
D-127 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.39   
D-128 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.67   
D-129 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.04   




D-131 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.71  Yes 
D-132 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.20   
D-133 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.99   
D-134 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.51   
D-135 33.37 34.31 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.19   
D-136 No Ct 37.51 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.76   
D-137 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.75   
D-138 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.48   
D-139 No Ct 35.73 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.30   
D-140 32.4 34.02 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.57   
D-141 33.11 35.44 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.60   
D-142 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.11   
D-143 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.04   




D-145 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.25   
D-146 34.48 32.95 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.17   
D-147 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.19   
D-148 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.69   
D-149 31.98 35.37 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.78   
D-150 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.10   
D-151 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.14   
D-152 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.07   
D-153 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.88   
D-154 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.15   
D-155 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct 25.75 No Ct 29.98 OROV Yes 
D-156 No Ct 35.52 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.31   
D-157 No Ct 26.77 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.43   




D-159 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.16   
D-160 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.30   
D-161 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.00   
D-162 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.47   
D-164 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.92   
D-166 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.53   
D-167 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.50   
D-168 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.48   
D-170 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.80   
D-171 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct 26.75 No Ct 28.99 OROV Yes 
D-172 35.49 34.38 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 27.99   
D-173 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.99   
D-174 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.12   




D-176 32.37 33.78 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.09   
D-177 No Ct 35.88 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.83   
D-181 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.98   
D-182 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 28.96   
D-183 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.16   
D-184 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.95   
D-185 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.14   
D-186 No Ct 35.29 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.46   
D-187 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.19   
D-189 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.44   
D-190 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.14   
D-191 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.50   
D-192 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.47   




D-194 37.72 28.11 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 27.98   
D-195 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.85   
D-196 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.89   
D-197 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.25   
D-198 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.81   
D-199 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.09   
D-200 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.25   
D-201 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.31   
D-202 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 29.89   
D-203 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.35   
D-204 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.05   
D-205 No Ct 34.06 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.47   
D-206 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct 30.87 No Ct 30.50 OROV Yes 




D-208 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 31.10   
D-209 No Ct 37.44 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.24   
D-210 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct 29.18 No Ct 30.29 OROV Yes 
D-212 No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct No Ct Negative No Ct No Ct No Ct 30.89   




APPENDIX 7: PRIMER MISMATCHES TO EXISITING OROV SEQUENCES 
OROV N gene sequences were aligned with published OROV oligonucleotide sequences 
(361) and newly designed reverse primer Ec2R. The number of bases at which variation 
















AM01_Manaus|1980 0 0 1 0 
AM03_Manaus|1980 0 0 1 0 
MA03_PortoFranco|1988 1 0 1 1 
PA22_Belem|1980 0 0 1 1 
PA28_SerraPelada|1994 0 0 1 1 
PA27_SerraPelada|1994 0 1 1 1 
PA39_Oriximina|1996 0 0 0 0 
MA06_BarraDaCorda|1993 1 0 1 0 
PA34_Oriximina|1996 0 0 1 0 
PA38_Oriximina|1996 0 0 1 0 
PA25_SerraPelada|1994 1 0 1 0 
PA26_SerraPelada|1994 2 0 1 0 
PA43_PortoDeMoz|2004 0 0 0 0 
PA17_Belem|1979 0 1 0 0 
PA29_Altamira|1994 0 1 0 0 
PA14_Ananindeua|1978 1 1 0 1 
RO05_Ariquemes|1991 0 1 0 0 
PA50_Maracana|2006 0 0 0 0 




PA49_MagalhaesBarata|2006 0 0 0 0 
PA47_MagalhaesBarata|2006 0 1 0 0 
PA41_Parauapebas|2003 0 0 0 0 
PA42_Parauapebas|2003 0 0 0 0 
PA05_Braganca|1967 0 1 0 1 
PA03_Belem|1961 1 1 0 1 
PA04_Belem|1961 1 1 0 1 
PA06_Belem|1968 0 0 0 0 
PA01_Ipixuna|1960 0 1 0 0 
PA09_Maracana|1971 0 0 0 0 
PA07_Maracana|1971 0 0 0 0 
PA08_Maracana|1971 0 0 0 0 
AC02_Xapuri|1996 0 1 0 0 
MA02_PortoFranco|1988 1 0 0 0 
RO01_MachadinhoDOeste|1990 1 1 0 0 
MG01_ArinoH29086s|2000 0 0 0 0 
OROV|087|Ecuador|2016 0 2 0 0 
OROV|057v|Ecuador|2016 0 2 0 0 
OROV|155v|Ecuador|2016 0 2 0 0 
OROV|171v|Ecuador|2016 0 2 0 0 
OROV|210v|Ecuador|2016 0 2 0 0 
OROV|206v|Ecuador|2016 0 2 0 0 
OROV|BeH389865|Brazil|1980 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH505764|Brazil|1991 1 0 0 0 




OROV|BeH498913|Brazil|1990 1 1 0 0 
OROV|GML444672|Panama|1989 0 0 0 0 
OROV|GML444477|Panama|1989 0 0 0 0 
OROV|GML444479|Panama|1989 0 0 0 0 
OROV|GML444911|Panama|1989 0 0 0 0 
OROV|GML445252|Panama|1989 0 0 0 0 
OROV|GML450093|Panama|1989 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeAn626990|Brazil|Callithrix|2000 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH472433|Brazil|1988 1 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH384192|Brazil|1980 0 0 1 1 
OROV|BeH384193|Brazil|1980 0 0 1 1 
OROV|BeH472435|Brazil|1988 1 0 1 1 
OROV|BeH356898|Brazil|1978 0 0 1 1 
OROV|BeH532490|Brazil|1994 0 1 1 1 
OROV|BeH532500|Brazil|1994 0 0 1 1 
OROV|BeH543091|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 1 
OROV|BeH366781|Brazil|1979 1 0 1 1 
OROV|BeH385591|Brazil|1980 0 0 1 1 
OROV|BeAr473358|Brazil|Culicoides|1988 0 0 1 0 
OROV|GML480914|Panama|1989 0 0 0 1 
OROV|PAN481126|Panama|1999 0 0 0 1 
OROV|TRVL9760|Trinidad_and_Tobago|1955 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH29086_29090|Brazil|1961 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH532314|Brazil|1994 1 0 1 0 




OROV|BeAr136921|Brazil|Culex|1968 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeAn206119|Brazil|sloth|1971 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeAn208402|Brazil|sloth|1971 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeAn208819|Brazil|sloth|1971 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeAn208823|Brazil|sloth|1971 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeAn19991|Brazil|sloth|1960 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeAn19991c|Brazil|sloth|1960 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH381114|Brazil|1980 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH669315|Brazil|2003 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH669314|Brazil|2003 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH521086|Brazil|1993 1 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH543733|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH543857|Brazil|1996 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH543639|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH543880|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH543760|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH541863|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH355186|Brazil|1978 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH504514|Brazil|1991 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH622544|Brazil|2002 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH544552|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH472204|Brazil|1988 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH472200|Brazil|1988 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH475248|Brazil|1988 0 0 1 0 




OROV|BeH543087|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH543033|Brazil|1996 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH271815|Brazil|1975 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH271078|Brazil|1975 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH390233|Brazil|1980 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH379693|Brazil|1980 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759531|Brazil|2009 1 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH758669|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759018|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759525|Brazil|2009 1 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759023|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH75955|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759021|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759022|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759024|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759025|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759040|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759146|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759529|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759620|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH758687|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759541|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759042|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759044|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 




OROV|BeH759041|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759043|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759483|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH759562|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH244576|Brazil|2009 0 1 0 0 
OROV|BeH708717|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH706890|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 1 
OROV|BeH706893|Brazil|2009 0 0 0 1 
OROV|BeAr366927|Brazil|Culicoides|1979 0 1 0 0 
OROV|01_812_98|Peru|1998 0 0 0 0 
OROV|IQT1690|Peru|1992 0 0 0 0 
OROV|IQT1690b|Peru|1995 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH707157|Brazil|2006 0 0 1 0 
OROV|BeH682426|Brazil|2004 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH708139|Brazil|2006 0 1 0 0 
OROV|BeH505768|Brazil|1991 0 1 0 0 
OROV|BeH505442|Brazil|1991 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH505663|Brazil|1991 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH682431|Brazil|2004 0 0 0 0 
OROV|IQT7085|Peru|1998 0 0 0 0 
OROV|BeH505805|Brazil|1991 0 0 0 0 
OROV|DEI216|Peru|1992 0 0 0 0 
OROV|OBS9478|Peru|2000 0 0 0 0 
OROV|GML444839|Panama|1989 0 0 0 0 




OROV|IQT4083|Peru|1997 0 0 0 0 
OROV|MD023|Peru|1993 0 0 0 0 
OROV|IQT4083b|Peru|1997 0 0 0 0 
OROV|IQE7894|Peru|2008 0 1 0 0 
OROV|IQT7085b|Peru|1998 0 0 0 0 
Count of 1 difference 17 20 41 21 
Count of 2 difference 2 6 0 0 




APPENDIX 8: POSITIONS IN THE OROV GENOME AT WHICH SNPS WERE IDENTIFIED BETWEEN THE PATIENT AND CULTURED GENOMES, FOR EACH ISOLATE   
Variance within each genome is also shown as the percentage of reads at that position showing a particular base. Seg. = segment. Seg. pos. = segment 






Depth A (%) C (%) G (%) T (%) 
Culture 
cons. 
Depth A (%) C (%) G (%) T (%) 
D-057 M 59 W 21 23.8 0.0 0.0 76.2 A 405 95.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-087 S 300 T 16 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 C 52430 0.0 99.9 0.0 0.0 
D-087 M 59 T 23 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 A 85 96.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-087 M 307 Y 1055 0.0 23.7 0.0 76.3 T 2419 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8 
D-087 M 1565 Y 286 0.0 21.0 0.0 79.0 T 5365 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8 
D-087 M 1858 G 129 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 R 5135 55.5 0.0 44.4 0.0 
D-087 M 3097 M 55 29.1 70.9 0.0 0.0 A 6677 99.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-087 M 3650 G 28 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 A 3710 99.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 




D-087 L 312 R 33 75.8 0.0 24.2 0.0 A 9936 99.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-087 L 1855 R 56 25.0 0.0 75.0 0.0 A 3997 99.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-087 L 3114 A 315 99.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 C 1923 0.0 99.9 0.0 0.0 
D-087 L 3875 T 775 0.0 1.4 0.0 98.6 C 11091 0.0 99.9 0.0 0.0 
D-155 S 107 G 19 5.3 0.0 94.7 0.0 A 4060 98.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-155 S 880 C 6 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 T 14890 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.7 
D-155 M 160 G 17 17.6 0.0 82.4 0.0 A 10115 92.9 0.0 6.7 0.0 
D-155 M 1586 K 35 0.0 0.0 22.9 77.1 G 49818 0.0 0.0 99.7 0.0 
D-155 M 2191 R 14 71.4 0.0 28.6 0.0 G 46084 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
D-155 M 2821 W 729 30.0 0.0 0.0 70.0 T 59384 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.9 
D-155 M 2931 M 370 23.2 76.8 0.0 0.0 C 55496 0.0 99.8 0.0 0.0 
D-155 M 4033 C 123 0.0 98.4 1.6 0.0 G 8704 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.0 
D-155 L 6 A 110 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 T 587 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.3 




D-155 L 1664 R 185 65.4 0.0 34.6 0.0 A 45106 99.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-155 L 2219 R 119 73.9 0.0 26.1 0.0 A 13427 99.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-155 L 3321 S 57 0.0 45.6 54.4 0.0 C 19968 0.0 99.9 0.0 0.0 
D-155 L 5126 K 4019 0.0 0.0 26.5 73.5 G 23406 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.0 
D-155 L 6206 R 572 75.0 0.0 24.8 0.0 A 8425 99.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-171 S 41 G 5 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 A 1008 97.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-171 M 144 C 71 0.0 95.8 0.0 0.0 T 6256 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.8 
D-171 M 1940 Y 2955 0.0 57.5 0.0 42.5 T 86762 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 
D-171 L 5165 Y 1251 0.0 24.7 0.0 75.3 T 34965 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.7 
D-171 L 6298 Y 483 0.0 70.6 0.0 29.4 T 7615 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.4 
D-171 L 6308 M 61 44.3 55.7 0.0 0.0 A 7409 99.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-206 M 1060 T 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 88.9 A 43090 99.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-206 M 3968 C 43 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 T 15874 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.6 




D-206 L 222 Y 2013 0.0 69.0 0.0 30.9 C 35017 0.0 98.4 0.0 0.0 
D-206 L 223 Y 2040 0.0 31.2 0.0 68.8 T 35739 0.0 1.8 0.0 97.0 
D-206 L 1041 R 8270 21.0 0.0 79.0 0.0 G 48064 0.0 0.0 99.6 0.0 
D-206 L 2143 S 1024 0.0 63.8 36.1 0.0 C 15102 0.0 99.7 0.0 0.0 
D-206 L 4093 R 368 75.8 0.0 24.2 0.0 A 27954 99.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-206 L 4381 S 110 0.0 66.4 33.6 0.0 G 30517 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.0 
D-210 M 3929 Y 5066 0.0 53.2 0.0 46.8 C 17041 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 
D-210 M 4376 W 230 53.0 0.0 0.0 46.5 T 365 0.0 0.0 0.0 99.5 
D-210 L 91 T 49 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.0 C 5779 0.0 99.7 0.0 0.0 
D-210 L 217 W 4454 29.8 0.0 0.0 68.4 T 25397 0.0 1.3 0.0 94.0 
D-210 L 3238 R 4655 70.3 0.0 29.7 0.0 A 26664 99.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
D-210 L 4111 R 466 36.3 0.0 63.7 0.0 G 29698 0.0 0.0 99.9 0.0 




APPENDIX 9: MULTIPLEX TILING PCR PRIMER DETAILS  
Tm = melting temperature.  
Primer name Sequence (5’ to 3’) 
Primer 
pool 








OROV_S_1_LEFT CATTTTCAACGATGTACCACAACGG 1 25 61.34 44 S 55 80 
OROV_S_1_RIGHT TACAACCCTTCACCTCTGCCAA 1 22 61.56 50 S 435 413 
OROV_S_2_LEFT TGTCAGGATACCTAGCTCGCTG 2 22 61.33 54.55 S 327 349 
OROV_S_2_RIGHT TCCAAATTGGCGCAAGAAGTCT 2 22 61.08 45.45 S 728 706 
OROV_S_3_LEFT GGATGCGTGAAGAAATAGTTGCTG 1 24 60.73 45.83 S 615 639 
OROV_S_3_RIGHT GTGTGCTCCCAATTCAAAAATACGT 1 25 60.79 40 S 948 923 
OROV_M_1_LEFT GCAACAAACAGTGACAATGGCG 2 22 61.67 50 M 16 37 
OROV_M_1_RIGHT ACTGGGTTGCATTCAGACCAAT 2 22 60.49 45.45 M 300 278 
OROV_M_2_LEFT TGTTAAGAGTACAACTGCCTTTAGTAAGA 1 29 60.44 34.48 M 195 224 




OROV_M_3_LEFT GTCGGAACTACTTCAACATCAGGT 2 24 60.56 45.83 M 457 481 
OROV_M_3_RIGHT TGGGCAGCTAGTAAAAGGGTGT 2 22 61.63 50 M 847 825 
OROV_M_4_LEFT CTTCTGCCATTGTTTTATCCAGTAACC 1 27 60.84 40.74 M 739 766 
OROV_M_4_RIGHT ATTCACCTGCTCTGCCAGTTCT 1 22 61.95 50 M 1099 1077 
OROV_M_5_LEFT TGGCTTAATATTGATGGAATTTGTTTCACC 2 30 61.42 33.33 M 996 1026 
OROV_M_5_RIGHT GCAAGATTCCCTTTGAACATGCA 2 23 60.31 43.48 M 1384 1361 
OROV_M_6_LEFT GACTAACAAATGCGGGAGTTGC 1 22 60.41 50 M 1278 1300 
OROV_M_6_RIGHT TCATTCTGTGTGCATCTTGAGCA 1 23 60.81 43.48 M 1697 1674 
OROV_M_7_LEFT TGATCTGCTTTCAAAGAACTTAATCACA 2 28 60.01 32.14 M 1584 1612 
OROV_M_7_RIGHT AGTCAGACCTATAAGCTGCAGCA 2 23 61.45 47.83 M 1946 1923 
OROV_M_8_LEFT GCAGCAGGCATAATTACAAAATGATATGT 1 29 61.38 34.48 M 1814 1843 
OROV_M_8_RIGHT AGGGGTTTGACTTAGGAATTTCGT 1 24 60.2 41.67 M 2201 2177 
OROV_M_9_LEFT TGGTCGGTGTGCTAAAATTTGCT 2 23 61.56 43.48 M 2090 2113 




OROV_M_10_LEFT GCCACTGCAACTTAGAATTTACTGC 1 25 61.13 44 M 2393 2418 
OROV_M_10_RIGHT TGTTCCTATTTCGGATTCAATTGCCT 1 26 61.31 38.46 M 2800 2774 
OROV_M_11_LEFT TGCAACTGGGACAAGACTTATAAGG 2 25 60.8 44 M 2698 2723 
OROV_M_11_RIGHT AGGTCCAGTTGTGTACACTTTCTG 2 24 60.68 45.83 M 3058 3034 
OROV_M_12_LEFT TTAGGCGTCGGCTACCACTTAG 1 22 61.84 54.55 M 2944 2966 
OROV_M_12_RIGHT TGAAAAGATGCACTCAATTTATCCCCA 1 27 61.46 37.04 M 3381 3354 
OROV_M_13_LEFT AAAAGATTGGTAGTGAAGCATCGC 2 24 60.14 41.67 M 3260 3284 
OROV_M_13_RIGHT TGGATTCAGTCTGGTGCAAGAC 2 22 60.55 50 M 3625 3603 
OROV_M_14_LEFT TGGGTCTGGCAATCCTAAATTTGA 1 24 60.51 41.67 M 3513 3537 
OROV_M_14_RIGHT TGGGGTGAGATTACAATGTTGCT 1 23 60.25 43.48 M 3903 3880 
OROV_M_15_LEFT GCTGAAGGCATATCATGTTCTATAAATGC 2 29 61.27 37.93 M 3796 3825 
OROV_M_15_RIGHT AGCCCAATATTTCCCTAATCCTGAAA 2 26 60.36 38.46 M 4159 4133 
OROV_M_16_LEFT AAAAGAAGAAGACCTCCAATGTGGA 1 25 60.4 40 M 4053 4078 




OROV_L_1_LEFT ACAATCTCAAAATGTCGCAACTGTT 2 25 60.45 36 L 33 57 
OROV_L_1_RIGHT TTATCAGGTGTGCAAAAGCGCA 2 22 61.65 45.45 L 276 254 
OROV_L_2_LEFT CAGAGCTGCAAACCTTGAGTATAGA 1 25 60.63 44 L 168 193 
OROV_L_2_RIGHT TCATCATCCCGGAATTTGCCAA 1 22 60.62 45.45 L 564 542 
OROV_L_3_LEFT AGATTTCATGAATACAATCGGGCCA 2 25 60.92 40 L 465 490 
OROV_L_3_RIGHT CAGCCAGCTGAAATTTGGTCCT 2 22 61.41 50 L 879 857 
OROV_L_4_LEFT AGGGAGTGATGTCTAAGTATGGTGA 1 25 60.58 44 L 758 783 
OROV_L_4_RIGHT TGCACCGGTTCTATTTTCCTGT 1 22 60.22 45.45 L 1191 1169 
OROV_L_5_LEFT TGATGGATATATCGTCAGACATCAAAAAGT 2 30 61.08 33.33 L 1082 1112 
OROV_L_5_RIGHT CCCACATTTCTACACTGCAGGC 2 22 61.77 54.55 L 1511 1489 
OROV_L_6_LEFT CAAGTCACACATAACTTGTCTCAAGTT 1 27 60.2 37.04 L 1408 1435 
OROV_L_6_RIGHT GCCTGTTGTTGTCTTGAAAGTGG 1 23 60.73 47.83 L 1789 1766 
OROV_L_7_LEFT GCTTAGTGATGCCAAGCTCAGA 2 22 60.68 50 L 1655 1677 




OROV_L_8_LEFT AGAGTCTAGAGTTTGATAAGTTACTAGGCT 1 30 60.99 36.67 L 1898 1928 
OROV_L_8_RIGHT TGCTTTTCATGCAATCCTTTGGAA 1 24 60.2 37.5 L 2310 2286 
OROV_L_9_LEFT AAATCCATTTGGTTCCCGGGAA 2 22 60.49 45.45 L 2212 2234 
OROV_L_9_RIGHT ACCAATTTTAATGCATGATTTCGAGCT 2 27 60.85 33.33 L 2572 2545 
OROV_L_10_LEFT TAATTTTGTGAGGAGCCGGGTG 1 22 60.88 50 L 2472 2494 
OROV_L_10_RIGHT TGTCCTTTGTTGAAGAACCCGA 1 22 60.09 45.45 L 2886 2864 
OROV_L_11_LEFT TGAGGATTTGAAACAATCTATCCCAGA 2 27 60.31 37.04 L 2709 2736 
OROV_L_11_RIGHT AAGACCCGGATTGCAGGTTTTC 2 22 61.4 50 L 3122 3100 
OROV_L_12_LEFT TGATAAGCGAACCAGGTGACTCT 1 23 61.38 47.83 L 2996 3019 
OROV_L_12_RIGHT ACCCTCTGGTCCAATATCGTAGTG 1 24 61.48 50 L 3357 3333 
OROV_L_13_LEFT TCTTATATCCTGCTGAGAGGAAGAGA 2 26 60.18 42.31 L 3248 3274 
OROV_L_13_RIGHT ACATTGTCATCTGGCAACTTGTTTTG 2 26 61.4 38.46 L 3618 3592 
OROV_L_14_LEFT ACATTATTAGAGGGGGAAGCCCT 1 23 60.64 47.83 L 3517 3540 




OROV_L_15_LEFT AGGCTATCTGCAACACAAACCG 2 22 61.45 50 L 3826 3848 
OROV_L_15_RIGHT AAGCCTCAGAATGTCGATCTGC 2 22 60.74 50 L 4195 4173 
OROV_L_16_LEFT AGGAAACTATCATCTCCAATCTTGCA 1 26 60.35 38.46 L 4087 4113 
OROV_L_16_RIGHT TGTGCTGGATTTTGTATTGACAGAGA 1 26 60.97 38.46 L 4518 4492 
OROV_L_17_LEFT TCCAGAGTTATTGGTCACAAAAGGTG 2 26 61.41 42.31 L 4404 4430 
OROV_L_17_RIGHT GCATTTTGCATGCTGATTGTCCT 2 23 60.93 43.48 L 4835 4812 
OROV_L_18_LEFT CGCCTTCTGTCTCATGAATGATCC 1 24 61.56 50 L 4725 4749 
OROV_L_18_RIGHT TCGTAACACACTTGGTAAAATCTAGTCA 1 28 60.69 35.71 L 5094 5066 
OROV_L_19_LEFT TCATACAAAGCACAAAACTCAGAGAGA 2 27 60.9 37.04 L 4967 4994 
OROV_L_19_RIGHT TCAGATGCCAAGAAAGTATCGGC 2 23 60.99 47.83 L 5349 5326 
OROV_L_20_LEFT ACACAAGGCACAAATCTCGTCC 1 22 61.39 50 L 5247 5269 
OROV_L_20_RIGHT AGCTGCCTGGAATAGCCACTTA 1 22 61.49 50 L 5619 5597 
OROV_L_21_LEFT AGTTTGATGCAGATAAATCAGACGAAAA 2 28 60.32 32.14 L 5507 5535 




OROV_L_22_LEFT GGTACTTCTATTCTATATTGCCCACCC 1 27 60.8 44.44 L 5813 5840 
OROV_L_22_RIGHT GCCATTTGGTCATTTTCACTGCC 1 23 61.42 47.83 L 6225 6202 
OROV_L_23_LEFT GTTAATGAAATCCACATCCTTATTGAGCT 2 29 60.44 34.48 L 6111 6140 
OROV_L_23_RIGHT TCTGTGGACCACTGATTCGTCT 2 22 61.08 50 L 6495 6473 
OROV_L_24_LEFT TCGACTTTCTTGACATGGGGTTT 1 23 60.43 43.48 L 6392 6415 
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